



**Mbolo C. Yufanyi Movuh**

**Power: a Driving Factor of  
Forest Policy in Cameroon**

---

**Example of Community  
Forestry**




---

POWER: A DRIVING FACTOR OF  
FOREST POLICY IN CAMEROON

---

EXAMPLE OF COMMUNITY  
FORESTRY

---



*Action and reaction are equal and opposite and when they are not,  
"Power" is a variable*



---

**POWER: A DRIVING FACTOR OF  
FOREST POLICY IN CAMEROON**

---

**EXAMPLE OF COMMUNITY  
FORESTRY**

---

A Case Study of the South West Region of Cameroon

Contributing to the comparative project:  
Stakeholders' Interests and Power as Drivers of  
Community Forestry

**Mbolo C. Yufanyi Movuh**



**Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the award of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)**

at the

**Faculty of Forest Science and Forest Ecology  
Georg-August-University Goettingen, Germany**

By

**Mbolo C. Yufanyi Movuh**

February 2013

Goettingen, Germany

1. Gutachterin / 1. Gutachter: **Prof. Dr. Max Krott**

2. Gutachterin / 2. Gutachter: **Prof. Dr. Mitlöhner**

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 14 April 2013

**Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek**

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

1. Aufl. - Göttingen : Cuvillier, 2013

Zugl.: Göttingen, Univ., Diss., 2013

© CUVILLIER VERLAG, Göttingen 2013

Nonnenstieg 8, 37075 Göttingen

Telefon: 0551-54724-0

Telefax: 0551-54724-21

[www.cuvillier.de](http://www.cuvillier.de)

Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Ohne ausdrückliche Genehmigung des Verlages ist es nicht gestattet, das Buch oder Teile daraus auf fotomechanischem Weg (Fotokopie, Mikrokopie) zu vervielfältigen.

1. Auflage, 2013

Gedruckt auf umweltfreundlichem, säurefreiem Papier aus nachhaltiger Forstwirtschaft.

978-3-95404-515-0



**Chair of Forest- and Nature Conservation Policy and Forest History**  
**Faculty of Forest Science and Forest Ecology**  
**Georg-August University Göttingen**  
**GERMANY**

This research is part of the comparative research on **“Stakeholders’ Interests and Power as Drivers of Community Forestry,”** conducted by the Community Forestry Working Group. Therefore, some parts have been prepared in the context of team work.

Supervision: Prof. Dr. Max Krott  
Coordination: Dr. Carsten Schusser

**Community Forestry Country Studies:**

1. Nepal: Rosan R. Devkota
2. Indonesia: Ahmad Maryudi
3. Namibia: Carsten Schusser
4. Cameroon: M. C. Yufanyi Movuh
5. Albania: Manjolla Salla
6. Germany: Carsten Schusser
7. Vietnam: Duy Bach Ngo
8. China: Haiyun Y. Chen and Ting Zhu

**This research presented in this book is funded by the Hans Boeckler Foundation (Hans Böckler Stiftung) and in part by the German Research Society (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft—DFG)**



This Work is Dedicated to My Entire Family  
&  
The African/Black Communities All Around The World

---

## Acknowledgements

---

I would like to use this opportunity to express my profound appreciation and gratitude to all those who gave me the possibility and support to complete this PhD.

I am deeply indebted to my supervisor in Goettingen, Germany, Prof. Dr. Max Krott, for granting me the possibility and liberty to work in my own way while supervising my PhD. His help, stimulating suggestions and encouragement helped me throughout the research, preparation of scientific publications and writing of this framework book.

Also in this manner I want to first of all thank my colleagues of the Hans Boeckler Stiftung for the wonderful financial and moral support they gave in making my PhD Studies possible, especially in the collection of the data for this study in Cameroon. Also many thanks to Dr. Bettina Roß and the Göttinger Graduiertenschule Gesellschaftsschaften (GGG) for the family friendly financial grant that enabled my smooth concentration at the end phase of my PhD.

Many thanks and appreciation also goes to my present and former colleagues in the Community Forestry Working Group at the Institute of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy, in Goettingen. I would like to especially thank Dr. Ahmad Maryudi and Dr. Carsten Schusser for their academic and content support, enabling me to complete this framework book.

Special thanks to Mr. Okenye Mambo from the GIZ Cameroon and all the staff at the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) in Yaoundé and Buea, who provided me with inside information about community forestry and about the different villages in the “Program for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources (PSMNR)”, and helped in the selection of the villages for my case study. Not forgetting





all the field staff in the region, as well as the communities and councils who facilitated my access to the field, especially Mr. Jean Pierre Kebou, Mr. Serge Djomo, Mr. Antoine Bidima, Mr. Mor-Achankap Bakia (all from MINFOF Buea), Chief Lordson Asek (Nguti Council) and Alex Wellenbeck, just to name a few.

I am bound and indebted to Chief Adolf Nwese and Prince Cletus Nwese of the Korup Rainforest Ecotourism Organisation/Korup Guide Association (KREO/KOGAN) and their families, all in Mundemba, for the sincere and familial assistance they afforded me. This goes especially to Prince Nwese, who was with me on many of my trips in the South West and Central regions of Cameroon. I would not have made it without him. Without forgetting the assistance and help of Mr. Nche Njungu Thomas, Assistant Mayor of Idenau, West Coast district – Cameroon, I extend my deepest and special gratitude.

To all my comrades, brothers and sisters in the struggle for freedom and justice and against racism here in Germany and elsewhere in the world, I express my deepest thanks for your support and solidarity. Merited thanks go to comrades of The VOICE Refugee Forum Network and The Caravan for the rights of Refugees and Migrants in Germany. To the African/Black Community here in Germany and the world over, I say UHURU, which means FREEDOM.

Last but not least, I would like to give my special thanks to my most dear wife, Mai Zeidani Yufanyi, who was of great help in difficult times and whose patience and love enabled me to complete this work. Special thanks to my daughter, Nkume Yufanyi Movuh, and to my son Niboh Yufanyi Movuh, who might not realise it now, but they are the driving forces of my convictions to study and also finish this work. To my family in Cameroon, Germany, Palestine and Israel, I express my heartfelt gratitude. This work also goes to my deceased parents, who would certainly have been proud of my accomplishments and are definitely proud wherever they are now. To them and also to my uncle, Papa John Mbolu, I owe a great deal of knowledge, strength and spirituality.

---

## Summary

---

This framework book is a synthesis of the author's (Yufanyi Movuh) PhD study, which is comprised of several scientific papers, all published in international journals, instead of a monographic dissertation. Based on the numerous publications in journals and working papers within the Community Forestry Working Group (CFWG) at the institute of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy in Göttingen, this synthesized framework not only summarises but also analyzes forest policy in Cameroon through the example of community forestry. Power being the core of the analysis as a driving factor of forest policy in Cameroon, the framework questions the "Role that Power plays in forest policy in Cameroon, with community forestry as an example". With scientific questions such as: (1) How can power be described in the context of forest policy case study of community forestry? (2) What are the power processes? and (3) what outcomes of this power processes could be observed? The framework analyses the importance of power through political and critical theories, connecting them with other theories and concepts formulated by the Community Forestry Working Group, backed by empirical data collected from field studies in Cameroon between 2008 and 2011.

The framework book is divided into two parts. The first part entails a synthesis of the published papers, describing and explaining how each contributes to scientific forest policy discourse and practice, with "Power" as a driving factor. The synthesis framework book serves as answers to the research questions in connection with the scientific forest policy discourse and the practical policy discourse in Cameroon, as listed below:



1. How is the theoretical framework applied in the publications by the author linked to the scientific discourse of forest policy?
2. How is the methodology applied in the publications by the author linked to the scientific discourse of forest policy with emphasis on field research in community forestry?
3. How do the results of the publications by the author correspond to the existing scientific results on community forestry in Cameroon?
4. What is the relevance of the results of the publications by the author for forest policy and forest policy discourse as practiced in Cameroon?

Out of the five scientific publications on which this synthesis is based, the author of this framework was the main contributing author in three (see publications 1, 4, 5, below), an equally contributing author in one (see publication 2, below) and a co-author in one of the publications (see publication 3, below), within the Community Forestry Working Group. Each publication delves into at least one of the research questions.

A list of the scientific publications introducing the content of part two of the synthetic framework book is presented below:

1. Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2012). The colonial heritage and post-colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry by the example of Cameroon. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 15, 70-77. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004)
2. Maryudi, A., Devkota, Rosan, R., Schusser C., Yufanyi, C., Salla, M., Aurenhammer, H., Rotchanaphatharawit, R. and Krott, M. (2012). Back to basics: Considerations in evaluating the outcomes of community forestry. *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol. 14(2), 1-5. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017)
3. Schusser, C., Krott, M., Devkota, R., Maryudi, A., Salla, M., Yufanyi Movuh, M., C. (2012). Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research. *AFJZ*, Vol. 183(3/4), 75-83. ISSN: 0002-5852
4. Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. and Schusser, C. (2012): Power, the Hidden Factor in Development Cooperation. An Example of Community Forestry in Cameroon. *Open Journal of Forestry*, Vol. 02, No. 04, p. 240-251. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030](http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030)
5. Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2013). Analyzing the Establishment of Com-

munity Forestry (CF) and its processes. Examples from the South West Region of Cameroon. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol 6, No. 1, p. 76-89. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v6n1p76>.

Based on the above publications, the synthetic framework paper establishes an hypothesis that: “Power is a driving factor in forest policy in Cameroon.” It uses results from the field study in Cameroon, conducted in the framework of the comparative research on community forestry in six countries. The comparative research, conducted within the Community Forestry Working Group, formulated, established and tested model concepts on Actor-centred-power (ACP) and Powerful Interest Desired Outcomes (PIDO), analyzing the interests of powerful stakeholders and outcomes in community forestry. These models are presently being used to analyze the aforementioned comparative research study on “Stakeholders’ Interests and Power as Drivers of Community Forestry”. The comparative study hypothesizes that “governance processes and outcomes in community forestry depend mostly on interests of the powerful external stakeholders”. The author of this piece has also produced data to be used for the comparative research analysis of the countries represented in the Community Forestry Working Group, in which he represents Cameroon.

Part of the comparative study results for Cameroon forms the basis for analysis of the framework book. This can be found in detail in publications 1, 4 and 5 of the published scientific papers.

As a theoretical concept underlying this synthesis, Actor-Centred-Power (ACP) is described in connection with political and critical theories, specifically: Max Weber’s theory on power, Max Krott’s theory on forest policy, post-colonial theory, post-development theory, and the decentralization and devolution theory. Actor-Centred Power (ACP), is posited as the starting point and blueprint for the investigation and empirical analysis of the implementation of forest policy in Cameroon, with community forestry as a practical example. The social relationships, influences and interests were investigated in the Actor-Centred-Power theoretical concept. These factors were subsequently analyzed through the three sources or elements of power, namely: Trust, (Dis-) Incentive and Coercion. Finally, a simple concept was suggested,

strictly reducing the social relations between community forestry actors in Cameroon to the basics of social interaction.

The Actor-Centred-Power concept defines power as “a social relationship, where an actor A alternates the behaviour of actor B without recognizing B’s will”; The first element of power, Trust, is when B changes his/her behaviour, by accepting stakeholder A’s information without check. The second element, **Incentives** (or disincentives, depending on the situation), are financial or non-financial factors (money, luxuries, or any other kind of benefit) that alter B’s behaviour by motivation (demonstration). The third element, **Coercion**, on the other hand, is the practice in which A forces B to behave in an involuntary manner, whether by violence or threat of violence. In the study, it was found that in any given situation, all three elements may overlap with one another, while distinctive processes can be used to analyse each power source separately (publication 4).

The synthetic framework book also entails an implementation of post-colonial theory. Post-colonial theory is analysed here as “a process of continuity”, forming “an intermixture of events, processes and actors that transcend any form of periodization [...], acknowledging the continuing domination of post-colonial societies by former colonial masters in one form or another [...] in the field of nature and forest policy formulation and implementation”.

Also, related to post-colonial theory, the synthetic framework analyses post-development theory through community forestry (publication 1). Post-development theory describes how the whole concept of development and practice is influenced by Western-Northern hegemonies, with blueprints of their values over the rest of the world. Post-development theory critiques development projects such as community forestry by virtue of the underlying development theory justifying them. It deconstructs development as a tool used by Western societies to define development concerns and dominate the power relations arena, in which the interests of development “experts”, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other western development agencies, define development priorities while excluding the voices of the people they are supposed to “develop”, with intrinsically negative consequences. It argues that attempting to overcome this inequality,



the stage should be taken over by non-Western, non-Northern peoples, their priorities and concerns; rejecting development in its present form, calling for an alternative to development, and thus moving beyond development (publication 4).

Furthermore, the framework analyzes the establishment of the community forestry processes in Cameroon, questioning the extent to which the community forestry models can act as a tool of decentralization and devolution. It describes the decentralization of forest resource management as any act by which the central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions, thereby enhancing efficiency, participation, equity, and environmental sustainability. Community forestry is defined as any forest practice which directly involves local forest users in the common decision-making processes and implementation of forestry activities, as a form of decentralization (publication 5).

While the above political and critical theories establish the rationale behind forest policy discourse and practice as presented in this synthetic framework, another theoretical concept is used for the evaluation of social, economic and ecological outcomes of community forestry based on the core policy objectives (publication 2). Furthermore, the basic methodology behind the comparative research objectives was conceptualized in the publication, “Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research” (publication 3).

Whatever the case, for a comprehensive and sound power research analysis in connection to forest policy, certain criteria must be applied. First, we need to focus in detail on single actors and their interactions, i.e., on the substance of social behaviour. Nevertheless, the phenomenon called “Power” should be inclusively covered with all its elements distinctively defined. We also need a theory of power which, while being independent of any methodology, is generally applicable, especially as the present study of community forestry in Cameroon is part of a comparative analysis of community forestry in different locations and countries.

The relevance of the findings of these publications and the synthetic framework for scientific forest policy discourse is that, in the new forest policies in general and community forestry in particular, a lot still has



to be done to involve the main stakeholder (the communities), who are being affected and who are crucial for the success of these policies. With the present trend, it can only be said that overwhelming positive outcomes for the local forest user are still far-fetched. Colonialism, in its different forms, was used in the past to establish coercive forest policies. Today's forest policy in Cameroon is still shaped by the colonial tradition and dominated by the Western-centric mindset about nature. The colonial logic of resource accumulation, including building financial capital on forest exploitation, has been replicated, with some modifications, by the Cameroonian neo-colonial state and propagated by development aid agencies. One of these replications entails the use of coercion as an instrument of power. But as coercion builds resentment and resistance from other stakeholders, in particular the communities involved, it tends to be the most obvious but least effective form of power. This is because it demands a lot of control. This is why modifications in the form of "Trust" and "Incentive" come into play, though these can also be levied as coercive "Trust" and "Incentive". The recommendations entail what could be of best interest to the people who are most affected by these policies and about whom these policies are all about. It also could be relevant to the indigenous communities or individual forest users in discovering ways of forming powerful alliances, enhancing their stakes for empowerment.



## Table of Contents

Summary	ix
1. Introduction and Background	1
2. Theoretical Framework	9
2.1 Linking forest policy and post-colonial critique emanating from post-colonial theory	10
2.2 Linking forest policy and post-development critique emanating from post-development theory	12
2.3 Actor-Centred-Power (ACP): connecting Max Weber's theory on power and Max Krott's theory on forest policy	14
2.4 Outcomes in Community Forestry	18
2.4.1 Social outcomes	19
2.4.2 Economic outcomes	20
2.4.3 Ecological outcomes	21
2.5 Decentralization and devolution	22
3. Methodology and Empirical Data	25
3.1 Sequence design of quantitative and qualitative surveys	25
3.2 Materials and Methods for Cameroon	27
3.2.1 Identification of Stakeholders/partners identification	28
3.2.2 Theoretically based empirical field study (Justification)	28
3.2.3 Selection of samples of community and council forests	30
3.2.4 Quantitative and qualitative power analysis	32
4. Results	38
4.1 Power in forest policy in Cameroon	39
4.2 Power processes in forest (development) policy in Cameroon	43
4.3 Outcomes of forest policy in Cameroon	47
5. Practical Relevance	51





5.1	Relevance for the State: Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF)	52
5.2	Relevance for the Forest User Groups' representatives: Common Initial Groups and Village Forest Management Committee representatives	53
5.3	Relevance for the German Development Cooperation (GIZ and KfW)	54
5.4	Conclusion: Scientific recommendations within forest policies in Cameroon	57
6.	References	59
7.	Annex. Constitutive Publications	68

### **List of Tables and Figures**

Table 1.	Overview of publications and their contributions to this study	8
Table 2.	General information of the selected community and council forests (CFs) in the SWR of Cameroon	34
Figure 1.	Community and Council Forestry regions in the PSMNR-SWR: Areas visited are encircled	36

---

## Constitutive Publications

---

**Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2012)**

The colonial heritage and post-colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry by the example of Cameroon. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 15, 70-77. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004) page 69

**Maryudi, A., Devkota, Rosan, R., Schusser C., Yufanyi, C., Salla, M., Aurenhammer, H., Rotchanaphatharawit, R. and Krott, M. (2012).**

Back to basics: Considerations in evaluating the outcomes of community forestry. *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol. 14(2), 1-5. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017) page 101

**Schusser, C., Krott, M., Devkota, R., Maryudi, A., Salla, M., Yufanyi Movuh, M., C. (2012)**

Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research. *AFJZ*, Vol. 183(3/4), 75-83. ISSN: 0002-5852 page 127

**Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. and Schusser, C. (2012)**

Power, the Hidden Factor in Development Cooperation. An Example of Community Forestry in Cameroon—*Open Journal of Forestry*, Vol. 02, No. 04, p. 240-251. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030](http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030) page 157

**Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2013)**

Analyzing the Establishment of Community Forestry (CF) and its processes. Examples from the South West Region of Cameroon. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol 6, No. 1, p. 76-89. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v6n1p76> page 199





---

# 1. Introduction and Background

---

Forest policy sciences emerged in the mid-90s with its primary focus in the temperate regions, but swiftly shifted its concerns to tropical regions, due to researchers' curiosity about the principal causes of deforestation (De Jong et al., 2012). Due to the growing influence of forests or forestry in issues such as sustainable development, social equity, biodiversity conservation and climate change, forest policy became even more important in the later years. The role of forest policy in promoting community forestry and local governance in natural resource managements has been emphasized in recent international scientific discourse and publications (see Ribot & Larson, 2012; Oyono et al., 2012; León et al., 2012; Larson & Pulhin, 2012; Larson & Dahal, 2012; Cronkleton et al., 2012; Arts, 2012; Broekhoven et al., 2012; Coleman & Fleischman, 2012; Cashore & Stone, 2012; Poteete & Ribot, 2011; Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Barsimantov et al., 2011; *Rebugio et al.*, 2010; Schreckenberg et al., 2009; Wollenberg et al., 2007; Flint et al., 2008; Charnley & Poe, 2007; Ribot & Agrawal, 2006; Ribot, 2003; 2009; Larson, 2005; Blaikie, 2006; Dahal & Capistrano, 2006; Shackleton et al. 2002). Specifically for Cameroon, a trend of theoretical and practical studies has been evident in recent years, analyzing forest policy and how community forestry and its processes have been a game changer in natural resource management (see Oyono et al., 2012; Oyono, 2009; Oyono 2005a,b; Oyono 2004a,b; Alemagi, 2010, 2011; Mbile et al., 2009; Etoungou, 2003; Mandodo, 2003; Sobze, 2003; Mambo, 2004, 2006; Ribot, 2003, 2004; Bigombe', 2003).

Although forest policy science is relatively young, forest policy in the tropics, especially in Africa, is as old as the debut of colonialism in the continent. In Cameroon, for example, forest policy reforms can be traced far back to colonial times (Larson & Ribot, 2007; Oyono, 2004b),



with very negative impacts and outcomes. Nevertheless, in recent times, there have been positive developments in forest policy formulation and implementation – including the local people in forest management and correcting their previous exclusion by the colonial policy in the management of their forest resources, thus acknowledging the self-determined life of people within the forest. One of these developments is community forestry. This synthesized framework paper not only summarises but also analyses forest policy through community forestry. Power being the core of analyses as a driving factor of forest policy in Cameroon, the framework questions the “role that Power plays in forest policy in Cameroon, using community forestry as an example”. With scientific questions such as: (1) how can power be described in the context of forest policy, in this case community forestry; (2) what are the power processes? and (3) what outcomes of this power processes could be observed?, the framework analyzes the importance of power through political and critical theories, connecting them with theories and concepts formulated by the Community Forestry Working Group in Göttingen, backed by empirical data collected on the field between 2008 to 2011.

Most, if not all, of the publications mentioned above have focused their attention on analyzing the impacts and outcomes of forest policy through the spectrum of local governance in forestry or natural resource management. Single or comparative case studies in one or a cross-section of countries have produced far-reaching results in all the case studies; these, not being self-evident especially after the forest policy change in Cameroon and elsewhere in Africa. For example, Ribot & Larson (2012) examined the effects of forest policy change and decentralization on local communities through the implementation of REDD (Reduced Emissions from Degradation and Deforestation). They argue that, “in spite of reforms since the end of the colonial period and more recent discourses of participation and democracy, the forestry policy environment rarely supports the needs or aspirations of rural communities” (ibid.: 233). They further reiterate that, “poverty is not just about being left out of economic growth. It is produced by the very policies that enable some to profit – today from timber, firewood and charcoal, tomorrow from carbon”. Finally, they conclude that, “the outcomes of

forest policy and implementation processes worldwide demonstrate the multiple and competing interests and goals of different stakeholders and the weaker power of those who consistently lose out, [...]” and that, “to make forestry policy emancipatory, strong social protections or safeguards are still needed that require REDD and other interventions to support and work through local democratic institutions”.

Oyono et al. (2012), investigated forest policy through, “the state of livelihoods under the exercise of new community rights to forests in rural Cameroon”. In their findings, they argue that rights-based reforms such as management and marketing rights in community forestry have not improved basic assets and means at the household level. This is a very relevant statement or finding, since in the basics of this framework paper, our social and economic outcomes boil down analytically to how the policy (e.g., community forestry) affects the local forest user. They describe the forest policy process in terms of community and market rights as being of “popular participation in decision-making, inclusion, discretionary powers, equity, democratic accountability, efficiency, transparency, collective-well-being and ecological sustainability” (ibid.: 175). All these culminate in a process of a shift in forest policy aiming at positive social, economic and ecological outcomes for the forest custodians. Oyono et al. conclude that the process and practice of community forestry through rights-based or development-based approaches of livelihoods have not been significantly consolidated. The present research also found similar indications, and this framework paper sheds light on the processes in the social relationship and mindset of stakeholders directly involved in these approaches.

Larson & Dahal (2012), in their comparative study carried out in ten countries in Asia, Africa and South America (including Cameroon), explain the forest policy shifts through forest tenure reforms, with implications for both communities and forests. In their argument, they assert that this is based theoretically, in part, “on the belief that communities can be good forest stewards” and, practically, on the understanding that “those responsible for implementation do not always appear to follow these benchmarks”. They further stress that “understanding this emerging dynamic as a forest tenure reform calls for the systematic and comparative analysis of the associated processes and outcomes



of these changes, amidst other global transitions, and of the need to develop frameworks and approaches that can facilitate such comparisons". While their research explores the origin, nature, goals and results of policies formally recognising or granting new community rights to forests, with particular emphasis on understanding the challenges they have faced in implementation and the extent to which they do, they do not go as far as analyzing the social relationships and the background mindsets of the stakeholders involved. The framework paper goes further in this regard.

Because this paper is limited to an analysis of the power relations in forest policy through the case study of community forestry, the detailed contemporary discourse and practical empirical findings of the literature cited will not be discussed. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned literature mirrors the current state of art. In the literature, forest policy in Cameroon has been linked to participation, equity, livelihood, tenure and sustainability issues, with the stakeholders being the direct connection to these issues. Closely linked to stakeholders' participation is the issue of power (Broekhoven et al., 2012). For Broekhoven et al., understanding stakeholders' relations and dealing with power and powerful groups is essential for the success of forest governance reform processes. Intentionally or otherwise, the above-mentioned recent findings have a limited scope, in that power in forest governance reform (forest policy) typically remains an implication and less an explicitly addressed issue. This is also why this study is important since it explicitly analyzes the power issue.

The framework paper does not contradict most of the findings in the mentioned publications, but goes further to answer the main question of **how "Power" acts as a driving factor in forest policy in Cameroon, through the example of community forestry**. It traces the development of forest policy in Cameroon and the mindset behind policy shifts. It also analyses the social relationships between stakeholders and the outcomes of their interests and actions. The theories and methods presented are scientifically sound in terms of reliability and validity. Forest policy can be understood differently when empirics are viewed through the lenses of different theories. Such endeavors allow the interpretation or explanation of social events, resulting in the creation of

new knowledge when confronted with additional empirical “reality”, or create abstract knowledge that can be applied to new contexts (De Jong et al., 2012). In their paper, De Jong et al. also explain that “each successful use of theory in analyzing a specific forest policy issue is a ‘test’ of the theory and by no way self-evident. Such testing of existing theories is an important contribution to the general academic discussion of each theory. The application and practical use of theory produces new perspectives on both the theory and the empirics” (ibid.: 6). In this synthetic framework book, political and critical theories are used to analyze forest policy processes in Cameroon, within the family of critical policy analysis (Arts, 2012). The framework study focuses on the following main sections:

1. How is the theoretical framework applied in the publications by the author linked to the scientific discourse of forest policy?
2. How is the methodology applied in the publications by the author linked to the scientific discourse of forest policy with emphasis on field research in community forestry?
3. How do the results of the publications by the author correspond with the existing scientific results on community forestry in Cameroon?
4. What is the relevance of the results of the publications by the author for forest policy and forest policy discourse as practiced in Cameroon?

The next sections will present the main contents of the publications by the author, providing the baseline of this framework study:

The article, “The colonial heritage and post-colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry by the example of Cameroon” (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012), by the author of this framework paper, uses Cameroon and its forest policy to approach the colonial paradigm till date; in the implementation of the Program for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources (PSMNR) through Community/Council Forest Managements (CFM) and open-access Forest Management Units (FMU), in conserving and sustainably managing the vast biodiversity of its forest resources. The history of the forest and environmental management is explored, while parallels are drawn confirming the colonial heritage and the continuation of Western-style ideologies, theories and concepts of





community forestry management in Cameroon. The paper is partially based on the concept of the Community Forestry Working Group in Germany, carrying out a comparative research study on “Stakeholders’ Interests and Power as Drivers of Community Forestry”. It uses case studies in the South West Region (SWR) of Cameroon, to verify and confirm the hypothesis that community forestry management is a “colonial heritage”. Furthermore, it uses the background of “post-colonial theory” and Adams & Mulligan’s<sup>1</sup> five points on “colonialism’s legacy for conservation” to strengthen this argument, with a direct link to the impact on the local communities. The author of this article is its sole author.

Secondly, the article, “Back to basics: Considerations in evaluating the outcomes of community forestry” (Maryudi et al., 2012), of which the author of this paper is an equal contributor, presents a theoretical approach on how to analyze the outcomes of community forestry. The contributions of the author can be found in section 2 and 3 of the article, explaining the concept of community forestry based on the core policy objectives of alleviating the poverty of forest users, empowering them, and improving the condition of the forests.

The third article, “Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research” by Schusser et al. (2012), presents a method on how to conduct empirical comparative research. It discusses an approach that involves a quantitative study, a qualitative follow-up study and triangulation of the results of both studies. The method is designed to make comparative research more resource-efficient and therefore useful for a large comparison of cases in different countries. The strength of this method is that it allows for the identification of powerful actors within the community

1 See Adams, W. M. & Mulligan, Martin John, 2003 (eds.). *Decolonizing nature: Strategies for conservation in a post-colonial era / edited by William M. Adams and Martin Mulligan* Earthscan Publications, Sterling, Va.: <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy036/2002152952.html>.

forestry network. The author of this framework study used the same methods presented in Schusser et al. (2012), to carry out field research for this study. The corresponding author, Carsten Schusser, developed the quantitative design and found scientific ways of triangulating the quantitative and qualitative results. He is the first author of the article.

The fourth article: “Power, the Hidden Factor in Development Cooperation. An Example of Community Forestry in Cameroon”, by Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser (2012), presents the Actor-Centred Power (ACP) concept as a starting point and blueprint of the forest policy study, to examine power as it is wielded in community forestry in Cameroon. It analyzes the empirically applicable actor-centred-power concept, which consists of three elements: trust, (dis)incentives and coercion; and at the same time connects these elements with the post-development theory. The author of this synthetic framework book is the first author of the paper.

The fifth article: “Analyzing the Establishment of Community Forestry (CF) and its processes. Examples from the South West Region of Cameroon” by Yufanyi Movuh (2013), reconstructs and analyzes the establishment of the community forestry processes in Cameroon, questioning the extent to which the community forestry models can act as a decentralization and devolution tool. Analysis show that the community forestry process is centralized, slow, long, complex and expensive, making it difficult for local communities to play an active part in policy implementation. Results also confirm that decentralization and devolution for sustainable local forest governance could offer the communities an opportunity to derive livelihoods from their forests, but the models and processes have also inhibited them through centralized control of the State and its development partners. The author of this article is its sole author.



Table (1) below, specifies the major contributions of the articles mentioned above to this framework study:

**Table 1.**

**Overview of publications and their contributions to this study**

Nr.	Publications
1	Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2012). The colonial heritage and post-colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry by the example of Cameroon. <i>Forest Policy and Economics</i> , 15, 70-77. <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004">Http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004</a>
2	Maryudi, A., Devkota, Rosan, R., Schusser C., Yufanyi, C., Salla, M., Aurenhammer, H., Rotchanaphatharawit, R. and Krott, M. (2012). Back to basics: Considerations in evaluating the outcomes of community forestry. <i>Forest Policy and Economics</i> , Vol. 14(2), 1-5. <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017">Http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017</a>
3	Schusser, C., Krott, M., Devkota, R., Maryudi, A., Salla, M., Yufanyi Movuh, M., C. (2012). Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research. <i>AFJZ</i> , Vol. 183(3/4), 75-83
4	Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. and Schusser, C. (2012): Power, the Hidden Factor in Development Cooperation. An Example of Community Forestry in Cameroon— <i>Open Journal of Forestry</i> , Vol. 02, No. 04, p. 240-251. <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030">Http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030</a>
5	Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2013). Analyzing the Establishment of Community Forestry (CF) and its processes. Examples from the South West Region of Cameroon. <i>Journal of Sustainable Development</i> , Vol 6, No. 1, p. 76-89. <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v6n1p76">http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v6n1p76</a> .



Theoretical Framework	Methodology	Results
X		X
X	X	
X	X	
X		X
X		X



---

## 2. Theoretical Framework

---

For the theoretical background of this synthetic framework, Cameroon's forest policy is described through political and critical theories, precisely, post-colonial theory, actor-centred-power theory in connection with Max Weber's theory on power and Max Krott's theory on forest policy, post-development theory, and the theory on decentralization and devolution, all pertaining to community forestry.

### 2.1 Linking Forest Policy And Post-colonial Critique Emanating From Post-colonial Theory

As explained by Ribot & Larson (2012: 247), “despite a new language concerning decentralisation and the recognition of indigenous or rural peoples' rights, forest services around the world still treat local people as subjects and continue to colonise forested territories. The policies they apply today are almost all – even when given a participatory or decentralised patina – relics of colonial management based on earlier European practice (as in Africa) or of post-colonial entrenched bureaucracies (as in Latin America)”. Conservation and development, with the involvement of the Western former colonial powers in natural resource management policies in Africa is as old as Christianity and colonialism in Africa. The present linkage to benefits acquired from these resources concerning management and especially sustainable management of forests and participation of the forest custodians, is an adjustment to suit the powerful. Due to colonialism and also often because of the post-colonial asymmetries in power relations between the former colonial so-called master and the colonized, forest and development policies in Africa have seen changes based on blueprints of Western or European

superiority. From the time of the liberation of territorial Cameroon from colonial rule (1960/61) until 1994, three new amendments were introduced (1973, 1974 and 1981) in its forest policy, but these amendments did nothing but reproduce the hegemonic colonial tenure framework (Oyono, Ribot & Larson 2006).

Today's forest policy in Cameroon is linked to its colonial past and this could be best analyzed using the post-colonial theory. Post-colonial theory here is analyzed as "a process of continuity", forming "an intermixture of events, processes and actors that transcend any form of periodization [...], acknowledging the continuing domination of post-colonial societies by former colonial masters in one form or another [...] connected to nature and forest policy formulation and implementation" (Ramutsindela, 2004: 1). Central to this critical examination is an analysis of the inherent ideas of European superiority over non-European peoples and cultures that such imperial colonization implies, critically analyzing the assumptions that the colonizers have of the colonized (Denyer, n.p). A key feature of such critical theoretical examinations is the analysis of the role played by representation in installing and perpetuating such notions of European superiority.

Discussing the effect of the colonial heritage in almost all aspects of Cameroon's politics, and in particular in natural resource management policy, is fundamental in understanding present-day forest policy and the community forestry component of the forest policy. Juxtaposing the community forestry component (theory and practice) with the assumptions and of the "logic" of the colonial practice of natural resource management in Cameroon until its liberation in the early 1960s, is relevant for understanding the present-day outcomes of community forestry. If the aim of post-colonial theory is to expose and deconstruct the relics of colonialism in the former colonized societies, then this paper sheds light on how this could be achieved through the forest policy spectrum. The colonial heritage as seen through the lens of community forestry can be identified in the concept of land tenure and the colonial logic of conservation and degree of participation and misinterpretation or neglect of community priorities. It is also found in the involvement of former colonial masters or institutions in the community forestry concept formulation and establishment. The relevance of the colonial heri-

tage in the analysis of the relatively new Forestry Law of 1994 and its community forestry component is among the issues discussed by the author in Yufanyi Movuh (2012).

In this article, community forestry was analyzed using post-colonial theory and arguments from Adams & Mulligan (2003), to portray the “colonial lineage” reflecting the colonial mindset. They explain that both the exploitation of nature in the colonies and the impetus to conserve nature for longer-term human use has been shaped by the interaction between colonial experiences in the centre and the periphery. It can only be better understood by looking at the following interactions within community forestry policy: a) the favour of techno-scientific knowledge over folk knowledge; b) nature seen as separated from human life; c) the bureaucratic controlled engagement with nature; d) the paternalistic external imposition; and e) how nature and people were made productive. All these points, also discussed by Adams & Mulligan, are fundamentally rooted in European values, constructing nature as nothing more than a resource for human use and wilderness as a challenge for the rational mind to conquer. These arguments are illustrated with the use of empirical findings from the field study. Although many researchers and scholars have tried to link colonialism, colonial legacy and entrenchments to forest policy in Cameroon, no one has really offered a basic concept to empirically analyze and evaluate this connection. The post-colonial critique emanating from the post-colonial theory as described by Yufanyi Movuh (2012) stands as an innovative piece for such an analytic development. This article is the first ever, using a critical approach of the post-colonial theory to analyze forest policy in Cameroon.

## 2.2 Linking Forest Policy and Post-development Critique Emanating from Post-development Theory

Because community forestry is rapidly becoming so important as a new paradigm in forest policy, many global funding agencies have bought into this paradigm and feel that it is a far more ethical way of donating money for the protection of forests and at the same time fulfilling their development agenda (Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012). But also, in

the last three decades, critical political and social scientists alike have had a growing interest in analyzing global society, especially areas of the world with weak economies that strive for better social and economic developments. They use critical theories to deconstruct the development theory that emerged in the period after World War II (late 1940s). This has been characterized by the continuing changes in the society, triggered by the unsatisfactory manifestation of the power relations between stakeholders of development projects and programs. The works of scholars such as Sachs (ed.) (1992), Escobar (1995) and Rahnema & Bawtree (1997), in the field of post-structuralism and post-development are very important cornerstones of post-development theory.

In Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser (2012), post-development theory is used to strengthen the argument that the whole concept of development theory and practice is influenced by Western-Northern hegemonies, imposing blueprints of their values over the rest of the world. Post-development theorists call for the rejection of the development concept (Sachs (ed.), 1992; Escobar, 1995; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997), looking beyond it. The theoretical concept came into existence following criticisms of development projects and the underlying development theory (Matthews, 2004). The concept sees development as a tool used by Western societies in the post-World War II era, to define development concerns, dominating the power relations arena, with the interests of development “experts” (the World Bank, International Monetary Fund [IMF] and other western development agencies) defining the development priorities and excluding the voices of the people they are supposed to “develop”, with intrinsically negative consequences. It argues that to attempt to overcome this inequality and negative consequences, the stage should be taken over by non-Western, non-Northern peoples, to represent their priorities and concerns. It differs from other critical approaches to development (such as “dependency” theory, “alternative development” theory and “human development” theory) in that it hitherto rejects development in its present form and calls for an alternative to development (Sachs (ed.), 1992; Escobar, 1995; Rahnema, 1997; Matthews, 2004, 2006), thus, moving beyond development.

Forest policy in Cameroon is implicitly and intricately dominated by development partners (see Ribot & Larson, 2012; Oyono, 2009; Oyono





2005a,b; Oyono 2004a,b; Alemagi, 2010, 2011; Mbile et al., 2009; Etoungou, 2003; Mandodo, 2003; Sobze, 2003; Mambo, 2004, 2006; Ribot, 2004; Bigombe', 2003). Post-development theory essentially questions the development that has been a response to the problematization of poverty that occurred in the years following World War II (Klipper, 2010; Matthews, 2004), and labels this type of development as being "an historical construct that provides a space in which poor countries are known, specified and intervened upon" (Escobar, 1995: 45). Hobley (2007: 4) rhetorically asks "why, if this was so clearly the case thirty years ago, we are still repeating the same mistakes with the same consequences", echoing poverty alleviation also as being a rationale for the international funding of community forestry. The theory critically analyzes how forest policy in Cameroon and its implementation through bilateral and multilateral actors using their forest development policies, has created an uneven playing field for the local stakeholders in community forestry. In the author's publications and also in this framework paper, the post-development critique emanating from post-development theory, as described by Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser (2012), stands as a ground-breaking piece for such an analytic development. This article is the first ever using a critical approach of the post-development theory to analyze forest policy in Cameroon.

### 2.3 Actor-centred-power (Acp): Connecting Max Weber's Theory on Power and Max Krott's Theory on Forest Policy

The common reality across the globe, and in Cameroon in particular, is that the governance process of community forestry has not yet produced expected outcomes (MINEP, 2004; Devkota, 2010; Yufanyi Movuh, 2013). While McDermott and Schreckenberg (2009: 158) have defined community forestry as the exercise by local people of power to influence decisions regarding management of forests, including the rules of access and the disposition of products, the "power shift" rhetoric from the State to the local communities through community forestry in Cameroon opens a question of power-sharing in putting these management objectives into practice. In Cameroon since 1995,

a new forest policy act (proclaimed in 1994) has been implemented in order to accommodate two approaches: community forestry and sustainable forest management. Conserving and enhancing biodiversity through rural peoples' involvement was one of the components of the new forest policy act of 1995 (Sobze, 2003; Yufanyi Movuh, 2008: 1). This law places the emphasis on increasing the participation of the local populations in forest conservation and management in order to contribute to raising their standard of living.<sup>2</sup> For the first time in Cameroon's history, the 1994 Forestry Law and its 1995 decrees of application, provided for a legal instrument for community involvement in forest management (Oyono, 2005a, b; Yufanyi Movuh, 2012, 2013; Mandondo, 2003).

As community forestry is being recognized as a paradigm shift of forest policy in the so-called developing countries, it is essential to understand the dynamics and distribution of power, so as to address the way it is wielded among stakeholders. More often than not, power comes in many forms and is concealed where it is strongest and therefore resists scientific analyses (Krott, 2005). Consequently, community forestry outcomes require a logically and theoretically based concept of power. As an important phenomenon in social relations, power has always attracted the attention of scientists in forest policy. Referring to Max Weber's classic sociological definition of power, Krott (2005) relates the issue as pertains to forest policy, as follows: "those who utilize or protect forests are forced to subordinate their interests to politically determined programs in the face of conflict. This is as a result of stakeholders and political players availing themselves of power" (ibid.: 14).

To understand this better, the work of Krott et al. (2013) analyses Actor-centred-power. Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser (2012) is also of great relevance for the understanding of ACP. Krott et al. (2013), describe ACP as follows:

2 The Forestry Law No 94/01 of 20<sup>th</sup> January 1994 and its decrees of application No 95/531/PM du 23 August 1995.

*Actor-centred-power analysis aims to provide a scientific answer to the question of who are the politically most powerful actors in community forestry practices. In making use of suitable components of power theories it builds strongly upon the social relations of actors, organizational aspects and power sources, as described by Weber, Dahl, Etzioni and their adherents. Actor-centred power is defined as a social relationship in which actor A alters the behaviour of actor B without recognizing B's will. In our framework we distinguish between three core elements: coercion, (dis-)incentives and dominant information. These make up the basis for observable facts which involve not only physical actions but also threats by power elements and the very sources of said power elements. Theoretical considerations show that despite the focus being on actors, by looking to their power sources, a considerable part of structural power can be more tangible at least in part, like rules, discourse or ideologies. Furthermore, the paper shows how the actor-centred power concept distinguishes power from other influences on forest management and contributes to the identification of the group of powerful actors on an empirical basis. Due to the focus on actors and well-defined and observable elements of power, the actor-centred power concept could serve not only as a basis for research but also for quick assessment of power networks, delivering valuable preliminary information for designing land use policy in practice (Krott et al., 2013: 1).*

This concept (Krott et al., 2013), was used as the analytic framework for the fourth paper of the author (Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012) and stands as a baseline for the analysis of the “rules, discourse or ideologies”, which also corresponds with the findings of the author in his analysis of Power as a driving force in forest policy in Cameroon.

Michel Foucault, on the other hand, sees power in the form of discourse. He is not dismissive of manifestations of power which become evident when A imposes his/her will upon B, giving rise to struggles against exploitation and domination (Foucault, 1983: 212). He nevertheless analyses discourse as “Power that produces; it produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and

the knowledge that may be gained of him/her belongs to this production". The power of discourse creates and destroys, but also constructs rationalities; our perception of reality is determined through the power of discourse with those in a position of power having the authority to determine which social constructs of reality become "truths". Foucault described this as a form of power which "makes individuals subjects; categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him" (ibid.), with individual and collective effects. But Rossi (2004: 22) argues that "Foucault's theory does not always provide a satisfactory explanation for two orders of questions which are central to the field of development: the relationship between different categories of actors and a particular kind of discourse; and the strategies and negotiations for the control of discourses conducted by differently positioned groups". This is where the actor-centred-power concept plays an effective role, in analyzing the social relations of forest policy actors with a simple concept that is strictly reduced to the basics of social interactions.

Power in forest policy was also analyzed, at least theoretically, by Arts & van Tatenhove (2005). They propose a conceptual framework designed to cover virtually all aspects of power. In their concept (ibid.: 350), they examine relational, dispositional and structural power. Nevertheless, the concept makes it difficult to understand what particular form of power an actor is able to use for which power process. Here, the actor, combined with his/her surroundings (the system, hierarchy, position) are important enabling facets for the wielding of power. Although these facets are not described in the actor-centred-power theory they are also not necessary for testing the hypothesis that powerful actors influence community forestry outcomes based on their interests, or that power is a driving factor in forest policy in Cameroon (see Schusser, 2012 [unpublished PhD framework] and Krott et al., 2013).

Although the actor-centred-power concept is not the main theoretical concept, it is one of the building blocks of this synthesis framework. This is because all the analysis is actor-centered, especially when it comes to outcomes of community forestry, in this case, the forest users.

## 2.4 Outcomes in Community Forestry

For the evaluation of outcomes in community forestry, the framework paper uses the theoretical framework of evaluating outcomes described by Maryudi et al. (2012) as the basic concept and approach. They conclude that:

*As any form of assessment, evaluation on community forestry outcomes aims to observe whether the program has produced the impacts as initially intended. In evaluating the outcomes, we propose an approach that is based on the core policy objectives of the program, i.e. poverty alleviation, and empowerment of direct forest users as well as improved forest conditions. [...] the focus on the core policy objectives appears to provide a more practical approach than the use of complex criteria and indicators. While similar field tests on other community forestry practices at different contexts are indeed needed, we conclude that our approach allows rapid evaluations and eventually reduces the associated costs and time without compromising the goals of the evaluation (Maryudi et al., 2012: 4).*

Outcomes in community forestry are the effects of manifested and implemented interests/priorities on the forest by direct forest users and other stakeholders on ecological, economic and social dimensions. These outcomes are influenced by the decision-making of the internal and external stakeholders. For the complete analysis and evaluation of our comparative power-network analysis of community forestry, it was important not only to define and analyze, but also to evaluate the outcomes of community forestry. This is necessary so as to find out if the applied community forestry models attain their forest policy objectives of poverty alleviation through empowerment, livelihood improvement, economic benefits, sustainable forest resource management and meaningful ecological effects of the forest. For this, an approach based on the core policy objectives of the community forestry models was used, translating results into justifiable outcomes.

For the examination of outcomes, Bradshaw (2003: 141) outlines: “if the priorities of the powerful [...] do not include a genuine desire to sustain the local resource base, then we should not expect the outcomes of

community-based resource management to differ from those of centralized management". Forest policy, especially with regard to community forestry, places the emphasis on increasing the participation of the local populations in forest conservation and management. This is expected to be realized through active participation in decision-making and policy implementation in order to contribute to raising their living standards and providing a legal instrument for community involvement in forest resource management. That is, the present community forestry models' objectives argue for sustainable forest management and poverty alleviation through the communities with incentive of acquiring benefits from community forestry coupled with environmental protection and conservation. These could be summarized into three basic outcomes: social (dealing with empowerment), economic (dealing with financial and material benefits from community forestry) and ecological (dealing with the conservation and environmental issues) (see also Maryudi et al., 2012). Overall, the social and economic evaluations of outcomes cover legal and illegal activities in the forest.

#### 2.4.1 Social Outcomes

For the evaluation of social outcomes, the framework focuses on the empowerment of the communities and emphasizes the empowerment of the direct forest user. Influential actors tend to narrow the scope and meaning of empowerment to only partial participation of the direct forest users in forest activities, without providing them with meaningful spaces of influence. Maryudi et al. (2012: 3) summarize that, "social outcomes in our approach rest on the empowerment of direct forest users, and are measured by the extent they can have: 1) access to information on forests, 2) access to decision making, and 3) access to forestland and resources, including the ability to exclude others for using the resources. Such depends on knowledge, information, legal restrictions, technical materials, money and informal access to the forest".

Schusser et al. (2013: 25) further operationalize social outcomes as measuring empowerment by,

*evaluating the means the direct forest user has to influence the management of the forest. It measures the degree to which he can make*

*decisions about the management of the forest. Here, the access to forest-related information and becoming a part of the decision making are important. In addition, the direct access to the forest and the use of its products empowers the end user. If the three criteria are fulfilled we evaluate the social outcome as high. By contrast, if there are limited information, decision rights and/or access, we determine that the social outcome for the direct forest user is intermediate (“middle”). If the direct forest user has no information, decision rights or access the social outcome is low.*

That some user groups have enjoyed marginally better access to decision-making procedures is to some extent due to the “successes” of some external actors, involved in community forestry (see Guizol et al., 2004; Guizol & Santoso, 2005). Notwithstanding, their assistance appears to be limited to the group committees, instead of the direct forest users. Overall, in practice, “arrays of interpretations” have been identified on so-called empowerment, which all nonetheless still diverge from our theoretical concepts. Such findings at the same time support and validate our concept on social outcomes, focusing on the direct forest user and on the powerful interest driven social outcomes (PIDO). In these cases, partial participation is modest empowerment.

#### 2.4.2 Economic Outcomes

For the measurement or evaluation of economic outcomes in our study and in this framework, priority is placed on poverty alleviation and emphasis also on the individual forest user. Maryudi et al. (2012: 2) see poverty alleviation as “the enhancement of human well-beings of the direct forest users. An optimal result would be lifting direct forest users into a better economic stage. Further, the economic outcomes are here defined as the products and services the household of a direct forest user obtains from the community forest”. Here, the evaluation does not only focus on pure financial benefits, since this might not give a complete picture of how economic benefits could be used to fight poverty. The framework goes a step further to ascertain that “economic outcomes should be qualitatively analyzed and partly measured in natural units and/or partly in money. This can vary from case to case. The out-

comes can include forest products (among others: timber poles, fodder, firewood as well as land-based products of agro-forestry), money and community development/services” (ibid).

The evaluation of economic outcomes are further explained by Schusser et al. (2013) as follows:

*The economical outcome for the direct forest user is measured by the contribution of the forest to his livelihood. The options are: all forest products, money from selling forest products or exclusive access to such community development as school buildings, roads, or water pipes financed by community forestry. The degree to which the economical outcome contributes to livelihood improvement is compared with the standard of living of the direct forest user. This means that if the economic contribution allows for a subsistence-level standard of living only, we rate the economic outcome as middle. If the contribution is greater, the outcome becomes high. A small contribution compared to the standard of living will be rated as low, e.g., for Germany the standard for comparison is the annual average income of households (Schusser et al., 2013: 26).*

### 2.4.3 Ecological Outcomes

Conceptually (see Maryudi et al., 2012), a clear and basic way of measuring ecological outcomes is described in the paper. Just like with the other outcomes, emphasis is placed on the core policy objectives in enhancing community forestry. Improving the ecological qualities of the forests and conservation through community forestry are highlighted in the case of Cameroon forest policy. Nevertheless, concerns on improving environmental forest qualities are rather shifted to the extent that environmental efforts can enhance the forest potential to producing economic benefits, rather than to the broader environmental context of improved biodiversity or such. That is why we conceptually want to evaluate ecological outcomes by distinguishing between forest growth and biodiversity. While forest growth would mean a contribution to sustainability to forest biomass and sustainable management of the forest biomes (environment), biodiversity entails increasing the variety of fauna and flora through the activities of community forestry.



This distinction is important and necessary in order to empirically evaluate high, modest or low ecological outcomes as well as cost-effective than other methods. An increase in forest growth with no increase in biodiversity would empirically mean that a high ecological outcome has not been met.

Formally, improved forest conditions have been desired by most of the (powerful) stakeholders involved in community forestry. Nonetheless, driven by their own interests and priorities, their focus and emphasis differ. We have seen that concerns over ecological outcomes are narrowed to the extent they serve the best interests of the forestry administration in promoting healthy forest stands, keeping the forests intact and thereby improving the economic potentials of the forests. Across cases, the forests have been growing immensely, but it does not follow that there is adequate attention paid to the broader issues of forest biodiversity. Our concept in evaluating ecological outcomes brings this observation to the point. Direct evaluation is binary. If reforestation is taking place on degraded areas and forest stands are developing in volume and height or the forest area increases, then the sustained forest stands are rated as middle. If the forest contributes additionally to biodiversity, i.e., genetic diversity, ecosystem diversity or a combination of these, the ecological outcome is rated as high (also see Schusser et al., 2013).

## 2.5 Decentralization and Devolution

Cameroon, like many other countries in Central Africa, has recently reformed its forest policies to allow for the possibility of community management (Binot et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the communities often require a large amount of support to establish and manage community forests. The promotion of local participatory and accountable institutions with authority over lands and resources seemed to be an essential component of such political reforms. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, reforms were adopted during the 1990s which called for the decentralization of natural resources and land tenure institutions and greater participation by the public and local communities (Ribot, 2003; Roe & Nelson, 2009) although these have not really been translated

into radical changes in local rights or authority over natural resources. Oyono (2009) stresses that, from the policy perspective, the Cameroonian model of forest governance is a dilemma, constituting another illustration of the historical challenges related to State-building and resource control.

Oyono (2004b) defines decentralization as “a process through which powers, responsibilities and resources are devolved by the central State to lower territorial entities and regionally/locally elected bodies, increasing efficiency, participation, equity, and environmental sustainability”. Likewise, Agrawal & Ribot (1999), followed by Ribot (2004), see decentralization and devolution as “any act by which central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy”. In their article, they further explain decentralization as follows:

*Devolving powers to lower levels involves the creation of a realm of decision making in which a variety of lower-level actors can exercise some autonomy. Deconcentration (or administrative decentralization) is said to occur when powers are devolved to appointees of the central government. Political decentralization is different from deconcentration since powers in this case are devolved to actors or institutions that are accountable to the population in their jurisdiction. Typically, elections are seen as the mechanism that ensures accountability in political decentralization.*

A bulk of other publications (Ribot, 2009; Larson, 2005; Blaikie, 2006; Dahal & Capistrano, 2006) also analyzes the “common practice” through the decentralization policy in forest resource management, using power devolution to the local users as a theoretical focus. Following the above-mentioned definitions of Oyono, Agrawal and Ribot, importance is placed on the role of the central government in achieving increased efficiency, participation, equity and environmental sustainability. They emphasize the importance of actors, powers and accountability as priorities in decentralization reforms on governance institutions. To contribute to the discourse, this framework paper uses the theoretical background of the decentralization concept to analyze the establishment of community forestry in Cameroon. In analyzing the



decentralisation and devolution theory, Yufanyi Movuh (2013) reconstructs and describes the establishment and processes, questioning the extent to which the community forestry models can act as a decentralization and devolution tool. The article uses qualitative interviews and documents from a variety of low-level actors to examine their influence or autonomy in the community forestry establishment and activities.

---

## 3. Methodology and Empirical Data

---

### 3.1 Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys

Publication 3 (Schusser et al., 2012), which is also part of this synthetic framework paper, presents a detailed methodology for combining quantitative and qualitative results to generate empirically comparable data. The aim is to design a method that is resource efficient but which at the same time produces reliable and valid data for comparative research. In Schusser et al., it is explained that:

*A sound empirical basis is of high importance for applied research in Forest Policy despite empirical methods increasing the resources needed for research. Especially in developing countries, the extensive needs of field research might exceed the available resources. A sequence consisting of a quantitative preliminary survey – qualitative study – quantitative follow up study is recommended in the literature as an efficient methodological strategy. This paper investigates how to diminish resources by means of the sequence design and discusses how to keep a high research quality using the example of comparative power analysis in community forestry. The sequence design is applied in seven studies in as many countries, of which two have been already completed successfully (Nepal, published by Devkota (2010) and Java-Indonesia, published by Maryudi (2011)). The preliminary quantitative survey is used to identify the group of most powerful actors for each community forest. The measurement validity, meaning the degree of agreement of*

*measurement and theory, is kept high by simplifying the hypothesis down to the claim that a group of powerful actors exists. The reliability of the survey is strengthened by using, for each actor, the external estimate of his power by the other actors in the network. Nevertheless, the reliability is relatively low due to the use of standardized questions only, but it is sufficient to indicate who the actors of the powerful actors group are. The follow-up qualitative power survey ascertains the power resources of the strong actors that have been identified as such. It applies a complex hypothesis about ACP that involves the three power elements of coercion, incentives and trust. Reliability is high due to such multiple empirical resources as are observations, interviews and documents. The data of the qualitative survey is used to improve the quantitative data of the preliminary survey. Finally, a comparative quantitative analysis of the power of actors in community forestry for all researched countries is conducted using the improved data. This analysis tests complex hypotheses that involve the power of different actors. The actors are differentiated using theoretically meaningful terms from which we can derive hypotheses for the empirical tests. In particular, the theories about bureaucratic politics and interest groups can deliver hypotheses about the power relations of these actors, which are then particularly suitable for the quantitative test. The results show that the sequence survey can reduce the resources needed by about half. Nevertheless, the validity can be kept up by formulating hypotheses of different complexity and sufficient reliability can be ensured by improving the data step by step by means of the follow-up survey (Schusser et al., 2012: 82).*

For a methodology to measure outcomes for community forestry policy, Rebugio et al. (2010: 361) based their indicators for evaluation on “expressed policy objectives” which were mentioned as (1) improvement of socio-economic conditions; (2) promotion of social justice and equity; and (3) sustainable development of forestlands and resources. The same method of evaluation is proposed by Maryudi et al. (2012) for the evaluation of outcomes (also mentioned in 2.4.3 above). Here, an alternative approach to the comprehensive criteria and indicators on sustainable community forestry is proposed, “based on the core policy objectives of the program”. Maryudi et al. (2012, publication 2 in

this framework book) summarize these indicators on the bases of: (1) empowered direct forest user (social outcome); (2) improved livelihood of the direct forest user (economical outcome); and (3) improved forest conditions (ecological outcome).

Maryudi et al. (2012) represents the basic methodology for this synthetic framework paper for the evaluation of outcomes, which is basically the same as that of Rebugio et al. (2010). Furthermore, Schusser et al. (2012), is the standard methodology used in this synthetic framework and the overall study for Cameroon, as well as for our comparative country studies.

### 3.2 Materials and Methods for Cameroon

We define community forestry as “forestry which directly involves local forest users in the common decision making and implementation of forestry activities” (Devkota, 2010; Maryudi, 2011; Yufanyi Movuh, 2012; Schusser et al., 2012). This includes community-based natural resource management through programmes involving biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management by the local communities (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012). Concretely, this definition includes legally gazetted and/or organized community and council forest activities. With this definition, one would find empirical examples in many countries of the world comprising the economically stable (so-called developed) und non-stable (so-called developing) countries. With this definition in mind, 13 communities were explored in the SWR (South West Region) of Cameroon in the course of the author’s field studies.

The research is based almost exclusively solely on the communities that have legalized and/or organized community forests. Added to these were forests assigned to local government councils or reserved for local councils. At the regional level, stakeholders such as the German Development Bank/German Consulting Firm (KfW/GFA), the German Agency for International Cooperation [GIZ (GTZ, and DED)], the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF), the World Wide Fund for Nature/Wildlife Conservation Society (WWF/WCS), and the various local councils and communities involved in community forestry in the South West region, and especially in the Korup Ndongere Techni-

cal Operation Unit, were visited and interviewed. At the national level, the central Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife and the Prime Ministry in the capital Yaoundé, Cameroon, were also visited with interviews conducted with officials involved in community and council forestry activities. Quantitative and qualitative data was collected in the form of interviews, recordings and observations.

### 3.2.1 Identification of Stakeholders/partners Identification

Stakeholders in our study refer to those who have interests in community forestry and the potential *to* influence the community forestry processes. We classify them into two main groups: State and non-State stakeholders. The main State stakeholder relevant for community forestry is the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife and its regional/local forest administrations. The non-State stakeholders include forest users, forest users' groups and their federations; donors, forest based enterprises; environmental and user associations and political parties; university and research institutions; media and consultants. Such stakeholders may belong to local/regional, national and international levels, all of which may be of importance in community forestry processes.

In order to identify the powerful stakeholders within each case of community forestry, we conduct a quantitative and a qualitative power analysis. The quantitative network analysis uses the knowledge of the stakeholders to identify the partners of the network, while the qualitative analysis goes deeper to describe and evaluate the powerful stakeholders, identified through the quantitative network analysis.

### 3.2.2 Theoretically Based Empirical Field Study (Justification)

Because we need the link between the study region chosen and the whole country, contributing what one can learn from community forestry in this area and at the same time extrapolating the results for the whole country, a stratified random sampling was carried out for the whole country. The strata were formed based on Cameroon's 10 regions' shared attributes or characteristics in community forestry activities. The shared characteristics in the stratification are: (1) active regions promoting community forestry; (2) passive regions with community forestry; and (3) regions where community forestry is virtually

not functioning or non-existent. The statistical population sample of the community forestry was drawn from the number of community and council forest applications received by the MINFOF until 2009 in Yaoundé-Cameroon as a whole. This adds up to 451 community forest and 28 council forest applications, for a total of 479 community forests,<sup>3</sup> spread out in all of Cameroon's ten regions. Criteria for establishing this population was also based on the Community Forestry Working Group's definition of community forestry. Furthermore, with this sampling method, it is relatively easy to statistically prove since communities or councils with community forest applications are represented by committees of either the Common Initiative Group and/or the Village Forest Management Committee.

### **A. Best Cases of Representativity for Community Forestry in Cameroon**

The first step was to identify an active community forestry area in Cameroon. Since we are looking for the relatively best cases in the country, determined by high social, economic and ecological outcomes, as specified in section 2.4., five main regions (Eastern, Centre, South, Littoral and the South West region) out of ten were identified as potential regions, falling on the stratum with active promotion of community forestry. The South West region was chosen for the establishment of field research samples for inferences or extrapolations. In other words, if community forestry is not successful here, then there is high probability that it will not be successful in other parts of Cameroon. The *modus operandi* and constraints in the South West region would be then replicable in the other regions of Cameroon. The engagements of the different internal (State and non-State) and external (State and non-State) stakeholders, are defined in the Manuals of Procedure available from the Ministry of For-

3 From the National statistics of MINFOF (2008) in Yaoundé, the situation of community forest in Cameroon in 2008 was as follows: 451 applications were made for CF, 252 SMPs were approved and 163 Management Conventions have been signed. On the other hand, 28 council forest applications were received by MINFOF until 2009 (researcher's observation).



estry and Wildlife. The general influence of the government of Cameroon through its various ministries and inter/intra power dynamics between and with stakeholders, respectively, could be verifiable in the whole territory, if they are well analyzed in this region.

Additional justification for the selection of the region was due to the availability of funding through foreign financial and technical assistance in this region to promote community forestry through projects, e.g., the Program for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources-South West Region (PSMNR-SWR). Also, as of 2009, there were 19 community forestry and 6 council forestry cases found in the South West.<sup>4</sup>

### **B. Good Accessibility and Knowledge of the Research Area**

In all of the five regions identified, best-case representativity without expert knowledge and accessibility to the field area of research would make data collection very difficult. Thus, ultimately the selection of the South West region was based on random selection. The fact that the place of birth of the researcher (author of this framework) was in this area was used as a selection criterion. This criterion bears no relation to the existence or nature of active community forestry areas in the country, and therefore the choice can be considered a random one. That being said, it is an area where the author of this framework book has a good existing knowledge and access to the field, facilitating data collection.

#### **3.2.3 Selection of Samples of Community and Council Forests**

Within the South West region, samples were chosen not through a random sampling approach (as might seem) but through a best-case approach, based on the empirical evaluation of outcomes. Emphasis was placed on the activities and success of the best cases, since we can empirically explain how the best cases work. From the 25 cases of community and council forests in the region, 13 samples were identified

4 These numbers have changed since 2010 due to some community and council forests not being able to acquire support to continue activity and thus going out of existence.

through the snowball effect described in Schusser et al. (2012) and from this, 10 case-study samples were chosen for analysis since they were the best cases in the region. The remaining three cases were rejected due to inactivity or not being successful in implementation, or existing only on paper. The representativity is justified due to the South West region's activeness in promoting community forestry in Cameroon, active funding of community forestry projects and the expert knowledge of the researcher in the region.

Concretely, the selections of the community and council forestry samples were done following indications made by the Program for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources-South West Region (see Table 2 and Figure 1) and based on information on recent activities and successes of the communities in the community forestry process. Interviews with different stakeholders were conducted in relation to the information given by other stakeholders in their networking (Schnell et al., 2005) and interest-representation in community forestry.<sup>5</sup> Quantitative and qualitative interviews were carried out with community forestry managers and forestry officers, and at times with members of the Common Initiative Groups (CIG) and Village Forest Management Committees (VFMC) responsible for the management of these forests, with representatives of the regional Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife and the German Development Bank/German Consulting Firm (KfW/GFA) representing the main program (PSMNR-SWR) for the facilitation of the implementation of the 1994 Forestry Law, hence community forestry. All the interviews were recorded for transcription and further analysis. More than 70 interviews were made, and observations noted, during the course of the research. Documents such as the Logframe of the Program for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources-South West Region (PSMNR-SWR), Management Plans (MP) and Technical Notes (NT) of the community forests were also part of the materials collected

5 This was done through the snowball method. It is a typical way to analyse networks (Schnell et al, 2005).

and analyzed. The sequence design for network analysis uses: “(1) a quantitative preliminary survey – (2) a qualitative survey and (3) a quantitative follow-up study, which focuses the observations on preselected subjects in order to save resources during the field work” (Schusser et al., 2012: 75).

### 3.2.4 Quantitative and Qualitative Power Analysis

An empirical analysis approach was used in order to verify theory-based descriptions and explanations of empirical evidence (Bryman, 2001; Yufanyi Movuh, 2007). Both quantitative and qualitative analysis were carried out as explained in Schusser et al. (2012). Through the snowball technique (Schnell et al., 2005; Hasanagas, 2004), each stakeholder is asked for his/her estimation of the power and informational sources of all other stakeholders. The purpose of for this non-probability sampling technique is to identify stakeholders who would qualify for further qualitative analysis (Neuman, 2003). The sum of all estimations is a robust indicator of the power of each stakeholder. The powerful stakeholders were then selected for further qualitative power analysis. At the end of the field research, 13 samples were probed and analyzed (though the Ikondo Kondo Community Forest was dropped due to its inclusion in the Mundemba Council Forest). Two more community forests (Toko and Konye Council Forests) were also dropped from complete analysis since they were found only on paper. This led to the final analysis of 10 communities with either community or council forests (see Table 2). Based on interviews, written sources and field observations, the different features of the power processes would be analysed.

Normally, there are concerns about the above-described research methods. In social-science research, errors like method bias can occur when carrying out sampling. In a comparative research such as ours, this is apparent, and we are aware of bias-related problems. Podsakoff et al. (2012: 540) analyzed “the biasing effects that measuring two or more constructs with the same method may have on estimates of the relationships between them”. They further state that “the major

concern with measuring different constructs with the same method is the danger that at least some of the observed co-variation between them may be due to the fact that they share the same method of measurement". Nevertheless, in the process, there is no indication of the existence of social desirability bias (Neuman, 2003) caused by the selection of "socially and/or politically correct" answers instead of the own opinion. High bias could exist in surveys or studies conducted in countries with an uncertain justice system (Schusser et al., 2012) or with different norms. Tourangeau & Yan (2007: 860) state that "the conception of sensitivity presupposes that there are clear social norms regarding a given behavior or attitude; answers reporting behaviors or attitudes that conform to the norms are deemed socially desirable, and those that report deviations from the norms are considered socially undesirable". In our study, to limit bias, answers were backed by authentic and proven documents. There was no special relationship with some stakeholders or communities, thus further justifying the samples. With little or no bias, there are high chances of increased reliability and with a simple categorization of powerful stakeholders, validity is ensured. Pre-knowledge of the research area and good contacts with some stakeholders of the different communities helped overcome barriers such as language, mistrust and traditional customs (Yufanyi Movuh, 2007).

In assuming that the three power sources in our study: trust, incentives and coercion, are the keys to explain how the actors drive the activities of community forestry and its outcomes, interviews, recordings and observations in pre-selected samples of community and council forests that fall under our definition of a community forest were carried out. This was done in communities with proposed council or community forests as illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 1, below.


**Table 2.**
**General information of the selected community and council forests (CFs) in the SWR of Cameroon**

Communit(y)ies		Forest status	Name of Management Institution
1	Mundemba	Council forest, Reserved	Mundemba rural council (Ndian)
2	Ikondo Kondo	Community Forest (not existing anymore)	Mundemba rural council (Ndian)
3	Mosongiseli	Community forest, Reserved	Mosongiseli Balondo Badiko CIG (MBABCIG) (Ndian)
4	Toko	Council Forest, (not existing anymore)	Toko rural council (Ndian)
5	Itali	Community forest, Operational	Christian Philanthropic Farms and Missions (CPFAM) CIG (Ndian)
6	Konye	Council forest, (not existing anymore)	Konye Rural Council (Meme)
7	Nguti	Council forest, Reserved	Nguti Rural Council (Kupe-Muanengouba)
8	Manyemen	Community forest, Operational	REPA-CIG (Kupe-Muanengouba)
9	Akwen	Community Forest, Reserved	Akwen CF(Manyu)
10	Bakingili	Community Forest, Reserved	Bakingili CF Management CIG (Fako)
11	MBACOF	Community Forest, Reserved	MBAAH Community Forest CIG (Kupe-Muanengouba)
12	Woteva Village	Community Forest, Reserved	Woteva Village Development CIG (WODCIG) (Fako)
13	Bimbia-Bonadikombo	Community Forest, Operational	CF Management CIG (Fako)

Source: revised from Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012 (nd = no data)

<b>Resource status</b>	<b>Donor involvement</b>	<b>Visited</b>
Rich	Yes, GIZ (GTZ)	2009/2011
Rich	Not anymore but previously GTZ	2009/2011
Rich	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
Poor	Not anymore but previously GTZ	2009/2011
Rich but no access	No	2009/2011
Poor	Not anymore but previously GTZ	2009/2011
Rich	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
Rich	Not anymore, but previously CAFECO	2009/2011
Rich	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
Poor	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
nd	No	2011
nd	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2011
Poor	Not anymore but previously MCP	2009/2011

These areas can also be located in the map as indicated in Figure 1 below.



Source: author

**Figure 1. Community and Council Forestry regions in the PSMNR-SWR: Areas visited are encircled**

All the interviews were recorded for transcription and further analysis. After the transcriptions, the dominance degree approach as described in Schusser et al. (2012) was used to determine the powerful stakeholders of the network through the different power sources (elements) of our power network analysis. A profound qualitative follow-up analysis was then carried out with the identified powerful stakeholders within the community forestry network. Following the results produced by the researchers in our group representing each of the six research countries, a comparative analysis is currently being conducted to understand the trend of community forestry globally.





---

## 4. Results

---

On the basis of Weber's definition of power, by which actor A imposes his/ her will on or changes the will of actor B, our Community Forestry Working Group (CFWG) decided to build its guidelines for the study in Cameroon and for this framework book. Furthermore, while Worrell (1970) portrays how powerful stakeholders may have a greater influence than less powerful stakeholders because they have their own priority interests and values, Evans (2001) also argues that the powerful stakeholders are likely to be able to insert their values and beliefs into public policy. Nevertheless, we assume that power is the key to explain how the interests of stakeholders drive the activities of community forestry. This leads to the identification and verification of the different interests of the powerful stakeholders, analyzing the elements of trust, (dis-)incentives and coercion as well as other factors that enable the measurement of the economic, social and ecological outcomes and their influence on policy formulation and implementation.

Policy-wise, there are a good deal of supporting policies for the implementation of community forestry in Cameroon. The National Forestry Law of 1994 as well as programs and projects such as the Forest Environment Sector Program (FESP/PSFE), being relevant policy pronouncements, seek to empower the local institutions in the sustainable management of their forest resources for their benefits, through the creation and management of council and community forests. For the South West Region, the Program for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources-South West Region (PSMNR-SWR) was established to facilitate the implementation of the Forestry Law, contributing through technical and financial support to community forestry.

Based on the empirical findings from the study and publications, the results focus on Power as a driving factor of forest policy in Cameroon. The framework questions the “role Power plays in forest policy in Cameroon, using community forestry as an example”. The scientific questions posed include:

1. how can power be described in this case,
2. what are the power processes and
3. what outcomes of this power processes could be observed

The framework analyzes the role and importance of power through the above-discussed scientific and critical theories. This section will be based on the above mentioned questions.

#### 4.1 Power in Forest Policy in Cameroon

Despite being the crucial question of political science, the concept of power has played an increasingly minor role forest policy analysis in the last decades. All the credit for the reintroduction of a power concept is due to Bas Arts and Jan van Tatenhove, who published a conceptual framework on power in 2005 (Krott et al., 2013). Although it is clear that powerful actors influence the policy outcomes heavily (Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012), there is still need to understand the social phenomenon called “power” in the given context of forest policy issues (Krott et al., 2013). Many political scientists, including Weber, offered explanations and definitions of power, but there is scant literature directly linking power with forest policy analysis and development. To analyze the role power plays in forest policy, more focus is put on single actors and their interaction in detail and therefore, the theories are focused on the substance of social behaviour.

Using forest policy to argue that the impact of colonialism was transformative rather than transitory (Chiriyankandath, 2007), publication 1 of this framework book (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012) tests how colonialism not only reshaped the economic and political forms, but also changed the very way people, especially the forest development policy experts, came to see nature and its management. Politics in Cameroon is influenced by its pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial experiences. Cameroon’s colonial past is of great significance in determining the process of forest

policy of the post-colonial state. Here, power is identified and described in the colonial heritage and post-colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry. The rationale of using post-colonial theory is to examine the continuing impact that colonialism has on post-colonial developments in forest policy in general and community forestry in particular. How to come to terms with the survival of nature and the mentality bequeathed in part by the colonial heritage has been a preoccupation of “Third World” intellectuals.

Publication 1 (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012) presents the main turning point in Cameroon’s forest policy as the 1994 Forestry law. Mbile et al. (2009: 3) explain that, “by the mid 1980s, the world economy was in decline, as was Cameroon’s and under pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank; the government of Cameroon introduced a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1988 to reduce its debts and to lay the ground for the recovery. From 1988 to 2005, the policy landscape of Cameroon took on a new direction impacting in important ways on forest livelihoods”. The Forestry Law No 94/01 of 20th January 1994 and its decrees of application No 95/531/PM of 23 August 1995 was one of the outcomes of this pressure (Bigombe’, 2003). Community forestry was one of the major innovations offered by the 1994 Forestry Law. It aims at explicitly involving rural populations in the sustainable management of their own forests, providing them with income-generating mechanisms for the equitable socio-economic development of their communities.

In this article, the model community forests that emerged as a result of this forest policy change, were identified and confirmed to have a strong colonial legacy. The use of post-colonial theory exposed the continuity of colonial policies in community forestry and the mindset of foreign organizations or external stakeholders, fundamentally rooted in European values. Based on political theory derived from Adams & Mulligan’s (2003) five elements of understanding the mindset of those implementing Western-style natural resource management and empirical data, colonial heritage and post-colonial domination by former “colonial masters” (Oyono, 2005b; Fisiy, 1996) could be seen in all five elements. The arguments of Adams & Mulligan (2003) portray the “colonial lineage” as reflecting the colonial mindset. This is done by exploring the interactions between the stakeholders in community forestry from the centre and the periphery.

The five power-driven post-colonial elements within community forestry are summarized as follows:

- a. The favoring of techno-scientific knowledge over folk knowledge of community forestry: strict management plan based on Western forest science
- b. Nature separated from human life: National Parks (NP) and Protected Areas (PA) show this concept (global heritage wilderness); Community forests are developed on the borderlines of national parks and protected areas in order to act as buffers and protect this colonial concept
- c. Bureaucratically controlled engagement with nature: Bureaucratic procedures for establishing and running community forestry are complex and exhaustive and not adequate to people in communities. The bureaucratic procedures offer the former colonial masters opportunities to dominate the formal participatory processes
- d. Paternalistic external imposition of the community forestry model: community forests were founded by external state authorities; grass-roots initiatives were not supported.
- e. Nature and people were made productive: the forest should become productive for people; not the people living with the forest following their traditional way of life.

Publication 4 (Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012), describes power through the actor-centred-power concept and post-development theory. This paper aimed at analyzing the empirically applicable concept of an actor-centred-power that consists of the following power sources: trust, incentives and coercion; and at the same time connects these elements with post-development theory. The elements were derived from basic assumptions on power made by Weber (1947) and Krott (1990). Trust, (dis-)incentive and coercion are clearly defined and described with instruments and empirical findings.

Results from the fourth article could confirm the existence of power in the forest (development) policy of Cameroon. They state that:

*Through our critical realistic sequence of quantitative and qualitative research design approach (Schusser et al., 2012), two stakeholder blocks*

*were identified from the state and non-state groups as being the most influential. MINFOF [state] and the GDC, German Development Cooperation [non-state] were identified as being more powerful than others in all the cases studied, determining most of the outcomes of community forestry in the region. This, is the reason why they are always mentioned in the empirical findings (Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012: 246).*

This confirmation was not only limited to the actor-centred-power concept but also to post-development theory. As Foucault (1983) puts it in his theory of discourse as a source of power, the community forestry model in Cameroon, and probably elsewhere in Africa, began as a discourse of equity and social justice. The power of discourse creates and destroys, as well as constructs rationalities, where reality is determined, with those in a powerful position having the authority to determine which social constructs of reality become “truths”. Foucault described this as a form of power which “makes individuals subjects; categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him” (ibid.: 212) with individual and collective effects. This form of power was also evident in the community forestry model as a development instrument and the forest policy discourse in general.

The fifth publication (Yufanyi Movuh, 2013), uses decentralisation and devolution to portray the existence of power in the forest policy arena through the community forestry models. The author’s results conclude that

*if forest resource decentralization is seen as, any act by which central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions, enhancing efficiency, participation, equity, and environmental sustainability and community forestry meant to be forest practices which directly involves local forest users in the common decision making processes and implementation of forestry activities, then the community forestry models have not yet functioned as a decentralization tool (Yufanyi Movuh, 2013: 85).*

Results from the article, which are in line with other studies in this direction, have led to the pessimistic conclusion that decentralization reforms have reinforced the power of the central state (see also Yufanyi Movuh, 2012; Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012; Devkota, 2010; Maryudi, 2011; Larson & Ribot, 2007; Ribot & Larson, 2005). Nevertheless, the article emphasizes the establishment of community forestry in forest policy and the political consequences of decentralization, examining how local actors have in fact gained some political power, but also how the central government's grip on centralization policies is still evident.

## 4.2 Power Processes in Forest (Development) Policy in Cameroon

While forest policy in Cameroon is as old as the European occupation of the Cameroonian territory, forest development policy (where foreign governments use development aid as leverage for participatory and sustainable forest management in countries with low incomes) is a relatively recent development. Power in forest policy can be observed through the interests and influence of actors implementing this policy. Clashes in interests, which is defined by Ezzine de Blas et al. (2011: 1) as “conflict in a particular process”, lead to the exertion of power. They argue that power can be observed in processes such as “decision making, control of environmental services, information sharing, involving at least two actors with different interests and concrete goals”, Furthermore, forest policy, like the decentralization of management of natural resources, automatically initiates political and social processes. Nevertheless, it is still challenging to follow the power processes taking place in the forest sector, since power comes in many forms and is concealed where it is strongest and therefore resists scientific analysis (Krott, 2005: 14). Also, since “interests are based on action orientation, adhered to by individuals or groups, and they designate the benefits the individual or group can receive from a certain object, such as a forest” (ibid.: 8), it is essential to revisit the actor-centred-power concept, to describe the processes.

Cameroon's forest policy, as defined in the 1994 Forestry Law, aims to protect forest resources, encourage public participation in forest conservation and management, raise living standards, establish effective institutions and enlist the full participation of all stakeholders to vitalize the forest sector. The results of publications 1 and 4 (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012; Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012), highlight two main groups of stakeholders, powerful internal and external stakeholders. In Yufanyi Movuh (2012), the main powerful stakeholders were the external NGOs such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), bilateral and multi-lateral organisations such as the German Organisation for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the European Union (EU), and institutions such as the World Bank. They have a formal interest in the improvement and sustainable management of forest resources, poverty reduction, empowerment of the local resource users, maintaining and improving their own status, and sometimes their own economic benefits and that of other stakeholders. Informally, the continuation of the colonial-style forest policy is promoted. This can be observed through the policies of national parks and protected areas. The author concludes that "the policies of national parks and protected areas" are what caused land tenure problems during the colonial and post-colonial Cameroon.

Results confirmed that these policies are still being implemented to date, and as long as Cameroon continues to allow itself to be controlled by its former "colonial masters", the interests of the communities that live in subsistence and in harmony with their rich natural resources will never be represented in its forest and other development policies. "If things continue like this, the community forestry regime, although at the moment a step forward for community participation and empowerment, will not meet its social, economic and ecological goals" (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012: 76). Results also confirmed that "the community forestry concept acknowledges the effects of the legacy of the colonial order in present governance structures, and reproduces unquestioned values that are tantamount to the Western imperial projects" (ibid.). In this paper, the power processes could be observed through the different *integrated conservation and development projects/programs* (ICDPs), formulated by the external stakeholders.

Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser (2012) also identified external stakeholders such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), the international scientific community, the World Bank, as well as bilateral development aid agencies such as the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), the British Department for International Development (DFID), the German Organisation for International Cooperation (GIZ) or German Development Cooperation (GDC) and other institutions with the same interests, couched in the language of biodiversity conservation and “sustainable” development. Their power dynamics could be observed through their interests and the different sources from which they wield power. These organisations and institutions, the authors explained, have inherited a rich heritage of colonial expertise and policies which they continue to implement to date, through different projects and programs. Powerful internal stakeholders like the State and internal and external elites, while formally having also an interest in conservation and development, exhibit interests such as maintaining and improving status/positions and securing economic benefits for themselves and some individual forest users. They avail themselves of power, forcing the subordination of interests by the less powerful stakeholders to politically determined programs, in the face of conflict.

Furthermore, results from Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser (2012: 249) proved that, “in Cameroon, the State and its international agents, use the three elements of power described above to influence and defend their interests in community forestry. In the study, it was found that at a given situation, all three elements could overlap each other while distinctive processes could be used to analyse each power source separately”. Results confirmed that “through documents like forest inventories, management plans and conventions between the State and the communities and administrative procedures, they (the State and its partners) keep the communities at bay , exercising far more authority than even before the implementation of the Forestry Law of 1994. With the present community forestry models, the influence and power of the forestry administration and their international collaborators go up, while the power of the communities to control their forest activities is reduced” (ibid.).



This was also confirmed in the fifth publication (Yufanyi Movuh, 2013), where decentralization and devolution of forest resource management was used to analyze the power process in community forestry. For Colfer et al. (2008: 209), decentralization, as a political process, entails an ongoing negotiation of power and authority over forests and related resources, and as a social process, it also has to deal with continuing struggles over ideology, guiding philosophies and the alternative meanings and directions they imply. Yufanyi Movuh (2013) shows, through the perception of actors concerned in community forestry in the political and social processes in Cameroon, how these decentralization processes are in fact centralized, slow, long, complex and expensive, making it difficult for local communities to play an active part in policy implementation. Results also confirm that decentralization and devolution for sustainable local forest governance could offer the communities an opportunity to derive improved livelihoods from their forests, but the models and processes have also inhibited them through the centralized control of the State and its development partners.

These results are also in line with results of other scholars in the field (see Ribot & Larson, 2012; Oyono et al., 2012; León et al., 2012; Larson & Pulhin, 2012; Larson & Dahal, 2012; Oyono, 2009; Oyono 2005a,b; Oyono 2004a,b; Alemagi, 2010, 2011; Mbile et al., 2009; Etoungou, 2003; Mandodo, 2003; Mambo, 2004; 2006; Ribot, 2004; Bigombe', 2003). For example, Oyono (2009: 19) describes this forest policy process as a “tactical form of delegation of powers to the local communities, which are frustrated by the accumulation of wealth by the State and forest concessionaries since the arrival of the Germans in 1885. These processes are not as representative of a tenure reform as it seems or as it is claimed: in essence, delegated powers are not rights [to possess and dispose]” (ibid.). Ribot & Larson (2012: 239) postulate that “forest policy frameworks tend to be developed with significant influence of timber interests, as well as the State and multilateral financial institutions, but less often, with the effective participation of community or indigenous groups [...] and not surprisingly reflecting the multiple interests of ‘stakeholders’ – at the expense of these under-represented forest-dependent populations”. This has been proven by many other scholars and only confirms results obtained from the research study and publications.

### 4.3 Outcomes of Forest Policy in Cameroon

The evaluation of outcomes in community forestry is important for analyzing the impacts of forest policy in Cameroon. Here, an alternative approach to the comprehensive criteria and indicators on sustainable community forestry is proposed, “based on the core policy objectives of the program”. Maryudi et al. (2012) summarize these indicators on the bases of: (1) empowered direct forest user (social outcome); (2) improved livelihood of the direct forest user (economic outcome); and (3) improved forest conditions (ecological outcome). Ezzine de Blas et al. (2011) also argue that outcomes will depend on specific actors’ actual and judicial powers to achieve these goals. Although they do not observe (in detail) the power processes leading to outcomes, their evaluation is not far from our concept in evaluating outcomes through core objectives in forest policy, which have social, economic and ecological dimensions.

Cameroon’s forestry sector uses its forest policy objectives in the community forestry models to address poverty alleviation through empowerment, livelihood improvement, sustainable forest resource management, economic benefits and meaningful ecological effects of the forest (see section 2.4 as well as Yufanyi Movuh, 2012, 2013; Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012). For this synthetic framework paper and also as noticed in section 2.4, the outcomes for Cameroon are evaluated through core policy objectives which we define in social, economic and ecological dimensions, as mentioned above.

One of the main policy objectives for Cameroon was to grant some usufruct rights to the local populace in a bid to include them in the management of their forest resources (social dimension). Results from the research study show that community forestry promised and continues to promise the participation of the local communities in the sustainable management of their resources and acquisition of benefits through participation. Nevertheless, effective participation is yet to be seen, since the central forestry administration still wields a lot of power in decision-making, although some access rights are granted to the forest users through community forestry. Of all the community forests visited in the research study, none could boast of total empowerment, which

in our study is signified by substantial access to information, decision-making and also substantial access (legal and illegal) to the forest, based on the individual forest user.

Another objective was to acquire economic benefits for the communities so as to alleviate poverty and reduce pressure on forest resources. Again, results from the study and publications show that economic outcomes that benefit the individual forest user have yet to be produced. Positive economic outcomes, for the study, would mean a significant or major contribution to livelihood of the individual forest user. This could not be observed in the majority of the community forests studied. Applying post-development theory, it could also be seen that community forestry, as a development instrument to alleviate poverty and improve livelihood while sustainably managing the forest, has actually not brought significant or meaningful development to the targeted sector of the society (Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012).

Larson & Ribot (2007: 190) point out that forest policy and its implementation “systematically exclude various groups from forest benefits [...] and often impoverish and maintain the poverty of these groups...”. They further argue that poverty is in fact produced by the policy, which enables some others to profit at their expense. In this case, we do not argue that the powerful stakeholders want to see the forest users remain poor in their daily lives. Instead, the powerful stakeholders do not aspire for high but modest economic outcomes for the users as anything more would jeopardize their own interests. Therefore, the benefits for forest users are kept at the level of a subsistence economy, limited to a “hand to mouth” practice without allowing people to save for the future. In effect, there can be limited or no positive economic outcomes, with limitations such as the following:

- only 5000 ha of CF for communities vying for management
- *in situ* lumber processing when there are no forest to market roads for sawn lumber products
- lack of information about lumber and product prices
- technical support from FA limited only to drawing of the management plan
- forest policies neglect to facilitate local management of and profit bearing from CF

For example, since 2012 all wood products exported from Cameroon to the EU have to follow some form of certification process, a legally binding Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) that will cover all wood products produced in the country. The agreement meant that from 2012 all wood products from Cameroon to the EU must have a license showing they were legally obtained and that the wood products must have been harvested in a way that retains the health of the nation's forests and gives benefits back to forest communities. Paradoxically, this has become a constraint for the forest managers who now not only have to look for buyers of their timber, but now are limited to those buyers who have some kind of Western certification, something rare to find in the local communities in Cameroon (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012).

On the ecological objectives of forest policy in Cameroon, while community forestry was one of the major innovations of the 1994 Forestry Law, the law itself was a by-product of an externally formulated and executed environmental and economic policy, with the main goal of conserving and maximizing profits from forest products of Cameroon's rich rainforest (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012). Some positive ecological outcomes could be observed which were in line with indicators of our ecological outcomes. In almost all community forests visited, results show some level of resource assessment through inventories, management plans, controlled harvesting activities, protection of biodiversity by creating community forests as buffer zones around protected areas to reduce human pressure on the natural resources in them. They also showed that community forestry contributes to sustainability of forest growth and sustainable management, although the contribution is not profound (increasing biodiversity) and the long-term successes are yet to be seen.

Oyono et al. (2012), on the other hand, examined the outcomes of Cameroonian community forestry initiatives in four research sites. They demonstrate that community forestry has not improved basic assets or incomes at the household level and has, rather, increased threats to natural resources, due to poor institutional arrangements and management strategies. The authors argue that the State and communities are in conflict over rights, and that secure tenure is an essential first step for effective reform. Also, Oyono (2004a,b) analyzed impacts of

many years of forestry decentralization through council and community forest implementation. His findings suggest that, despite a formal transfer of powers to regional- and local-level stakeholders, the practical forestry management experiment strongly reinforces central stakeholders' (bureaucrats and State authorities) power.

From results of Yufanyi Movuh (2013), it was clear that "if forest resource decentralization is seen as any act by which central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions, enhancing efficiency, participation, equity, and environmental sustainability and community forestry meant to be forest practices which directly involves local forest users in the common decision making processes and implementation of forestry activities, then the community forestry models have not yet functioned as a decentralization tool", meaning the envisaged outcomes have yet to be seen and positive impacts yet to be felt.

---

## 5. Practical Relevance

---

The scientific and practical relevance of the study is embedded in the notion of knowledge transfer. This section discusses the relevance of the results of the publications by the author for forest policy and forest policy discourse as practiced in Cameroon. This is important for countering the very mindset that used scientific results to implement European-style forest policies in Cameroon. In this section, it is in the interest of the author to establish concrete points from this study, providing recommendations on how the study's results can contribute positively to practical pro communities forest policy formulation, implementation and evaluation.

First of all, the relevance of the results of the publications in this framework book can be presented as a baseline for analyzing the “rules, discourse or ideologies” and the leverages used to attain particular outcomes. Addressing community power, Schiffer (2004) stresses that the theories of power fail to address people's power. In her practical analysis of power, she again expresses concerns that “technically sound interventions regularly fail to achieve their intended goals, because of adverse power structures” (Schiffer, 2007: 1). Also, in many of the definitions and in the discourse on the theories of power, especially Michel Foucault, power is seen as a vehicle to implement interest and influence outcomes. This framework book sees the power sources (the three elements: trust, (dis)incentives and coercion) as the vehicle used to achieve actor-centred outcomes and powerful stakeholders as the drivers. If, like in Physics, “action and reaction are equal and opposite”, then, there is no movement without applied force. And if the force/action applied is more than the friction/reaction (resistance), then the object moves. For power and forest policy, power is observed or exists only when, “an actor A alternates the

behaviour of actor B without recognizing B's will" (applied force > friction). This could be through the sources: trust, incentive and/or coercion (physical force or the threat of physical force). It could also be achieved through discourse, producing reality, domains of objects and rituals of truth (the mindset behind policy projects and programs of intervention).

From the publications of the author (Yufanyi Movuh), powerful stakeholders were identified and analyzed. Through quantitative and qualitative interviews, documents and observations of the specific interests and outcomes analysis of the stakeholders, the main powerful stakeholders were found to fall under the category of internal stakeholders, namely, the State Forestry Administration (MINFOF) and the forest user groups representatives [FUGR (Common Initiative Group representatives – CIGRs and Village Forest Management Committee representatives – VFMCRs)]; and external stakeholders, which are the German Organisation for International Cooperation (GIZ) or German Development Cooperation (GDC) including the German Development Bank (KfW).

## 5.1 Relevance for the State: Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (Minfof)

The Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) is the main ministry acting on behalf of the State and government of Cameroon, supervising and controlling or regulating the community forestry models, acquisition processes and activities. Cameroon forest policy lays emphasis on increasing the participation of the local populations in forest conservation and management. This is expected to be realized through active participation in decision-making and policy implementation in order to contribute to raising their living standards and providing a legal instrument for community involvement in forest resource management. That is, the objectives of the present community forestry model argue for sustainable forest management and poverty alleviation through the community forestry with the incentive of acquiring benefits from it, coupled with environmental protection and conservation. The policy also highlights the government of Cameroon's strategies to strengthen the forest sector's contribution to socio-economic development through the involvement of non-governmental organizations, economic agents and the local population (MINFOF: Manual of Procedure (MoP) 2009).

From the study and published results, it is apparent that the government of Cameroon, through its central forestry administrative department (MINFOF), tends to push through its (unstated or informal) interests of reinstating State control over community lands through community forestry. It was also found to be entrenched and entangled with the colonial-type policy implementation, using more information monopoly (trust) and violence or the threat of violence (coercion) to implement a forest policy which emanates from a colonial mindset. Though present models of community forestry came about as a result of the new forest policy which promised community participation, paradigms such as decentralization, equity and sustainable management of forest resources are found more on paper and in State rhetoric and pledges for such policies, and less in practice.

It is relevant for the government of Cameroon to understand that as long as Cameroon continues to let itself be controlled by its former “colonial masters”, the interests of the communities that live in subsistence and in harmony with their rich natural resources will never be represented in its forest- or any other development policies. The community forest regime, although at the moment a step forward for community participation and empowerment, would not meet its social, economic and ecological goals. The practice of community forestry might be just a new element within post-colonial developments, and less a turning point to promote local communities’ participation. The community forestry concept acknowledges the effects of the legacy of the colonial order on present governance structures and reproduces unquestioned values (Matthews, 2006) that are tantamount to the Western imperial projects. It has failed to recognize pre-existing systems of governance and as such imperial economic interests remain firmly in place.

## 5.2 Relevance for the Forest User Groups’ Representatives: Common Initial Groups and Village Forest Management Committee Representatives

In forest policy discourse on community forestry, the communities are supposed to be the main beneficiaries of the paradigm shift. Here, we





address the issue of individual forest users benefiting from positive social (empowerment) and economic (improvement in livelihood) outcomes. Through their representatives in formal committees, their interests are outlined as striving to maintain and improve their status and bargaining position for themselves and for the individual forest user. They also strive for economic benefits for the forest user group and the community (individual forest user).

From the study and publications results, it emerges that for communities to be powerful, they need at least one source of power from the three sources analyzed in the study. The results also recognize the importance of discourse as an instrument and an effect of power at a strategic level (Foucault, 1983), as well as the role of actors in constituting power through collective action at the micro-level, as seen in the actor-centred-power analysis. The relevance of the results for the communities would be the understanding of the different aspects of forest policy discourse and practical policy implementations. This could facilitate the formation of alliances and networking with other powerful stakeholders to represent their interests in community forestry. Stakeholders like the local forest users, who are theoretically supposed to fall into the network of powerful stakeholders, are still lagging behind because they do not understand or have not discovered the different power relations manifestations or are not able to understand the power processes for numerous reasons, also mentioned in the publications. For indigenous and local non-governmental agents and organisations striving for the empowerment of the communities like the Korup Rainforest Ecotourism Organisation/Korup Guide Association (KREO/KOGAN), which is in the study area, these results could help to understand the leverages used to wield influence in community forestry issues. This study gives them the opportunity to understand these social and power relations.

### 5.3 Relevance for The German Development Cooperation (Giz And Kfw)

External stakeholders are involved through financial and/or material aid or grants, officially reaping no “economic benefits” out of these. They embody the objectives of assisting: in conservation, improvement

and sustainable management of forest resources, poverty reduction, empowerment of the local resource users, maintenance and improvement of status and at times economic benefits for the donor stakeholder and other stakeholders within the forestry sector. For the South West region, the German Development Cooperation (The German Organisation for International Cooperation and the German Development Bank) is the main powerful external stakeholder. Its main intervention is evident in the Program for Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the South West region of Cameroon, a development program of the government of Cameroon, co-financed by the Federal Republic of Germany through the German Development Bank (KfW), in cooperation with the German Organisation for International Cooperation (GIZ). Officially and rhetorically, their main goal in the South West region is to promote “sustainable forest and wildlife management by affected stakeholders for their benefit, with emphasis on the poorer segment of the local populations” (MINFOF, unpublished, 2010).<sup>6</sup> This objective is with the vision of a long-term contribution towards the conservation of high-value ecosystems in the South West region.

Results show that in the past decades, Cameroon’s rainforests and its conservation for global posterity have attracted much concern among northern “Green” non-governmental organisations, the international scientific community, the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies and other institutions with an interest in biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. These organisations and bilateral institutions, such as the German Organisation for International Cooperation or other organizations within the German Development Cooperation, have inherited a rich heritage of colonial expertise and policies still implemented today.

There have nevertheless been some remarkable albeit marginal positive changes concerning community involvement in forest resource

6 Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF unpublished) (2010). Review of the 1<sup>st</sup> phase (2006 – 2010) and Proposal for a 2<sup>nd</sup> phase (January 2011 – December 2015). Manfred Graf (Consultant MINFOF/KfW) Christian-A. Münkner (Consultant DED). Yaoundé, 17<sup>th</sup> of March 2010.

management. As mentioned earlier, the reason some user groups have enjoyed marginally better access to decision-making procedures, is to some extent due to the “successes” of some external actors, involved in assisting the communities. Their efforts are nonetheless limited in scope, consistent with the provisions of the forest administration, due either to the coercive pressures or the expectations of economic gains encouraged with participation, or a combination of the two. This was evident in the results of the study and relevant for the forest development policy of the German Cooperation.

Although the study results and publications have proven the hypothesis that “governance processes and outcomes in community forestry depend mostly on the interests of powerful external stakeholders”, the results also confirm that the objective of the German Development Cooperation for “sustainable forest and wildlife management by affected stakeholders for their benefit, with emphasis on the poorer segment of the local populations” has not been achieved. Nevertheless, the goal of ecosystem preservation through conservation has been achieved by the establishment of numerous protected areas and national parks within the region, confirming and upholding the underlying concept or principle of colonial land tenure.

Furthermore, the results are relevant in the scientific forest policy discourse and practice to the German Development Cooperation in that, their financial and technical support is being used by the government of Cameroon through their decentralization propaganda to recentralize power in the forestry sector; i.e., recentralization through decentralization. The present community forestry models have failed to produce benefits that can be equated to development, especially after eighteen years of implementation. For the German Corporation to assist in real empowerment and substantial livelihood improvement (and not mere subsistence) through economic benefits to the poorer segment of the population, the study proposes that support for the implementation of these models should be reconsidered, to suit the needs and demands of the communities concerned. This could be done by first recognizing and acknowledging traditional modes of community engagements and simultaneously promoting more research to support them. These modes should be encouraged and promoted rather than destroyed, which is the case now.

## 5.4 Conclusion: Scientific Recommendations Within Forest Policies in Cameroon

Most researchers, scholars, the international community at large and external non-governmental organisations dealing in community forestry have failed to see it as just a “pixel or a cluster of pixels” forming part of a bigger picture. Community forestry as a form of forest policy has been isolated and analyzed, though not in connection with the socio-economic and political systems in place. Although Ostrom (1990) demonstrated that “groups of people could come together for the shared management of resources and develop a set of design principles that, successful long-enduring common resource institutions all seem to share”, this cannot be possible if politics and economics are driven from the outside. Forest policy cannot be seen in isolation from the entire array of political and economic developments in Cameroon. These two arenas are still being controlled by the former colonial powers and the imperialist-oriented concessions and multinational companies. For community forestry to succeed, much has to be done against the present political and economic systems and policies, which at the moment are not pro-community or pro-poor. Findings have shown that bottom-up accountability, effective implementation and periodic and regular monitoring and evaluation are key elements for genuine positive outcomes. In Cameroon, these words are still strange in the practical dictionary of community forestry in particular and forest policy implementation in general.

Also relevant for scientific forest policy discourse and what can be learnt from the results of the study and publications is that, in the new forest policies in general and community forestry in particular, a lot still has to be done to involve the main stakeholder (the communities) who are being affected and who are crucial for the success of these policies. With the present trend, it can only be said that overwhelming positive outcomes for the local forest user are still far-fetched. Colonialism in its different ways was used to establish coercive forest policies in the past. Today’s forest policy in Cameroon is still shaped by the colonial tradition and dominated by the Western-centric mindset on nature. The colonial logic of resource accumulation, including building financial

capital on forest exploitation, has been replicated, with some modifications, by the Cameroonian neo-colonial State and propagated by the development aid agencies. One of these replications as a power instrument is coercion. But as coercion builds resentment and resistance from other stakeholders, especially the communities involved, it tends to be the most obvious but least effective form of power. This is because it demands a lot of control. This is why modifications in the form of trust and incentive come into play, though these can be levied as coercive trust and incentives.

Finally, it is understood that policy-makers, forest administrators and practitioners and the powerful external stakeholders are not waiting to implement recommendations derived through scientific studies analyzing the effects of their forest policies, especially in Cameroon. It is also clear that eighteen years since the announcement and enactment of the new forest policy through the Forestry Law, critical results of numerous researches on community forestry in Cameroon have not aroused much interest from the powerful stakeholders in this sector. Nevertheless, the results of this study could offer another possibility for policy-makers, practitioners and the local community to rethink or better organize their ways and methods of engagement in community forestry activities. We do not assume that the powerful stakeholders who represent or were identified as continuing the colonial type of forest policy implementation will give this up. The recommendations point out what could be of best interest to the people who are most affected by these policies and about whom these policies are all about. It also could be relevant to the indigenous communities or individual forest users in discovering ways of forming alliances for empowerment.



---

## 6. References

---

- Agrawal, Arun, and Jesse C. Ribot. 1999. "Accountability in decentralization: A framework with South Asian and African cases." *The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol.33, summer 1999, pp: 473-502.
- Alemagi D (2010). A comparative assessment of community forest models in Cameroon and British Columbia, Canada. *Land Use Policy*, 27(3), 928-936. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2009.12.006>
- Alemagi D (2011). Sustainable development in Cameroon's forestry sector: Progress, challenges, and strategies for improvement. *African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology*, Vol. 5(2), 65-72. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5897/AJEST10.280>
- Andersson, K. & Agrawal, A. (2011). Inequalities, institutions, and forest commons. *Global Environmental Change*. Vol 21, pp. 866-875.
- Andersson, K. & Agrawal, A. (2011). Inequalities, institutions, and forest commons. *Global Environmental Change*. Vol 21, pp. 866-875.
- Arts, B. & van Tatenhove, J. (2005). Policy and power: A conceptual framework between the "old" and "new" policy idioms. *Policy Science*, 37(3/4), pp. 339-356. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11077-005-0156-9>
- Arts, Bas (2012). Forests policy analysis and theory use: Overview and trends. *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol 16, pp. 7-13. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2010.12.003>
- Barsimantov, J., Racelis, A., Biedenweg, K. & DiGiano, M. (2011). When collective action and tenure allocations collide: outcomes from community forestry in Quintana Roo, Mexico and Petén, Guatemala. *Land Use Policy*, Vol 28, pp. 343-352
- Barsimantov, J., Racelis, A., Biedenweg, K. & DiGiano, M. (2011). When collective action and tenure allocations collide: outcomes from community forestry in Quintana Roo, Mexico and Petén, Guatemala. *Land Use Policy*, Vol 28, pp. 343-352



- Bigombe', P. (2003). The decentralized forestry taxation system in Cameroon, in Ribot, Jesse, Conyers, Diana (Eds.), *Local Management and State's Logic*. WRI, Washington, DC. Available online at [http://pdf.wri.org/eea\\_wp10.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/eea_wp10.pdf).
- Binot Aurélie, Blomley Tom, Coad Lauren, Nelson Fred, Roe Dilys and Sandbrook Chris (2009). Community involvement in natural resources management in Africa – regional overviews. In Roe D., Nelson, F., Sandbrook, C. (eds.) 2009. *Community management of natural resources in Africa: Impacts, experiences and future directions*, *Natural Resource Issues* No. 18, International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK.
- Blaikie, P. (2006). Is Small Really Beautiful? Community-based Natural Resource Management in Malawi and Botswana. *World Development*, 34(11), 1942-1957. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.023>
- Broekhoven, G., Savenije, H. & von Scheliha, S. (eds.)(2012). *Moving forward with Forest Governance*. Wageningen: Tropenbos International.
- Bryman, A. (2001). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Cashore, B. & Stone, M. (2012). Can legality verification rescue global forest governance? Analysing the potential of public and private policy intersection to ameliorate forest challenges in Southeast Asia. *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol 18, pp. 13-22.
- Charnley, S. & Poe, M. (2007). Community forestry in theory and practise: where are we now? *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 36, pp. 301-336.
- Chiriyankandath, James (2007). Colonialism and Post-Colonial Development, in "Politics in the developing world", second edition (pages 35-52). Peter J. Burnell and Vicky Randall. Also [http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199296088/burnell\\_ch02.pdf](http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199296088/burnell_ch02.pdf) (visited 20.10.2010).
- Coleman E.A., Fleischman F.D. (2012). Comparing forest decentralization and local institutional change in Bolivia, Kenya, Mexico, and Uganda. *World Development*; 40(4), 836-849. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.09.008>
- Colfer, C.J.P.; Dahal, G.R.; Capistrano, D.; (eds) (2008). *Lessons from forest decentralization. Money, justice and the quest for good governance in Asia-Pacific*. Earthscan London, UK.
- Cronkleton P., Pulhin J. M. and Saigal S. (2012). Co-management in community forestry: How the partial devolution of management rights creates challenges for forest communities. *Conservation and Society*, Vol. 10(2), 91-102. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4103/0972-4923.97481>.

- Dahal, G. and D. Capistrano (2006). Forest governance and institutional structure: an ignored dimension of community-based forest management in the Philippines. *International Forestry Review*. 8(4): 377-394.
- De Jong Wil, Arts Bas and Krott Max (2012). Political theory in forest policy science. *Forest Policy and Economics, Vol 16*, pp. 1-6. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.001>.
- Denyer, Martin (not published (n.p)). An Introduction to Postcolonial Theory. <http://www.photoinsight.org/theory/theory.pdf> visited (04.07.2010), <http://www.photoinsight.org/theory/index.htm>.
- Devkota, R. (2010). *Interests and Powers as Drivers of Community Forestry: A case study of Nepal*. Göttingen: University Press Göttingen.
- Escobar, Arturo (1995). *Encountering Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Etoungou, P. (2003). Decentralization viewed from inside: The implementation of community forests in East Cameroon (Working Paper No. 12). Washington, DC: *World Resources Institute*. Available online at: [http://pdf.wri.org/eea\\_etoungou.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/eea_etoungou.pdf).
- Etzioni, A. (1975). *A comparative analysis of complex organizations: On power, involvement, and their correlates*. New York: Free Press.
- Evans, M. (2001). Understanding Dialectics in Policy Network Analysis. *Political Studies*, Vol. 49 (3), pp. 542–550. <Http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00326>
- Ezzine de Blas, D., M. Ruiz-Pérez, and C. Vermeulen (2011). Management conflicts in Cameroonian community forests. *Ecology and Society* 16(1): 8. [online] URL: <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art8/>.
- Fisiy, C. (1996). Techniques of land acquisition: The concept of 'crown land' in colonial and post-colonial Cameroon. In: Debusmann, R., Arnold, S. (Eds.), *Land law and land ownership in Africa*. Bayreuth African Studies, Bayreuth, pp. 223–254.
- Flint, G., Luloff, A. & Finley, J. (2008). Where Is "Community" in Community-Based Forestry? *Society and Natural Resources, Vol 21*, pp. 526-537.
- Foucault, M. (1983). The subject and power. In H. Dreyfus, & P. Rabinow (Eds.), *Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Guizol, P. and Santoso, L. (2005). *Levelling Playing Field (LPF): Fair Partnership for Local Development to Improve the Forest Sustainability in South-east Asia*. Annual Report 2005- Year 2. LPF/ 04/ 2005.





- Guizol, P., Hartanto, H., Purnomo, H. and Santoso, L. (2004). Levelling Playing Field (LPF): Fair Partnership for Local Development to Improve the Forest Sustainability in Southeast Asia. Annual Report 2004- Year 1.LPF/ 04/ 2004
- Hasanagas D. Nikolaos (2004). Power factor typology through organizational and network analysis – Using environmental policy networks as an illustration. Ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart: 2004. ISBN: 3-89821-386-2. Url. : <http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/diss/2004/hasanagas/hasanagas.pdf>
- Hobley, M. (2007). Forests – the poor man’s overcoat: foresters as agents of change? 6th Jack Westoby Lecture, 3rd April 2007. The Fenner School of Environment and Society, The Australian National University.
- Kippler, Caroline (2010) Exploring Post-Development: Politics, the State and Emancipation. The question of alternatives. POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010. Available online at <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-10/caroline-kippler-summer-10.pdf>
- Krott, M. (2005). ‘Forest Policy Analysis, Netherlands: Springer
- Krott, M., Bader, A., Devkota, R., Schusser, C., Maryudi, A., Giessen, L., Aurenhammer, H. (2013)(forthcoming). Driving Forces in Community Forestry – A Framework for Assessing Actor-Centered Power in a Decentralized Mode of Forest Governance. *Forest Policy and Economics*.
- Larson A. M and Dahal G. R. (2012). Forest tenure reform: New resource rights for forest-based communities? *Conservation and Society*, Vol. 10(2), 77-90. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4103/0972-4923.97478>.
- Larson A. M. and Pulhin J. M. (2012). Enhancing forest tenure reforms through more responsive regulations. *Conservation and Society*, Vol. 10(2), 103-13. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4103/0972-4923.97482>.
- Larson, A. M. (2005). Democratic decentralization in the forestry sector: *lessons learned from Africa, Asia and Latin America*, in Colfer, C.J. and Capistrano, D.,eds, *The Politics of Decentralization- Forests, Power and People*, London: Earthscan. pp. 32–62.
- Larson, A. M. and Ribot, J. C. (2007). The poverty of forestry policy: double standards on an uneven playing field, *Sustainability Science Journal* Vol. 2, No.2 / October 2007, pp 189-204, Springer Verlag Japan ISSN1862-4065 (Print) 1862-4057. Available Online at [http://pdf.wri.org/sustainability\\_science\\_poverty\\_of\\_forestry\\_policy.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/sustainability_science_poverty_of_forestry_policy.pdf).
- León R., Uberhuaga P., Benavides J. P and Andersson K. (2012). Public policy reforms and indigenous forest governance: The case of the Yuracaré people

- in Bolivia. *Conservation and Society*, Vol. 10(2), 195-207. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4103/0972-4923.97493>.
- Mambo Okenye. (2004). Community Forest in the South West Province of Cameroon. Lessons Learned Opportunities, Successes and Constraints. GTZ-PGDRN, SW Antenna. Available online at: [http://data.cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18\\_64\\_07.pdf](http://data.cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18_64_07.pdf).
- Mambo Okenye. (2006). PSMNR- in Cameroon Feasibility study on creation of Council Forests in the South West Province. Mission Report for GTZ-PGDRN, Buea September 2006. Available online at: [http://data.cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18\\_61\\_127.pdf](http://data.cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18_61_127.pdf)
- Mandondo, A. (2003). Snapshot Views of International Community Forestry Networks: *Cameroon Country Study*, CIFOR/Ford Foundation, March 2003. Available online at [http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf\\_files/CF/Cameroon\\_CF.pdf](http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/CF/Cameroon_CF.pdf)
- Maryudi, A. (2011). *The Contesting Aspirations in the Forests: Actors, Interests and Power in Community Forestry in Java, Indonesia*. University Press Goettingen, Göttingen
- Maryudi, A., Devkota, Rosan, R., Schusser C., Yufanyi, C., Salla, M., Aurenhammer, H., Rotchanaphatharawit, R. and Krott, M. (2012). Back to basics: Considerations in evaluating the outcomes of community forestry. *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol. 14(2), 1-5. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017).
- Matthews, Sally (2004). Post-development theory and the question of alternatives: a view from Africa. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 373–384. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000174860>
- Matthews, Sally (2006). Responding to Poverty in the Light of the Post-Development Debate: Some insights from the NGO Enda Graf Sahel, *Africa Development XXXI (4)*, 52– 72. © Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. ISSN 0850– 3907.
- Mbile, P., G. Ndzomo-Abanda, H. Essoumba, and A. Misouma (2009). *Alternate Tenure and Enterprise Models in Cameroon: Community Forests in the Context of Community Rights and Forest Landscapes*. Washington: World Agroforestry Centre and Rights and Resources Initiative, 2009. <http://worldagroforestry.org/publications/publicationsdetails?node=52624>, (Visited 20.07.2009)
- McDermott, M.H. and Schreckenber, K. (2009). Equity in community forestry: insights from North and South, *International Forestry Review* 11 (2), 157–170. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1505/ifor.11.2.157>.



- MINEP (2004). Etat des lieux de la foresterie communautaire au Cameroun, Ministère de l'Environnement et des Forêts, Direction des Forêts, Cellule de Foresterie Communautaire. Available Online at [http://cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18\\_64\\_17](http://cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18_64_17).
- MINFOF (Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife). (2009). Manual of Procedures for the Attribution and Norms for the Management of Community Forests. Cameroon.
- Neuman, L.W. (2003). Social Research Methods – Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Fifth Edition. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Pp. 438-467.
- Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Oyono P. R. (2004a) Institutional deficit, representation, and decentralized forest management in Cameroon. Elements of natural resource sociology for social theory and public policy, *Environmental Governance in Africa, Working Paper No. 15*, Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Available online at [http://pdf.wri.org/eea\\_wp15.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/eea_wp15.pdf)
- Oyono, P. R. (2004b). One step forward, two steps back? Paradoxes of natural resource management decentralization in Cameroon, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42(1), 91-111. Cambridge: University Press Available online at [http://pdf.wri.org/paradoxes\\_natresmanage.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/paradoxes_natresmanage.pdf).
- Oyono P. R., Biyong M. B. and Samba S. K. (2012) Beyond the decade of policy and community euphoria (2012). The state of livelihoods under new local rights to forest in rural Cameroon. *Conservation and Society*, Vol. 10(2), 173-181. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4103/0972-4923.97489>.
- Oyono, P. R. (2005a), 'Profiling local-level outcomes of environmental decentralizations: The case of Cameroon's forests in the Congo Basin', *Journal of Environment and Development* 14 (3): 317-337. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1070496505276552](http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1070496505276552).
- Oyono, P. R. (2005b). 'The Foundations of the Conflit de Langage over Land and Forests in Southern Cameroon'. *African Study Monographs* 26 (3), 115–144. Available online at [http://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/68242/1/ASM\\_26\\_115.pdf](http://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/68242/1/ASM_26_115.pdf).
- Oyono, P. R. (2009). 'New niches of community rights to forests in Cameroon: tenure reform, decentralization category or something else?' *International Journal of Social Forestry (IJSF)*, 2009, 2(1):1-23 ISSN 1979-2611. Available online at: [http://www.ijsf.org/dat/art/vol02/ijsf\\_vol2\\_no1\\_01\\_oyono\\_community\\_rights\\_cameroon.pdf](http://www.ijsf.org/dat/art/vol02/ijsf_vol2_no1_01_oyono_community_rights_cameroon.pdf).

- Oyono, P. R., Ribot, J. C. and Larson A. M. (2006). Green and black gold in rural Cameroon: natural resources for local governance, justice and sustainability. Environmental Governance in Africa Working Paper No. 22. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
- Podsakoff M. Philip, MacKenzie B. Scott and Podsakoff P. Nathan (2012). Sources of Method Bias in Social Science Research and Recommendations on How to control it. *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 63: 539-569. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100452](http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100452).
- Poteete, A. & Ribot, J. (2011). Repertoires of Domination: Decentralisation as Process in Botswana and Senegal. *World Development*, Vol 39, pp. 439-449.
- Rahnema, M. (1997). Development and the People's Immune System: The Story of Another Variety of AIDS' in Rahnema, M. and V. Bawtree, 1997 eds, *The Post- Development Reader*, London: Zed Books, 1997), pp. 111-129.
- Rahnema, M. and Bawtree V. (1997 eds.). *The Post-Development Reader*. London: Zed Books.
- Ramutsindela, Maano, 2004. *Parks and People in Postcolonial Societies: Experiences in Southern Africa*. Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dor-drecht978-1-4020-2842-7. (viii+185 pp. \$89.95 (cloth)).
- Rebugio L. Lucrecio, Antonio P. Carandang, Josefina T. Dizon and Juan M. Pulhin, Leni D. Camacho, Don Koo Lee and Eleno O. Peralta. (2010). Promoting Sustainable Forest Management through Community Forestry in the Philippines. In *Forests and Society – Responding to Global Drivers of Change*, by Gerardo Mery, Pia Katila, Glenn Galloway, René I. Alfaro, Markku Kanninen, Max Lobovikov and Jari Varjo. (eds.). 2010. *IUFRO World Series*, Vol. 25. Vienna. Chapter 19, pp 355-368. ISSN 1016-3263.
- Ribot, J. & Agrawal, A. L. (2006). Recentralising While Decentralising: How National Governments Reappropriate Forest Resources. *World Development*, Vol 34(11), pp. 1864-1886.
- Ribot, J. C. (2003). Democratic decentralisation of natural resources: institutional choice and discretionary power transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Public Administration and Development* 23: 53-65.
- Ribot, J. C. (2004). *Waiting for democracy: The politics of choice in natural resource decentralization*. Washington, DC: *World Resources Institute*. Available online at: [http://pdf.wri.org/wait\\_for\\_democracy.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/wait_for_democracy.pdf)
- Ribot, J. C. (2009). Authority over Forests: Empowerment and Subordination in Senegal's Democratic Decentralization. *Development and Change*. Vol.



- 40, No. 1, pages 105–129, January 2009. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01507.x>.
- Ribot, J.C. and Larson, A. M. (eds.) (2005). *Democratic Decentralization through a Natural Resource Lens: Experience from Africa, Asia and Latin America*. Routledge, London.
- Ribot, Jesse and Larson, A. M. (2012). Reducing REDD risks: affirmative policy on an uneven playing field. *International Journal of the Commons*, Vol. 6 (2), 233–254. URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1-113804, ISSN: 1875-0281.
- Roe Dilys and Nelson Fred (2009). The origins and evolution of communitybased natural resource management in Africa. In Roe D., Nelson, F., Sandbrook, C. (eds.) 2009. *Community management of natural resources in Africa: Impacts, experiences and future directions*, Natural Resource Issues No. 18, International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK.
- Rossi, D. (2004). Revisiting Foucauldian approaches: power dynamics in development projects, *Journal of Development Studies*, 40(6), pp. 1–29. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0022038042000233786>.
- Sachs, W. (Eds.)(1992). *The Development Dictionary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power*. London: Zed Books.
- Schiffer, E. (2004). *Community Based Natural Resource Management in Namibia: How does it influence Local Governance?* Online-Resource: University of Bochum
- Schiffer, E. (2007). *The Power Mapping Tool—A Method for the Empirical Research of Power Relations*. IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 703.
- Schnell, Rainer, Hill, Paul and Esser, Elke (2005). *Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung*, 7 Auflage. Oldenbourg, München.
- Schreckenber, K., McDermott, M. & Pottinger, A. (2009). Special Issu: Equity in Community Forestry-Insights from the North and South. *International Forestry Review*, Vol 11(2), pp. 155-297.
- Schusser, C. (2012). Unpublished PhD Framework: Comparative Analysis of Community Forestry: Theoretical and Methodological Requirements. Department of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy and Forest History, Georg-August University Goettingen, GERMANY.
- Schusser, C., Krott, M. and Logmani, J. (2013). The applicability of the German community forestry model to developing countries. *forstarchiv* 84, 24-29 (2013). [Http://dx.doi.org/10.4432/0300-4112-84-24](http://dx.doi.org/10.4432/0300-4112-84-24)

- Schusser, C., Krott, M., Devkota, R., Maryudi, A., Salla, M., Yufanyi Movuh, M., C. (2012). Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research', *Allgemeine Forest und Jagdzeitung (AFJZ)*, Vol. 183(3/4), 75-83.
- Shackleton, S. C., Wollenberg, E. & Edmunds, D. (2002). Devolution and Community-Based Natural Resource Management: Creating Space For Local People To Participate and Benefit? *Natural Resource Perspectives*, Vol 76, pp. 1-6.
- Sobze, J. M. (2003). Analysis of implication of forest policy reform on CF in Cameroon: Case study of Lomié. Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag.
- Tourangeau, Roger and Yan, Ting (2007). Sensitive Questions in Surveys. *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 133(5), 859–883. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.133.5.859](http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.133.5.859).
- Wollenberg, E., Merino, L., Agrawal, A. & Ostrom, E. (2007). Fourteen years of monitoring community-managed forests: learning from IFRI's experience. *International Forestry Review*, Vol 9(2), pp. 670-684.
- Worrell, Albert C. (1970). Principles of Forest Policy. McGraw-Hill. New York.
- Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2008). Community-Based Biodiversity Conservation Management: Reaching the Goal of Biodiversity Conservation and Community Development, *Master's Thesis, 2007*, München: GRIN Publishing.
- Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2012). The Colonial heritage and post-Colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry by the example of Cameroon, *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol. 15, pp. 70-77. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004).
- Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2013). Analyzing the Establishment of Community Forestry (CF) and its processes. Examples from the South West Region of Cameroon. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol 6, No. 1, p. 76-89. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v6n1p76>.
- Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. and Schusser, C. (2012). Power, The hidden factor in Development Cooperation. An example of Community Forestry in Cameroon. *Open Journal of Forestry*, Vol.2, No.4, 240-251. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030](http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030)

---

## 7. Annex. Constitutive Publications

---

- Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2012). The colonial heritage and post-colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry by the example of Cameroon. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 15, 70-77. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004)
- Maryudi, A., Devkota, Rosan, R., Schusser C., Yufanyi, C., Salla, M., Aurenhammer, H., Rotchanaphatharawit, R. and Krott, M. (2012). Back to basics: Considerations in evaluating the outcomes of community forestry. *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol. 14(2), 1-5. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017)
- Schusser, C., Krott, M., Devkota, R., Maryudi, A., Salla, M., Yufanyi Movuh, M., C. (2012). Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research. *AFJZ*, Vol. 183(3/4), 75-83. ISSN: 0002-5852
- Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. and Schusser, C. (2012): Power, the Hidden Factor in Development Cooperation. An Example of Community Forestry in Cameroon—*Open Journal of Forestry*, Vol. 02, No. 04, p. 240-251. [Http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030](http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030)
- Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2013). Analyzing the Establishment of Community Forestry (CF) and its processes. Examples from the South West Region of Cameroon. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol 6, No. 1, p. 76-89. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v6n1p76>.




---

The Colonial Heritage and  
Post-colonial Influence,  
Entanglements and  
Implications of the Concept  
of Community Forestry by  
the Example of Cameroon

---



First published by  
**Forest Policy and Economics 15 (2012) 70–77**



Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

journal homepage: [www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol](http://www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol)

Chair of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Georg August University Goettingen,  
Buesgenweg 3 37077 Goettingen, Germany

### **Article Info**

Article history:

Received 29 November 2010

Received in revised form 2 May 2011

Accepted 23 May 2011

Available online 9 September 2011

© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

E-mail address: [cyufani@gwdg.de](mailto:cyufani@gwdg.de) (M.C. Yufanyi Movuh).



## **Abstract**

In literature on Natural Resource Management related policies in Africa and Cameroon in particular, Colonial heritage was defined and identified. The question of this paper is whether “community forestry” which promotes giving back the forest to people breaks with this tradition. The key elements of Colonial heritage in resource management were deduced from literature. Based on these benchmarks the program and practice of community forestry in Cameroon were evaluated. Data about community forestry in Cameroon was collected in 10 selected communities in 2009/10. Today in practice community forestry favors techno-scientific knowledge about the forest, separate nature from human life, is a bureaucratic controlled engagement with nature and is aimed to make nature and people productive. The benchmark identifies a strong Colonial heritage within community forestry in Cameroon and questions whether the aim of including the local people in forest management, correcting their previous exclusion by the Colonial policy in the management of their forest resources, thus, the self determined life of people within the forest can be reached.

## **Keywords:**

Community forestry, Council forestry, Local communities<sup>1</sup>  
Post-Colonial theory, Colonial heritage, Cameroon

- 1 Since there are at times naïve assumptions of local homogeneity and discreteness, we define the local community as actors who directly affect or are affected locally by the natural resources management programs. This includes local Common Initiative Groups (CIGs), Village Forest Management Committees (VFMCs), village tradition councils, the municipal councils and the civil society who directly depend on these natural resources for their subsistence.



---

# 1. Introduction

---

## 1.2. The Issue of Colonial Heritage in Cameroon Forestry

Cameroon, with the second largest forest estate among African countries after the Democratic Republic of Congo (Burnham 2000: 32), is found in the Congo basin,<sup>2</sup> with a rich diversity of natural (forest) resources. The bilingual West/Central African country was first colonized by Germany (1884–1918) and then later divided and colonized by France and Britain (1918–1960/61), as protectorates under the “League of Nations” and subsequently the “United Nations Organization” as trust territories. With its relatively new Forestry law of 1994,<sup>3</sup> Cameroon marginally shifted away from its longtime Colonial background by granting some usufruct rights to the local populace in a bid to include them in the management of their forest resources but this was not in consultation with the local communities (Bigombe', 20) or their participation. Community forestry promised and is still promising participation from the local communities in sustainably managing of their resources and acquiring benefits through participation (Shahabuddin & Rao, 2010). The central question in this paper is how this concept works in practice (Sunderlin, 2006) and whether there is an influence by the Colonial heritage in Cameroon. The Colonial legacy exists in many aspects of Cameroon's politics (Mbuagbo & Akoko, 2004) especially in natural

2 The Congo basin is the second largest tropical forest area of the world after the Amazon.

3 The Forestry Law No 94/01 of 20th January 1994 and its decrees of application No 95/531/PM du 23 August 1995.

resources management policy. The Colonial heritage is a special challenge for community forestry because this concept aims at including the local people in forest management, correcting their previous exclusion by the Colonial policy (Jum et al., 2007: 11).

The analysis will be done by checking whether there are elements of Colonial heritage in the formulation and implementation of the program of Community Forestry in Cameroon. The elements will be defined based on the post-Colonial theory discussed in recent literature. The program of community forestry and its implementation will be analyzed based on political theory (Krott, 2005) with empirical data about the case of Cameroon. The conclusion gives an answer whether at all and in which specific elements post-colonialism shapes community forestry in Cameroon.

---

## 2. Application of Post-colonial Critique, Emanating from the Post-Colonial Theory

---

The post-Colonial theory is an area of cultural and critical theory that deals with the reading and writing of literature written in former western colonies. Post-Colonial theory may also be literature that was written in colonizing countries (the metropolis/center) dealing with colonization or the colonized people. The theory also focuses largely on the way in which literature by the colonizers distorts the experience and realities of the colonized countries, and inscribes the inferiority of the colonized while at the same time promoting the superiority of the colonizer (Mapara, 2009). Central to this critical examination is an analysis of the inherent ideas of European superiority over non-European peoples and cultures that such imperial colonization implies, critically analyzing the assumptions that the colonizers have of the colonized (Denyer, 2010). A key feature of such critical theoretical examinations is the analysis of the role played by representation in installing and perpetuating such notions of European superiority. Simply put, how does representation perpetuate negative stereotypes of Africans and their cultures and how do such stereotypes negatively affect their identity? Furthermore, given the so-called decolonization of many African countries after World War II and the development of so-called “independent nation states”, what is the role of representation in the construction of new post-Colonial identities? A concrete example is how the liberation struggles against European colonization by African freedom fighters are represented. Most of the time, the self governance of the former colonized societies is being seen as the Europeans granting them independence and less as




Fig. 1. Community and council forestry regions in the PSMNR-SWR.

the success of the liberation struggles against European colonization. Coming to natural resources management, a key issue which is being contested until date and the main focus of this paper are the western concepts of land and natural resources management in relation to CF.

Why post-Colonial theory in community forestry? This question is justified so as to establish the grounds of argument in this paper. The concept of post-Colonial theory as Ramutsindela (2004: 1) puts it is, “a process of continuity”. He further defines this concept as “an intermixture of events, processes and actors that transcend any form of periodization [...] acknowledging the continuing domination of post-Colonial societies by former Colonial masters in one form or another”.<sup>4</sup> I use the post-Colonial theory in analyzing CF to counter the misinterpretation or misinformation of the Government of Cameroon (GoC) and some international donor organizations of the local communities’ participation in managing their natural resources through CF. Though the present CF concept is new, I put out arguments that, in pre-Colonial, Colonial and post-Colonial Cameroon, there existed and still exist traditional forms of CF which were either neglected (Murphree, 2000; Oyono, 2005) or seen as primitive and inferior, preferring the concepts and ideologies of former Colonial masters. I also link the issue of land tenure, Protected Areas (PA) and National Parks (NP) to confirm the heritage of the Colonial past, of which CF is just a bi-product, exploring the mindset of those who pushed for CF and those directly affected. Adams and Mulligan (2003) in their analytic piece in “decolonizing nature”<sup>5</sup> identified 5 features reflecting the ideological ordering of the Colonial mindset. These points are based on the ways in which “colonization changed the very categories within which nature and society are conceived” (Adams & Mulligan, 2003: 5; Chiriyankandath, 2007: 38). These elements will be the benchmarks used in the analysis of community forestry. They are discussed based on theory in the context of empirical findings.

4 See Ramutsindela(2004). Parks and People in Postcolonial Societies, pp 1.

5 See Decolonize Nature: Colonialism’s legacy for conservation pp 42–44



---

### 3. Concept and Practice of “Community Forestry” in Cameroon

---

#### 3.1. Theoretical Based Empirical Field Study

We define “community forestry” as “forestry which directly involves local forest users in the common decision making and implementation of forestry activities”.<sup>6</sup> This includes community based natural resource management through programs emphasizing biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management involving the local communities (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; Charnley & Poe, 2007). With this definition the practice of council forestry in Cameroon is included as part of the community forestry. Conscious of this definition, 10 communities (see Fig. 1, map) were explored in the South West Region (SWR) of Cameroon and the history and status of the community forests were analyzed. Qualitative and quantitative interviews were carried out with CF managers and forestry officers and at times with members of the Common Initiative Groups (CIG) and Village Forest Management Committee (VFMC), responsible for the management of these forests, with representatives of MINFOF- SWR, KfW/GFA representing the main program (PSMNR-SWR) for the facilitation of the implementation of the forestry law (GFA, 2007), hence CF. 17 interviews were made and observations noted over a period of 3 months.

6 The Community Forestry Working Group (CFWG) in Germany, within the Chair for Forest and Nature Conservation Policy of the University in Goettingen.

Documents like logframe of the PSMNR-SWR, Management Plans (MP) and Technical Notes (NT) of the CFs were also part of the materials collected and analyzed.

The selections of the community and council forestry (CF) samples were done following indications made by the PSMNR-SWR (see Fig. 1 below). Although it was a simple random selection, it was also based on information on recent activities of the communities in the CF process. Interviews carried out with different stakeholders were in relation to the information given by other stakeholders in their networking (Schnell et al., 2005) and interest representation in CF.<sup>7</sup> All the interviews were recorded for transcription and further analyses. More the qualitative and less the quantitative analysis will be subject of comparison of the elements of Colonial heritage with the concept and practice of CF in Cameroon.

### 3.2. Practice of Community Forestry in Cameroon

Quoting Mbile et al. (2009: 3), “by the mid 1980s, the world economy was in decline, as was Cameroon’s and under pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank, the GoC introduced a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1988 to reduce its debts and to lay the ground for the recovery. From 1988 to 2005, the policy landscape of Cameroon took on a new direction impacting in important ways on forest livelihoods”. The Forestry Law No 94/01 of 20th January 1994 and its decrees of application No 95/531/PM of 23 August 1995 was one of the outcomes of this pressure (Bigombe’, 2003). CF was one of the major innovations offered by the 1994 forestry law. It aims at explicitly involving rural populations in the sustainable management of their own forests, providing them with income-generating mechanisms for equitable socio-economic development of their communities (Mambo, 2006; Betti, 2007; Milol & Pierre, 2000; Bigombe’, 2003). But this empowerment through community forests and community hunting zones has

7 This was done through the snowball method. It is a typical way to analyze networks (Schnell et al., 2005, 300).

proven to be a complicated and slow process (Fomété & Vermaat, 2001). The law was also intended to engage the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) actively in partnerships with the civil society in the management of forest resources. As part of the non-permanent forest estate, CF provides for a legal tool, where a management agreement between a community and the forest administration is established.

From the onset of the law, there were Community Development Projects funded by the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), the now Department for International Development — DFID (Mengang Mewondo, 1998). But in the devolution of some usufruct and to a limited extend participation rights to local communities, institutional arrangements had not been followed by the establishment of more effective institutions, all these, under a national government that is not really ready to substitute for sustainable resource management regimes (Poffenberger, 2006). While socio-economic development and social justice are among the reasons officially evoked for the implementation of a forest management decentralization model in Cameroon (Oyono et al., 2005: 362; Bigombe', 2003), these same reasons will cause future conflicts in the management of the forest resources. An example is that, in view of the sociologically contentious nature of what constitutes 'community', households considered not to strictly belong to the 'community' can be excluded from decision-making in formal village development plans (VDP) associated with community forests (Mbile et al., 2009). For communities aspiring for CF, the process is long, difficult, complicated and expensive and even with the state sponsored RIGC Project,<sup>8</sup> communities mostly depend on NGOs or outside assistance from logging companies (which use the opportunity to further exploit them) to assist with the financing of the Simple Management Plan (SMP).

8 The RIGC Project (also a MINFOF project) is a project assisting communities managing community forests especially in drawing up SMPs and carrying out some training and providing them with basic equipments like chainsaws in the form of a loan, expecting that when the community is operational, then they refund the money for others to use. They are based in Yaounde.

**Table 1**

**Community forest facts and figures (as of June 2009). Source: from Author.**

Number of community forest requests received by MINFOF	451
Number of community forest requests physically classified by MINFOF	441
Number of simple management plans approved by MINFOF	252
Number of community forests with management conventions signed	163
Number of community forests awaiting signed conventions	89
Forest area demanded for community forests	1,436,765.64 ha
Forest area reserved for community forests	519,033.61 ha
Forest area attributed to community forestry with approved SMP	886,087.4 ha
Forest area of CF under management convention	657,481.4 ha
Administrative divisions involved in CF in the whole of Cameroon	33

There are conflicting figures<sup>9</sup> concerning number and areas of CFs

9 It is very difficult to verify the correctness of documents from the forestry sector of the state institutions. Oyono (2004a,b), states that between April 1998 and November 2001, the Community Forestry Unit (CFU), had received 136 applications from local communities with about 30 Simple Management Plans approved and more than 20 Management Conventions signed with village communities and about 25 community forests being managed as of 2004. Following an evaluation of the state of community forestry carried out in collaboration with MINEF-DFID (MINEP, 2004), there were conflicting results to Oyono's, claiming that in concrete terms, the community forestry process in Cameroon started in the year 2000 and that in 2004, 4 years after, the CFU received 256 files that were at various processing levels: 63 community forests were granted, 56 were reserved and 120 communities had been engaged in the

already approved and this is at times political. Table 1 below was drawn following research figures got from MINFOF Yaoundé, which were at times not well calculated. These are only figures of CF classified under Cameroonian law. For council forestry, there were 28 CFs in either one of the prescribed 7 stages of classification,<sup>10</sup> with a total area of 526.920 ha (MINFOF, 2009). At the time of writing this paper, only 1 council forest (Nanga Eboko) had been classified and 6 others (Ambam, Salapoumbé, Minta, Dzens, Lomié, Nguti) have been sent to the PM for signing.

An agreement (Management Convention) signed between the state and the community concerned is valid for 25 years on the condition that the community adheres to the Management Plan (MP) and agreement articles. The communities are supposed to be solely responsible for the management of the CF and receive all the benefits arising from its utilization. Theoretically, a village community can apply for a community forest of not more than 5000 ha, which is then reserved for them by the Minister in MINFOF, awaiting a SMP from the community which can either be approved or rejected. If the SMP is approved, a MC is signed, granting the community with this piece of land for sustainable exploitation of timber and NTFP for 25 years but the land does not belong to them. The SMP is renewable after every 5 years. Practically, this process is slow, expensive and centralized and does not lead to devolution of authority as claimed by the government and many international organizations. Also within the scope of the 1994 Forestry Law

reservation process. Nuesiri (2008), claims that as of 2008, there were about 107 community forests in different parts of Cameroon covering 400,000 ha of forest. From the national statistics of MINFOF (2008) in Yaoundé, the situation of Community forest in Cameroon in 2008 was as follows: 451 applications were made for CF, 252 SMPs were approved and 163 Management Conventions have been signed (researchers' observation).

- 10 0–7 steps for the classification process: 0 initiation by municipal council; 1 public notice of intention; 2 sensitization of administrative authorities and local elites; 3 sensitization of the population; 4 formation of classification commission; 5 preparation of documents to be sent to Prime Ministry for signing; 6 documents transmitted to PM for signature; 7 decree signed and made available.

(article 21) and the current forest environment sector program (PSFE), it became imperative that local councils manage council forests as part of the decentralization process. The “German Cooperation” (KfW/GFA, GTZ, DED)<sup>11</sup> is working with other partner organizations to provide support to councils nation-wide to create and manage council forests within their area of jurisdiction (Mambo, 2006).<sup>12</sup> For council forest an agreement is valid for 30 years,<sup>13</sup> with an unlimited land area size compared to the 5000 ha of the community forest.

In the last 14 years, following the failure or better said unsuccessful implementation of the CF concept in the SWR in particular and Cameroon at large donor organizations especially the “German Cooperation – GTZ ProPSFE” have embarked on fostering the council forest approach. It comes with the argumentation that municipal councils have a much more financial base to embark on forest management activities than village communities would. In the SWR of Cameroon, there are supposedly 19 CFs and 6 proposed council forests.<sup>14</sup> At the moment classification procedures are being undertaken in only 2 of the planned council forests (a process which began in 2006) although all 6 of them are being branded as acquired council forests in all MINFOF and PSMNR-SWR cartographic images on community and council forests. These community and council forests spread in all the 4 regions of the Technical Operation Units (TOU)<sup>15</sup> of the SWR (Mambo, 2006; GFA, 2007; PSMNR, 2).


11 These different organizations have and represent different interests within the PSMNR-SWR although they want to be seen as representing the same interest.

12 Examples of support are the Nguti and Mundemba Councils in the SWR.

13 The Management Agreement has a rotation period of 30 years and is renewable.

14 To repeat, all these are just on paper or on maps. Some are just reserved forests with no Management Plan, Management Agreement or Management Convention.

15 A TOU is a given geographic space (a given ecosystem or an ecologically fragile zone) which is selected due to its socio-economic, ecological, cultural and political importance with the benchmark strongly conforming to the development of an integrated management of natural resources and sustainable development based on an arrangement that assures the sustainable use of the resources by all stakeholders concerned. It is elaborated within the framework of component No 3 of the PSFE, and component No 2 of the PSMNR–Cameroon (PGDRN).



**Fig. 2. CF organogram.**

Fig. 2 (Organogram) gives a brief overview of the different local institutions responsible for the acquisition and running of the community and council forests. It starts from bottom to top where an interested community forms a CIG,<sup>16</sup> or a VFMC. This CIG/VFMC subsequently follows-up the application and classification process of the CF. The legal provisions and methodological instruments prescribe that each village community applying for a community forest should register for a legally-recognized management body, the CIG (under the 1994 decentralization law) with a constitution and an executive committee. For a council forest, the villages forming part of the council forest should also form a legal body, the VFMC. These two, are the main bodies within the village community and villages within the municipal council respectively, responsible for the adjacent forests, follow up and running of the CFs. They could be assisted by the forestry administration (MINFOF), NGOs or the private sector including timber companies.

16 There are four types of legal entities recommended to rural organizations, to be officially recognized and to be institutionalized actors in the CF game: i) the common initiative group (CIG); ii) the association (Ass); iii) the economic interest group (EIG); and iv) the cooperative.



---

## 4. Evaluation of Colonial Heritage in Community Forestry

---

In the evaluation of the Colonial heritage of community forestry I will apply the arguments of Adams and Mulligan (2003) to portray the “Colonial lineage” reflecting the Colonial mindset. This will be done by exploring the interactions between the stakeholders in CF from the center and the periphery. The evaluation is based on five elements of Colonial heritage derived from theory: a) the favor of techno-scientific knowledge over folk knowledge, b) nature seen as separated from human life, c) bureaucratic controlled engagement with nature, d) the paternalistic external imposition and e) how nature and people were made productive. Adams and Mulligan (2003) show that these five elements are fundamentally rooted in European values, constructing nature as nothing more than a resource for human use and wildness as a challenge for the rational mind to conquer.

### 4.1. Favor of Techno-scientific Knowledge over Folk Knowledge. Cf: Strict Management Plan Based on Western Forest Science

Prior to the enactment of the decrees leading to the current CF in Cameroon, there existed local forms of CF practices which are based on informal and localized methods. The rural populations have had to rely on management forms which derive in large part on pre-Colonial communalism, in which order is induced by “affective” modes of personal relationship which emphasize scriptive roles, peer pressure and

collective control (Murphree, 2004). Through the present “manual of procedures for the attribution and norms for the management of CFs”, the GoC chose to privilege formalized and centralized ways. These are embedded in the different pre-requisites guiding the acquisition of a CF, the main one being the SMP, a document that has to be strictly followed in the management of the CF. Under the CF law, without the approval of this document by MINFOF in Yaoundé, the communities are not allowed to exploit their forest as a CF. After some amendments in the articles guiding CF were made, the Minister at MINFOF can now sign a maximum of 2 years provisional management agreement for exploitation to begin so as to finance the drawing of the SMP. In all the CFs visited, only REPA CIG CF, Akwen and Christian Philanthropic CF could boast of a SMP (see Fig. 1). The others were still in the process or gave up in the process, like Ikondo Kondo. In all, the Colonial heritage manifests itself in the different documents demanded in the procedures like the constitution for CIG, forestry inventory for the CF, etc., all included in the SMP, which is not simple and too expensive, technical and scientific for the village communities and bearing blueprints of western Colonial values.

## 4.2. Nature Separated from Human Life

The myth of wilderness in the African tropical forests was a pillar stone of European colonialism and an important step in establishing dominant Colonial theories in Africa’s natural resources especially forest policy approaches. The development of protected areas (PA) and reserves that began in Colonial times (Arrey, 2008) created tensions between rural communities and newly formalized administrative structures at that time and well as at present. This policy of the PAs in Cameroon today creates a situation where the distance between humans and non-humans, an ideology maintained in the Colonial times is being formally executed through CF policies by the post-Colonial state, creating apartheid at species level (Burnham, 2000). In the Colonial mind, nature was treated separate from the Africans that lived with it. Nature was “out there” and “not here”. The general concept of the colonialist conservationists bore the “Colonial masters” perception that Africans and their poaching activities were

one of the main reasons for declining wildlife numbers. Today, the same trend is still being reported in the media and research studies, quoting an article in the BBC (2007) that, “the main cause behind the animals’ decline was human activity” and concluding that, “many parks are subject to the ravaging impact of illegal hunters”.<sup>17</sup>

In the SW region of Cameroon with presently 3 National Parks and approximately 50% of the forest areas conserved or reserved,<sup>18</sup> failure to conserve biodiversity or its depletion is been accredited to the local communities with reasons being the increase in population and better medical facilities (Arrey, 2008), and increased agricultural and economic activities. It is argued by the PSMNR-SWR (personal interview) that conserved areas (Mt. Cameroon NP) are increasingly being infringed (encroached) and used for farm land, grazing, hunting and the carrying out of other forest activities like the so-called illegal logging. Today’s PAs are being created with the rationale or premise of mitigating unsustainable management of forest resources or unsustainable farm practices. The question here is how does this policy of PAs connect to CF as “Colonial heritage”?

While CF was one of the major innovations of the 1994 Forestry Law, the law itself was a bi-product of an externally formulated and executed environmental and economic policy, with the main goal of conserving and maximizing forest product profits of the Cameroon’s rich rainforest. In all the CFs visited in my research, all of them are sharing boundaries or found near NPs or PAs (see Fig. 1). This goes with the western policy of creating buffer zones around PAs to reduce human pressure on the natural resources in them (Malleon, 2000). Apart from the Bakingili CF which shares boundaries with the recently gazetted Mt. Cameroon NP (a former reserve of Colonial times – 1939), all the other CFs either

<sup>17</sup> This is the result of a research carried out by researchers Tim Caro (University of California, Davis, USA) and Paul Scholte (Leiden University, the Netherlands), reviewing a range of wildlife inventories covering the entire African continent.

<sup>18</sup> All of the National Parks in the SWR were classified as protected areas in the form of “Forest Reserves” during the British Colonial era and there are also still plans to create more protected areas in the SWR.

share boundaries with or are found near the Korup National Park in short KNP (1937 as Forest Reserve), the Rumpi Hills Reserve (1938) or the Takamanda National Park (1934 as Reserve). These PAs are by large a Colonial heritage and the policies surrounding them with community forests are of a Colonial mindset. CF is developed on the borderlines of NP and PA in order to protect this Colonial concept.

### 4.3. Bureaucratic Controlled Engagement with Nature

Contrary to the Forest Management Units (FMUs) that are exploited by large timber companies, the CF enterprises have to depend on external financial, material and technical support. Although the amendments through a 2 year “provisional management agreement” is being offered by the Minister, there is no change in procedures in facilitating acquisition especially in costs, know-how and decentralization. The bureaucratic procedures are still complex and exhaustive, leading to many communities not being able to apply and acquire CFs. For all the communities mentioned in this paper, almost all of them acquired their reservation or classification with external help from either donor organizations or timber companies. Mundemba and Nguti are getting assistance from GTZ and DED respectively. Ikondo Kondo is now under Mundemba CF so indirectly linked to GTZ. The CF process of Mosongiseli which has broken down many times since 1999 is being followed up by DED. Toko, Konye CFs although not functioning began with the aid of KfW. Akwen CF and REPA CIG CF were both supported by CAFECO timber exploitation company. The only community that financed its process was the Itali Batanga Christian Philanthropic CF, but the SMP was produced in French, a language they do not understand. All these examples, although not with a direct connection to Colonial heritage makes it clear that the interests of the communities were never represent when this CF model was established and standardized. Nevertheless, the CF program of the SWR depends on the structures of former Colonial masters like the German Cooperation (KfW, GFA, GTZ, DED) and the bureaucratic procedures in CF offer the former Colonial masters opportunities to dominate the formal participatory processes.

#### 4.4. Paternalistic External Imposition

Since the late 1980s onward, the World Bank has played a leading role in the formulation of the forest management and conservation policies in Cameroon. One of the examples was the drafting of the 1994 Forestry Law, entailing fiscal and administrative reforms coupled with environmentalist policies such as restriction on log exports, the development of forest management plans and the creation of community forestry. Nevertheless, this law did not encompass the social and economic realities of the majority of the population that would be affected and hence effect it. The foreign consultants who drafted the law incorporated written legal clauses with contemporary popular principles taken from shelves elsewhere, with little attempt to adapt them to the country where they would be implemented (Burnham, 2000: 36). Just like in the Colonial times this law came up with the assumption that forest management policies especially CF could be discussed, established and administered with no participatory involvement of the rural populace and other local stakeholders. This led to the difficulties that the communities are facing at the moment, before, during the process and after acquiring their CF. The revision of the law already started in 2009 and would be completed by the end of 2010 but still with little or no participation of local communities. CF was founded by external state authorities; grass root initiatives were not supported.

#### 4.5. Nature and People were Made Productive (and in actual fact exploited)

Oyono et al. (2005: 357) point out that commercial logging was inaugurated by the German colonization in Cameroon in the nineteenth century, and under the French and English Colonial periods, it had registered a notable expansion motivated by metropolitan logics of financial accumulation (Meniaud, 1948 cited in Oyono et al., 2005: 358; Oyono, 2005). Also, as earlier mentioned in the paper, pre-Colonial and present communities had and still have integrated systems of cognition and belief embedded in proverbs, myths and some religious rituals, cultural and domestic practice (Murphree, 2000, 2004; Baldus, 2001; Sunseri,

2003) entangled to their traditional CF. Nevertheless, the present CF model forces them to adjust to a solely production and profit oriented CF management. This in effect also influences the way the communities are engaged in CF. CF should become productive for people; not the people living with the forest following their traditional way of life.

The fact that part of the aim of community forests is the regeneration of hardwood timber trees, which require at least 30 years to mature, the expectation that local villagers will be able and willing to make substantial sacrifice in forest management schemes, which will only yield financial returns to generations to come, raises fundamental questions about the understanding of the priorities of local groups, their inheritance rules and land tenure conceptions and the reasons behind their subsistence living methods. Interviews with all the communities concerned exposed the paradox of trying to conserve while at the same time exploiting the forest resources for subsistence.

In 2010, Cameroon signed a legally-binding Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the European Union (EU) to get rid of all illegal wood from its supply chain to the EU and worldwide. The agreement meant that by 2012 all wood-products from Cameroon to the EU must have a license showing they were legally obtained and that the wood products must have been harvested in a way that retains the health of the nation's forests and gives benefits back to forest communities (Mongabay.com, 2010; How We Made it in Africa, 2010). But this agreement has the sole aim of supporting economic interest of the European actors and adding to the difficulties of the CF managers who do not only have to look for buyers of their timber but now only those buyers that have some kind of western certification, something rare to find in the local communities of Cameroon. Also, the relatively limited size of community forests (5000 ha) often has the undesirable effect of also limiting the customer base of CF with challenging risk-taking or innovation efforts within such contexts while exploitation by international timber companies remain unaffected.

---

## 5. Conclusion

---

### 5.1. Strong Colonial Heritage in Community Forestry in Cameroon

This paper identifies and confirms strong Colonial heritage of the Post-colonial state of Cameroon's community forestry model. The use of Postcolonial theory exposes the continuity of Colonial policies in community forestry and the mindset of foreign organizations or so-called external stakeholders, fundamentally rooted in European values. With bases on political theory derived from Adams and Mulligan's (2003) five elements of understanding the mindset of those implementing western-style natural resource management and empirical data, Colonial heritage and post-Colonial domination by former "Colonial masters" (Oyono, 2005; Fisiy, 1996) could be seen in all five elements. The research confirmed that the Program of CF: was in favor of technoscientific knowledge over folk knowledge, saw nature as separated from human life, inherited a bureaucratic controlled engagement with nature, promoted a paternalistic external imposition and with the main aim of making nature and people productive and less interested in their participation in the management of their natural resources.

The policies of PAs and NPs are what caused land tenure problems during the Colonial and post-Colonial Cameroon. These policies are still implemented till date and as long as Cameroon continues to leave itself to be controlled by its former "Colonial masters", the interests of the communities that live in subsistence and in harmony with their rich natural resources will never be represented in its forest and other development policies. If things continue like this, the CF regime, although at

the moment a step forward for community participation and empowerment, will not meet its social, economic and ecological goals.

Community forestry is an instrument of devolution and a base for communities' participation in the management of forest resources, but the Colonial heritage which was impregnated into the concept and its implementation endanger the success. Community forestry might not be much more than a new element within post-Colonial developments and not a turning point to promote local communities' participation. The CF concept acknowledges the effects of the legacy of Colonial order on present governance structures and reproduces unquestioned values (Matthews, 2006) tantamount to the western imperial projects. It has failed to recognize pre-existing systems of governance and as such a continuity of Imperial economic interests remains firmly in place.





---

## References

---

- Adams, W.M., Mulligan, Martin John (Eds.), 2003. Decolonizing nature : strategies for conservation in a post-colonial era / edited by William M. Adams and Martin Mulligan. Earthscan Publications, Sterling, Va.:<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy036/2002152952.html>.
- Agrawal, Arun, Chhatre, Ashwini, 2006. Explaining success on the commons: Community forest governance in the Indian Himalaya. *World Development* (ISSN: 0305-750X) 34 (1), 149–166. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.07.013<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VC6-4HP6GG7-1/2/b6a1e51bb592315c3d656e44c706ca04> (January 2006, Visited 13.06.2010).
- Arrey, M. Ivo, 2008. Why Forest Conservation in South West of Cameroon is a problem. ©2008 African Centre for Community and Development <http://www.africancentreforcommunity.com/Why%20Forest%20Conservation%20in%20South%20West%20of%20Cameroon%20is%20a%20problem%20By%20Arrey%20Mbongaya%20Ivo.%202008%20African%20Centre%20for%20Community%20and%20De.pdf>. (Visited 13.06.2010).
- Baldus, R.D., 2001. Wildlife conservation in Tanganyika under German colonial rule. Tanzanian-German Development Cooperation, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania <http://www.wildlife-programme.gtz.de/wildlife/download/colonial.pdf>. (Visited 13.06.2010).
- BBC, 2007. Parks 'failing Africa's wildlife. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6972416.stm>2007(Visited 01.07.2010).
- Betti, J.L., 2007. Exploitation and Exportation of *Pericopsis elata* (Fabacea) in CAMEROON. MINFOF/Cabinet/CT1. [http://www.itto.int/direct/topics/topics\\_pdf\\_download/topics\\_id=33340000&no=21](http://www.itto.int/direct/topics/topics_pdf_download/topics_id=33340000&no=21). (Visited 13.06.2010).
- Bigombe', P., 2003. The decentralized forestry taxation system in Cameroon. In: Ribot, Jesse, Conyers, Diana (Eds.), *Local Management and State's Logic*. WRI, Washington, DC. [http://pdf.wri.org/eea\\_wp10.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/eea_wp10.pdf). (03.07.2010).

- Burnham, Philip, 2000. Whose forest? Whose myth?—conceptualisations of community forests in Cameroon. In: Abramson, A., Theodossopoulos, D. (Eds.), *Land, Law and Environment: Mythical Land, Legal Boundaries*. Pluto Press, London, pp. 31–58 (074531575).
- Charnley, Susan, Poe, Melissa R., 2007. Community Forestry in Theory and Practice: Where Are We Now? *Susan Annual Review of Anthropology* 36, 301–336. doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.35.081705.123143. (September 2007).
- Chiriyankandath, James, 2007. Colonialism and Post-Colonial Development, In: Burnell, Peter J., Vicky, Randall (Eds.), *Politics in the developing world*, second edition, pp. 35–52. Also [http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199296088/burnell\\_ch02.pdf](http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199296088/burnell_ch02.pdf). (visited 20.10.2010).
- Denyer, Martin, 2010. *An Introduction to Postcolonial Theory*. <http://www.photoinstitut.org/theory/theory.pdf>. (visited 04.07.2010) <http://www.photoinstitut.org/theory/index.htm>.
- Fisiy, C., 1996. Techniques of land acquisition: The concept of ‘crown land’ in colonial and post-colonial Cameroon. In: Debusmann, R., Arnold, S. (Eds.), *Land law and land ownership in Africa*. Bayreuth African Studies, Bayreuth, pp. 223–254.
- GFA Consulting Group, 2007. Programme for the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources South-West Province. VN: 81090213. PN: 2003.2097.8-002.00 Short-term mission: Facilitation of the elaboration of regional land use Plan for the Cameroon SW region (8–16 Dec. 2006) Prepared for: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH. Yaoundé, Cameroon January 2007. [http://69.59.158.2/fr/system/\(03.07.2010\)](http://69.59.158.2/fr/system/(03.07.2010)).
- Jum, Cyprain, Nguiebouri, Joachim, Mireille, Zoa, Chimere, Diaw, 2007. The model forest experience in Cameroon. ITTO Tropical Forest Update, 17/2. Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) Central Africa Regional Office.
- Krott, Max, 2005. *Forest Policy Analysis*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Seiten, p. 323.
- Malleson, Ruth, 2000. *Forest Livelihoods in South-West Province, Cameroon: An evaluation on the Korup experience*, Ph.D. Thesis, Dept. of Anthropology, University College, London, 2000. [http://cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18\\_69\\_19.pdf](http://cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18_69_19.pdf). (Visited 19.07.2010).
- Mambo, Okenye, 2006. PSMNR- in Cameroon Feasibility study on creation of Council Forests in the South West Province. Mission Report for GTZ-

- PGDRN, Buea September 2006. [http://cameroun-foret.com/fr/system/files/18\\_61\\_127.pdf](http://cameroun-foret.com/fr/system/files/18_61_127.pdf) (Visited 19.07.2010).
- Mapara, Jacob, 2009. Indigenous Knowledge Systems in Zimbabwe: Juxtaposing Post-colonial Theory. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, vol.3, no.1. Department of African Languages and Literature, Great Zimbabwe University, Masvingo, Zimbabwe, p. 141. <http://www.jp.anafri.c.a.n.c.o.m/docs/vol3no1/3.1%20Indigenous%20Knowledge%20Systems%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf>. (September 2009. Visited 19.07.2010).
- Matthews, Sally, 2006. Responding to Poverty in the Light of the Post-Development Debate: Some insights from the NGO Enda Graf Sahel. *Africa Development XXXI (4)*, 52–72. © Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. ISSN 0850–3907.
- Mbile, P., Ndzomo-Abanda, G., Essoumba, H., Misouma, A., 2009. Alternate Tenure and Enterprise Models in Cameroon: Community Forests in the Context of Community Rights and Forest Landscapes. World Agroforestry Centre and Rights and Resources Initiative, Washington. <http://worldagroforestry.org/publications/publicationsdetails?node=52624>. (Visited 20.07.2009).
- Mbuagbo, O.T., Akoko, M.R., 2004. Roll-Back: Democratization and Social Fragmentation in Cameroon. *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 13 (1), 1–12. <http://www.njas.helsinki.fi/pdf-files/vol13num1/mbuagbo.pdf>. (Visited 10.07.2009).
- Mewondo, Mengang J., 1998. Resource Use in the Tri-National Sangha River Region of Equatorial Africa: Histories, Knowledge Forms, and Institutions. In: Eves, Heather E., Hardin, Rebecca, Rupp, Stephanie (Eds.), *Bulletin Series*, 102. Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies.
- Milol, Adonis, Pierre, J.-M., 2000. Impact de la Fiscalité Décentralisée sur le Développement Local et les Pratiques d'Utilisation des Ressources Forestières au Cameroun. Consultative Report for the World Bank.
- MINEP, 2004. Etat des lieux de la foresterie communautaire au Cameroun, 21 avril 2004
- MINISTERE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DES FORETS Direction des Forêts, Cellule de Foresterie Communautaire. Online: [http://cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18\\_64\\_17.pdf](http://cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18_64_17.pdf) 2004. (Visited 19.07.2010).
- MINFOF, 2008. FICHE D'IDENTIFICATION DES FORETS COMMUNAUTAIRES—SITUATION DES F.C 2008, unpublished.

- MINFOF, 2009. La Foresterie Communale au Cameroun : Rapport Annuel, 2009.
- Ndangang Vincent Awa, Cadre Responsable de la Foresterie Communale Direction des Forêts, MINFOF Yaoundé. Décembre 2009, unpublished.
- Murphree, Marshal, W., 2000. COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION: Old Ways, New Myths And Enduring Challenges. Conference on "African Wildlife Management in the New Millennium". Key Address for Theme No. 3 "Community-Based Conservation – The New Myth?" <http://www.rmportal.net/library/content/frame/marshalmurphree-mweka2000.pdf>. (Visited 20.07.2010).
- Murphree, Marshall, W., 2004. Communal approaches to natural resource management in Africa: From whence and to where? Center for African Studies, UC Berkeley. <Http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3mw325br>. (Visited 20.07.2010).
- Nuesiri, O. Emmanuel, 2008. Forest Governance Challenges on Mount Cameroon in IHDP Update 2.2008: Magazine of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change. Issue 2, pp. 27–30 (ISSN 1727-155X). Online: <http://www.ihdp.unu.edu/file/get/7173h> [p://www.ihdp.unu.edu/file/get/7726](http://www.ihdp.unu.edu/file/get/7726). (Visited 16.06.2010).
- Oyono, P.R., 2004a. Institutional deficit, representation, and decentralized forest management in Cameroon. Elements of natural resource sociology for social theory and public policy (Working Paper No. 15). World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. [http://pdf.wri.org/ea\\_wp15.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/ea_wp15.pdf). (Visited 19.07.2010).
- Oyono, P.R., 2004b. One step forward, two steps back? Paradoxes of natural resource management decentralization in Cameroon. : *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42(1). Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, pp. 91–111. doi:10.1017/S0022278X03004488 [p://pdf.wri.org/paradoxes\\_natresmanage.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/paradoxes_natresmanage.pdf). (Visited 19.07.2010).
- Oyono, P.R., 2005. The Foundations of the Conflit de Langage over Land and Forests in Southern Cameroon. *African Study Monographs* 26 (3), 115–144 Online: [http:// repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/68242/1/ASM\\_26\\_115.pdf](http://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/68242/1/ASM_26_115.pdf). (Visited 19.07.2010).
- Oyono, P.R., Kouna, C., Mala, W., 2005. Benefits of forests in Cameroon: Global structure, issues involving access, and decision-making hiccoughs. *Forest Policy and Economics* 7 (3), 357–368.



- Poffenberger, Mark, 2006. People in the forest: community forestry experiences from Southeast Asia. *Int. J. Environment and Sustainable Development* 5 (1), 57–69. [http:// www.communityforestryinternational.org/publications/articles/People\\_in\\_the\\_Forest. pdf](http://www.communityforestryinternational.org/publications/articles/People_in_the_Forest.pdf). (Visited on 15.07.2010).
- PSMNR, 2008. Programme for the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the South West Region (PSMNR-SWR). 2nd Technical Committee Meeting of the Korup-Ndongere Technical Operations Unit (TOU), Mundemba, 13th June 2008. Ayuk Enyang, Unpublished.
- Ramutsindela, Maano, 2004. Parks and People in Postcolonial Societies: Experiences in Southern Africa. Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dor-drecht978-1-4020-2842-7. (viii + 185 pp. \$89.95 (cloth)).
- Schnell, Rainer, Hill, Paul, Esser, Elke, 2005. Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung, 7 Auflage. Oldenbourg, München.
- Shahabuddin, G., Rao, M., 2010. Do community-conserved areas effectively conserve biological diversity? Global insights and the Indian context. *Biological Conservation* 143 (12), 2926–2936.
- William, Sunderlin D., 2006. Poverty alleviation through community forestry in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam: An assessment of the potential. : \* Forest Policy and Economics, 8. Forests and Livelihoods Program, Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), pp. 386–396.
- Sunseri, Thaddeus, 2003. Reinterpreting a Colonial Rebellion: Forestry and Social Control in German East Africa, 1874-1915, vol. 8, no. 3. *Forest History Society and American Society for Environmental History*, pp. 430–451. Jul., 2003 <http://www.historycooperative.org/cgi-bin/justtop.cgi?act=justop&url=http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/eh/8.3/sunseri.html>. (Visited 09.07.2010).
- Timotheé, Fomété, Vermaat, Jaap, 2001. Community Forestry and Poverty Alleviation in Cameroon: Rural Development Forestry Network network paper 25th July 2001. <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/789.pdf>. 2001(Visited 20.07.2008).

## Internet

Mongabay.com, 2010. Cameroon agrees to cut illegal wood out of its supply chain by Jeremy Hance Available at: [http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0510-hance\\_cameroon.html](http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0510-hance_cameroon.html). 2010 (May 10 2010, Visited 19.06.2010).

How We Made it in Africa, 2010. N.p. Available at: <http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/cameroon-signs-trade-agreement-on-tropical-hardwood/>. 2010 (Visited 19.06.2010).





---

Back to Basics:  
Considerations in  
Evaluating the Outcomes of  
Community Forestry

---



First published by  
**Forest Policy and Economics 14 (2012) 1–5**



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

journal homepage: [www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol](http://www.elsevier.com/locate/forpol)

Ahmad Maryudi <sup>a, b, \*</sup>, Rosan R. Devkota <sup>b</sup>, Carsten Schusser <sup>b</sup>, Cornelius Yufanyi <sup>b</sup>,  
Manjola Salla <sup>b</sup>, Helene Aurenhammer <sup>b</sup>, Ratchananth Rotchanaphatharawit <sup>b</sup>, Max  
Krott <sup>b</sup>

### Article Info

Article history:

Received 31 December 2010

Received in revised form: 24 May 2011;

Accepted: 21 July 2011;

Available online 27 August 2011

© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1389-9341/\$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2011.07.017

E-mail address: [cyufani@gwdg.de](mailto:cyufani@gwdg.de) (M.C. Yufanyi Movuh).

<sup>a</sup> Faculty of Forestry, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Bulaksumur-Yogyakarta, Indonesia 55281

<sup>b</sup> Chair of Forest- and Nature Conservation Policy, Georg-August Universitaet Goettingen, Buesgenweg 3, Germany 37077

\* Corresponding author at: Faculty of Forestry, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Bulaksumur-Yogyakarta, Indonesia 55281. Tel./fax: + 62 274 550541. E-mail address: [maryudi76@yahoo.com](mailto:maryudi76@yahoo.com) (A. Maryudi).



## **Abstract**

Evaluations on community forestry outcomes are important to observe whether the program community forestry produces what it has promised. For the evaluation-as an alternative to the comprehensive criteria and indicators on sustainable community forestry-, we propose an approach based on the core policy objectives of the program. In fact, community forestry is very much connected to the following three objectives of: 1) alleviating the poverty of forest users, 2) empowering them, and 3) improving the condition of the forests. Based on field tests in two community forests in Indonesia, the focus on the core policy objectives appears to provide a more practical approach than the use of complex criteria and indicators. We conclude that our approach allows rapid evaluations and eventually reduces the associated costs and time without compromising the goals of the evaluation.

## **Keywords:**

Community forestry, Evaluation, Outcomes, Policy objectives.



---

## 1. Introduction

---

Why evaluating the outcomes of community forestry? Over the past few decades, the program has been promoted as an innovative and potential approach to improved forest management and conservation strategies with a comprehensive blend of ecological and socio-economic objectives. Many countries across the globe have since experimented with community forestry; the program is now in the run, albeit at different stages of development (Gilmour et al., 2004; McCarthy, 2004). It is estimated that over a tenth of the world's forests are managed accordingly to models of community forestry (Bull and White, 2002). Whether the program's potentials on producing multiple positive outcomes have been shown on the ground is of great interests. In fact, there have been a pool of assessment studies on the outcomes of community forestry program, but scholars are increasingly aware that different forms and models interpreting the program are yet to realize its potentials (see Wollenberg et al., 2008). Even when positive outcomes are there, the comprehensive blend of goals is rarely achieved since the implementation of the program often emphasizes particular goals over the others (Brendler and Carey, 1998; Chakraborty, 2001; Dev et al., 2003; Malla et al., 2003; Thoms, 2006; Springate-Baginski and Blaikie, 2007).

Such has made evaluation on the outcomes of community forestry is still highly appropriate that eventually encourages us to involve ourselves in the procedures on the evaluation. Indeed, there is a need to develop pre-defined standards, against which the performance of the program can be assessed. It is here not to argue that the standards for evaluating the performance of community forestry were absent. Over the past few decades, numerous sets of criteria and indicators (C&I) on sustainable forestry, including those exclusively dedicated for com-

munity forestry (e.g. Ritchie et al., 2000), have been there for use. While we also see that the C&I(s) provide robust and comprehensive frameworks on how particular community forests should be managed, a more practical approach is needed to see whether the implementation of community forestry has produced the impacts as initially intended. For this purpose, Krott and Stefanov (2008) recommend to limit the focuses accordingly to the core objectives of community forestry. This eventually allows rapid but appropriate evaluation. Field tests on two Indonesian community forestry cases show that our approach provides meaningful feedbacks to policy makers on how far the objectives were reached and helps them to chart out a course of action (Garcia and Les-cuyer, 2008) so that community forestry can produce the potentials it holds.

---

## 2. The Concept of Community Forestry

---

Over the past few decades, community forestry has been placed at the top of priorities of forest policy makers (Gauld, 2000) to tackle forest degradation and the pervasive rural poverty in one single package of program by mobilizing local people, particularly those heavily depend on the resources and directly use them (hereafter we refer to as 'direct forest users') through democratic processes of program formulation and decision making as well as the implementation of the forest activities. The core concept of community forestry lays on its attempt to build active participation of the locals, with the external involvement having a supportive rather than management nature (Arnold, 1991). The concept is founded on the recognition of interdependency and intimate synergies between rural people and forests (Stevens, 1997). The basic premise is that people's meaningful role in decisions affecting surrounding forests can achieve improved socio-economic well-being and ecological sustainability (Shrestha, 2005). The participatory approach of community forestry is considered to produce increasing benefits for the local community, to make use of local knowledge, to encourage voluntary compliance, to trigger innovation and to contribute to sustainable forestry comprising economic, social and ecological benefits (Kellert et al., 2000).

Since the earliest definition at the 1978 World Forestry Congress, a significant number of scholars (e.g. Shepherd, 1985; Gilmour and Fisher, 1991; Duinker et al., 1994; Hobley, 1996; Shackleton et al., 2002; Pangdee et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2005; Alden Wily, 2005; Poffenberger, 2006) have reviewed the concepts and definitions of community forestry. The important issues in their definition include (but not limited to): 1) deci-

sion-making procedures and authority, 2) representation — who is involved locally and how are they selected; and 3) equity — who pays and who benefits. Nonetheless, many of them focus on the normative values of community forestry, i.e. what it should be — rather than what community forestry actually is. As such, Shrestha (2005) argues on the need for defining and understanding community forestry in relation to specific contexts and with a realization of gaps between actual and ideal versions.

With such a consideration, this paper thus defines community forestry as: “forestry practices which directly involve direct forest users in common decision making processes and implementation of forestry activities”. As such, meaningful good community forestry practices require decision-making autonomy to the direct forest users in setting objectives, local control in forest management and utilization, and ownership of the benefits of the forest. McDermott and Schreckenberg (2009:158) have elaborated community forestry as the exercise by local people of power to influence decisions regarding management of forests, including the rules of access and the disposition of products. This definition entails community forestry as ‘power shift’ from the state to the local communities and opens a question of power sharing in order to deliver its objectives into practice.

---

### 3. Community Forestry Outcomes and the Key Elements of Evaluation

---

As has been mentioned in the earlier section, community forestry is very much connected to the following three objectives of: 1) alleviating the poverty of direct forest users, 2) empowering them, and 3) improving the condition of the forests (among others see Wiersum, 1984; Bhattacharya and Basnyat, 2003; Charnley and Poe, 2007; Karmacharya et al., 2008). Seeing this way, we do not necessarily discount the importance of other indicators on sustainability. We instead give more emphasis on assessing what community forestry policy has promised, that is the three policy objectives. Therefore, the rest of the section will analyze the objectives, explaining why they were underlined in community forestry policy formulation, and their key elements of our evaluation approach.

#### 3.1. Poverty Alleviation of Direct Forest Users

That community forestry has been widely promoted is coined with the pervasive poverty in rural areas in the forest vicinity. Westoby (1987: 291) trenchantly criticizes forest activity by external stakeholders that “its contribution to improving the quality of rural life and raising the welfare of the rural masses has been negligible.” While the problems of the poverty of forest dwellers have been long raised, they persist. Hobley (2007: 4) rhetorically asks “why, if this was so clearly the case 30 years ago, we are still repeating the same mistakes with the same consequences”. This suggests us to remain focused on the poverty alleviation in our approach to evaluating the economic outcomes of community forestry.



There is a spectrum of theories on poverty alleviation in regard to the implementation of community forestry policy. At one point poverty alleviation is barely meant to serve a safety-net function meeting the basic needs of forest users (see Acharya, 2002). Dev et al. (2003) also emphasize on the access of poorer households to essential forest products for their subsistence. In fact, in most developing countries, desires on community forestry are markedly linked to meeting basic needs and serving subsistence purposes, and therefore the benefits to the community are achieved by extracting them directly from the forest (Glasmeyer and Farrigan, 2005). On the other hand, numerous scholars expand the focus and equate poverty alleviation with livelihood improvement (see Pandit et al., 2008). Looking at the various products a community forest can produce Oyono (2005) stresses on the wealth and human well-being in the evaluation of economic outcomes. Sunderlin (2006) also refers poverty alleviation to the accumulation of wealth as the uses of forests as source of savings and asset building for permanent increases in income.

Referring to those two poles, Glasmeyer and Farrigan (2005) argue that forest resource uses can embrace conditions ranging from meeting basic needs to full-scale economic development and everything in between. Angelsen and Wunder (2003) summarize that poverty alleviation refer to both poverty reduction (people become better off, in absolute and relative terms) that being lifted out from poverty, and poverty prevention. In this evaluation, we also adopt the two extremes in defining poverty alleviation and refer poverty alleviation as the enhancement of human well-beings of the direct forest users. An optimal result would be lifting direct forest users into a better economic stage.

Further, the economic outcomes are here defined as the products and services the household of a direct forest user obtains from the community forest. Mahanty and Guernier (2008) point out how focusing on pure financial benefits might create an incomplete picture on the way community forestry contribute in poverty agenda. Therefore, the economic outcomes should be qualitative analyzed and partly measured in natural units and/or partly in money. This can vary from case to case. The outcomes can include forest products (among others: timber poles, fodder, firewood as well as land-based products of agro-forestry), money and community development/services.

### 3.2. Empowerment of Direct Forest User

As earlier said, the enthusiasm on community forestry has been linked mainly with the premises that 'forest communities' are closely attached to the surrounding forests, not only for their daily livelihood but also for cultural and even religious lives. In community forestry, direct forest users are expected play an important role in the common decision making procedures and implementation of forestry activities. To be able to doing so, empowerment of direct forest users is said as the key; in fact the empowerment is one of the core community forestry objectives (see Wiersum, 1984; Bhattacharya and Basnyat, 2003; Charnley and Poe, 2007).

While scholars are generally conclusive on the importance of empowerment in a development intervention, their understanding on empowerment spectrally diverges. Empowerment is often equated with participation and the involvement of local forest users in forestry activities. There have been arguments that the lack of participation exclude disadvantages groups from decision-making, particularly in product distribution (see Brown et al., 2002; Maskey et al., 2007). Nonetheless, even when the forest users are participating in forestry activities, such does not necessarily mean that they get empowered. In fact, the participatory approach in forest management is often modelled for disempowering some forest users (Agrawal, 2001; Sarin, 2001).

Such suggests that participation approaches alone might be insufficient to empower the disadvantages groups. Bryant and Bailey (1997) give more emphasis on the context of existing socio-political power structure and argue that with imbalance accumulation of power of the stakeholders, empowerment of rural poor is unlikely to be achieved. The idea of forest decentralization of the transfer of powers from central government to lower levels in a political– administrative and territorial hierarchy (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999) can be nicely slated in the context of the empowerment of forest users. Timsina (2002) similarly argues that empowerment means the disadvantaged groups gain some power. Further, Sarin (2001) broadens empowerment beyond the context of relationships within the locals, and see the importance on how the locals deal with external actors.

Empowerment is manifested as control over access to the resources (Bryant and Bailey, 1997), meaning real empowerment should enable a direct forest user to influence the forest and forest use. Edmunds et al. (2003: 3) remind us that the key rationale for such devolution policies as community forestry is to provide the poor forest users with “better access to forest resources and more self-determination in decisions about local resources”. Although some other scholars (e.g. Alden Wily, 2001) do not see increased access of users to the forest resources as a determinant for empowerment, looking at numerous forest conflicts – which usually stem from struggles over the access to the resources in that less empowered groups secure limited access to the forest resources – control over access should be placed at the prominence of discussing empowerment of forest users. Further, access and control over forest resources are often linked with the extent to which forest users can benefit from the resources (Edmunds et al., 2003; Lachapelle et al., 2004; Mahanty et al., 2006; Larson et al., 2007). Changes in access to the forests are thought to profoundly affect the livelihood of the people (Chomitz, 2007). Therefore, secure access and control is seen here as the principal key of empowerment.

Access and control nonetheless come with prerequisites. Larson et al. (2007) argue that tenurial rights are to affect forest access and the security of the access. Having effective property rights over forests, the users can exclude others, exploit the resource and allocate access (Ribot, 2009). McDermott and Schreckenberg (2009) also focus on the access land and forest products so that community forestry is to bring benefits to the users. Edmunds et al. (2003) emphasize on access and control over decision-making processes, economic assets and livelihood as well as the forest quality. McDermott and Schreckenberg (2009: 160) similarly argue that community forestry needs to expand decision-making space, through which users can gain the desired benefits. Summarizing their indicators/ variables on access and control, the social outcomes in our approach rest on the empowerment of direct forest users, and are measured by the extent they can: 1) access to information on forests, 2) access to decision making, and 3) access to forestland and resources, including the ability to exclude others for using the resources. Such depends on knowledge, information, legal restrictions, technical materials, money and informal access to the forest.

### 3.3. Improved Forest Conditions

For the evaluation of the ecological outcomes of community forestry, we also need to highlight that degraded forest condition is one of the main drivers of the implementation of the program. Experience from many countries, e.g. Nepal, India and Indonesia, the goals on restoring the forest conditions are explicitly outlined in the formal policy on community forestry (Bhattacharya and Basnyat, 2003; Rusli, 2003; Karmacharya et al., 2008). It is therefore of high appropriateness of improved forest conditions as the focus of our analysis. There are indeed numerous complex sets of indicators on ecological outcomes. Hagan and Whitman (2006) point out how the complexity can hinder the process of measuring or monitoring. Further, they argue that the complex indicators might not be very useful to decision making processes. In fact, managers might not see the importance to measure everything of potential interest within an ecosystem of forests (Carignan and Villard, 2002).

In light of the complexity, many highlight the importance of selecting critical and relevant indicators for the goals of assessments (Carignan and Villard, 2002; Failing and Gregory, 2003; Hagan and Whitman, 2006). Failing and Gregory (2003) further argue that if the fundamental objective is to preserve ecological services and resilience, then appropriate indicators may be related to primary productivity, or to landscape or ecosystem diversity, and so. For operationalization, they argue that one of valuable characteristics of indicators is cost-effective to measure and can be accurately estimated by all personnel (even non specialists) involved in the monitoring. Gautam and Shivakoti (2008) argue that the positive changes in forest cover and condition are said to provide some evidence of ecological sustainability of community forestry. Rutters et al. (1992) has recommended that forest growth proves as an important indicator to detect changes in forest conditions. Likewise, biodiversity has become a key objective in managing forests (Failing and Gregory, 2003).

Nonetheless, it becomes increasingly apparent that both indicators are spectrally interpreted by different actors accordingly to their respective social and political preferences. Sarkar and Margules (2002: 300) point out how “[t]he biological realm – patterns and processes – is

marked by variability and complexity at every level of organization” so that difficult to pin down a precise sense for policy-making. Therefore, in this evaluation, we are rather interested on the different interpretations on forest growth and biodiversity of community forests. Such suggests us not to directly evaluate or measure the indicators, but to rely on the existing knowledge on biodiversity directly or indirectly measured by different stakeholders. The factual measurement of ecological outcomes is an indicator for their importance for a special stakeholder. This means the reliance on the existing studies conducted by any (strong) actors within the respective selected community forests, if any.

---

## 4. Testing the Approach

---

From the above analysis, we propose a set of key considerations — derived from the core policy objectives of community forestry, for the evaluation of the program (Table 1).

Empirical tests are nonetheless needed to see whether the approach on focusing the core policy objectives of community forestry in evaluating the outcomes can be applied. For that purpose, between October and December 2009 we conducted field tests on two community forests in Gunungkidul District (Indonesia), i.e. Banyu- soco and Karangasem, under the community forestry scheme called Hutan Kemasyarakatan (HKm). The community forests were started around the mid of the 1990s, from virtually barren forestland. While the ownership of the forests is still of the state, the forestland was parcelled for forest users, who are then responsible on the forest management activities and are to benefit for their respective forest parcels.

**Table 1****Focus of evaluation and the key elements.**

Focus of evaluation	Key elements
Poverty alleviation of direct forest users	▪ Forest products
	▪ Cash money
	▪ Community services
Empowerment of direct forest users	▪ Access to forest information
	▪ Access to decision making
	▪ Access to forest land and resources
Improved forest condition	▪ Forest growth
	▪ Biodiversity

From the outset, instead of promoting genuine empowerment, the community forestry scheme limits the involvement of the locals only to the functional participation which sees the people as the medium for executing pre-determined objectives and decisions (Hobley, 1996). For instance, prevents tenurial claims over the forestland as the users are bound to acknowledge the state's ownership over the forests despite some sporadic aspirations on foreseeing ownership rights over the forests (see Fuadi and Rahman, 2004). Access on the decision-making procedures is limited to the extent that the locals have to follow management procedures regulated in the HKM licenses. In fact, the community forestry scheme rests on the granting of two different licenses to the users and their groups, i.e. 1) the management license – which focuses on the management of the forests and the uses of the forestland, and 2) the utilization license for timber harvests. According to the Ministerial Regulation No: P.37/ Menhut-II/ 2007, the users and their groups have to submit different working plans to the Ministry for securing both licenses. By the end of 2010, only the management right has been secured. The management right is defined for the duration of 35 years, during which the users are allowed to cultivate food crops and entitled other (non-timber) benefits from, are responsible for nurturing

the forest species, and later to obtain a share of the sale of timber from their respective forest parcels.

Given the degraded forest condition at the start of the scheme, forest activities are focused on forest restoration. At first glance, one might expect to sparking efforts on improving the ecological qualities of the forests, but concerns on improving environment forest qualities are rather shifted to the extent that environmental efforts can enhance the forest potential to producing economic benefits, rather than to the broader environmental context of improved biodiversity or such. Such is primarily due to the focuses on commercial monoculture forests for principally timber production that relegates concerns on the broader ecological issues. Observations on the forests have unveiled some promising ecological outcomes in terms of healthy monoculture forests. The barren forestland has successfully been transformed greeneries and healthy stands; the forests have been growing immensely.

While the objective on improving forest conditions has been very much reached, the extent to which the community forestry scheme can contribute in the effort to alleviate rural poverty remains in questions, at least over the next few years. The main products the users can benefit from are the food crops (usually rice and corn) planted under the forest species. There are indications that the crops are by no means to satisfy the farmers' daily needs. Instead, they are seen as either complements to those yielded from their private farmland or additional earnings as some of the users sell the products. As suggested, "rice from the agroforestry practices is usually kept for own-uses, but is insufficient to satisfy the daily needs of the users for the whole year. Corn is sold in the markets to provide additional incomes for the users' (The report on Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) of Banyusoco Group, 2003/ Page 11). In addition, there are some concerns on the declining agricultural yields from the forest parcels the forest canopies start to connect. Thinning of the forests is seen as necessary to maintain the outcomes of agricultural crops, but they are yet to be planned, which need approval from the forest offices. Non-timber forest products are indeed free for collection by the forest users. However, given the nature of monoculture forests, the products are sporadic and limited. The common products across cases include fodders and fuel-wood (from dead branches) (Djamhuri,





2008). Overall, at the current stage, HKm community forestry is yet to achieve its high promises on poverty alleviation as it only creates subsistent economy, let alone the accumulation savings and asset building for permanent increases in income.

---

## 5. Conclusions

---

As any form of assessment, evaluation on community forestry outcomes aims to observe whether the program has produced the impacts as initially intended. In evaluating the outcomes, we propose an approach that is based on the core policy objectives of the program, i.e. poverty alleviation, and empowerment of direct forest users as well as improved forest conditions. Based on a test in two community forests in Indonesia, the focus on the core policy objectives appears to provide a more practical approach than the use of complex criteria and indicators. While similar field tests on other community forestry practices at different contexts are indeed needed, we conclude that our approach allows rapid evaluations and eventually reduces the associated costs and time without compromising the goals of the evaluation.



---

## References

---

- Acharya, K.P., 2002. Twenty-four years of community forestry in Nepal. *International Forestry Review* 4 (2), 149–156.
- Agrawal, B., 2001. Participatory Exclusions, Community Forestry, and Gender: An Analysis for South Asia and a Conceptual Framework. *World Development* 29 (10), 1623–1648.
- Agrawal, A., Ribot, J.C., 1999. Accountability in decentralization: A framework with South Asian and West African cases. *Journal of Developing Areas* 33, 473–502.
- Alden Wily, L., 2001. *Forest Management and Democracy in East and Southern Africa: Lessons From Tanzania*. Gatekeeper Series, no. 95. Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods Programme, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), London.
- Alden Wily, L., 2005. From meeting needs to honoring rights: The evolution of community forestry. In: Sayer, J. (Ed.), *Earthscan Reader in Forestry and Development*. Earthscan Publications, pp. 388–395.
- Angelsen, A., Wunder, S., 2003. *Exploring the Forest-Poverty Link: Key Concepts, Issues and Research Implications*. CIFOR Occasional Paper No.40. Center of International Forestry Research, Bogo.
- Arnold, J.E.M., 1991. *Community Forestry: Ten Years in Review*. Community Forestry Note, No.7. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Rome.
- Bhattacharya, A.K., Basnyat, B., 2003. Empowering people through Joint Forest Management: a study from Madhya Pradesh (India). *International Forestry Review* 5 (4), 370–378.
- Brendler, T., Carey, H., 1998. Community Forestry, Defined. *Journal of Forestry* 96 (3), 21–23.

- Brown, D., Malla, Y., Schreckenber, K., Springate-Baginski, O., 2002. From supervising “subjects” to supporting “citizens”: recent developments in community forestry in Asia and Africa. NRP, 75. Overseas Development Institute, London.
- Bryant, R.L., Bailey, S., 1997. *Third World Political Ecology*. Routledge, London.
- Bull, G., White, A., 2002. Global Forests in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities. Proceedings of Global Perspective on Indigenous Forestry: Linking Communities, Commerce and Conservation, 4–6 June 2002, Vancouver, Canada.
- Carignan, V., Villard, M.A., 2002. Selecting Indicator Species to Monitor Ecological Integrity: A Review. *Environmental Monitoring and Assessment* 78 (1), 45–61.
- Chakraborty, R.N., 2001. Stability and Outcomes of Common Property Institutions in Forestry: Evidence from the Terai Region of Nepal. *Ecological Economics* 36, 341–353.
- Charnley, S., Poe, M.R., 2007. Community Forestry in Theory and Practice: Where are we now? *Annual Review of Anthropology* 36, 301–336.
- Chomitz, K.M., 2007. *At Loggerheads?: Agricultural Expansion, Poverty Reduction, and Environment in the Tropical Forests*, A World Bank Policy Research Report. The World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Dev, O.P., Yadav, N.P., Springate-Baginski, O., Soussan, J., 2003. Impacts of Community Forestry on Livelihoods in the Middle Hills of Nepal. *Journal of Forest and Livelihood* 3 (1), 64–77.
- Djamhuri, T.L., 2008. Community participation in a social forestry program in Central Java, Indonesia: the effect of incentive structure and social capital. *Agroforestry System* 74, 83–96.
- Duinker, P.N., Matakala, P.W., Chege, F., Bouthilier, L., 1994. Community forests in Canada: An overview. *The Forestry Chronicle* 70 (6), 711–720.
- Edmunds, D., Wollenberg, E., Contreras, A.P., Dachang, L., Kelkar, G., Nathan, D., Sarin, M., Singh, N.M., 2003. Introduction. In: Edmund, D., Wollenberg, E. (Eds.), *Local Forest Management: The Impacts of Devolution Policies*. Earthscan, London, pp. 1–19.
- Failing, L., Gregory, R., 2003. Ten common mistakes in designing biodiversity indicators for forest policy. *Journal of Environmental Management* 62 (8), 121–132.



- Fuadi, F., Rahman, Z.N., 2004. Desentralisasi versus Deforestasi. Konsorsium Pengembangan Hutan Kemasyarakatan, Gunungkidul.
- Garcia, C.A., Lescuyer, G., 2008. Monitoring, indicators and community based forest management in the tropics: pretexts or red herrings? *Biodiversity and Conservation* 17, 1303–1317.
- Gauld, R., 2000. Maintaining Centralized Control in Community-based Forestry: Policy Construction in the Philippines. *Development and Change* 31, 229–254.
- Gautam, A.P., Shivakoti, G.P., 2008. Evolution, Impacts and Challenges of Community- Based Forestry in Nepal. In: Webb, E.L., Shivakoti, G.P. (Eds.), *Decentralization, Forests and Rural Communities: Policy Outcomes in South and Southeast Asia*. SAGE Publication, New Delhi, pp. 150–176.
- Gilmour, D.A., Fisher, R.J., 1991. Villagers, Forests and Foresters: the Philosophy, Process and Practice of Community Forestry in Nepal. Sahayogi Press, Kathmandu.
- Gilmour, D., Malla, Y., Nurse, M., 2004. Linkages between Community Forestry and Poverty. Regional Community Forestry Training Center for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand.
- Glasmeyer, A.K., Farrigan, T., 2005. Understanding community forestry: a qualitative meta-study of the concept, the process, and its potential for poverty alleviation in the United States case. *The Geographical Journal* 171 (1), 56–69.
- Hagan, J.M., Whitman, A.A., 2006. Biodiversity Indicators for Sustainable Forestry: Simplifying Complexity. *Journal of Forestry* 104 (4), 203–210.
- Hobley, M., 1996. Participatory forestry: The process of change in India and Nepal. Rural Development Study Guide, 3. Rural Development Forestry Network, Overseas Development Network, London.
- Hobley, M., 2007. Forests — the poor man’s overcoat: foresters as agents of change? 6th Jack Westoby Lecture, 3rd April 2007. The Fenner School of Environment and Society, The Australian National University.
- Karmacharya, M., Karna, B., Ostrom, E., 2008. Implications of Leasehold and Community Forestry. In: Webb, E.L., Shivakoti, G.P. (Eds.), *Decentralization, Forests and Rural Communities: Policy Outcomes in South and Southeast Asia*. SAGE Publication, New Delhi, pp. 177–208.
- Kellert, S.R., Mehta, J.N., Ebbin, S.A., Lichtenfeld, L.L., 2000. Community Natural Resource Management: Promise, Rhetoric, and Reality. *Society and Natural Resources* 13 (8), 705–715.

- Krott, M., Stefanov, M., 2008. Comprehensive Comparison of State Forest Institutions by a Causative Benchmark-Model. *Allg Forst Jagdztg*, Heft, 4, pp. 57–64.
- Lachapelle, P.R., Smith, P.D., McCool, S.F., 2004. Access to Power or Genuine Empowerment? An Analysis of Three Community Forest Groups in Nepal. *Human Ecology Review* 11 (1), 1–12.
- Larson, A.M., Pacheco, P., Toni, F., Vallejo, M., 2007. The Effects of Forestry Decentralization on Access to Livelihood Assets. *The Journal of Environment Development* 16 (3), 251–268.
- Mahanty, S., Guernier, J., 2008. A Fair Share: sharing the benefits and costs of community-based forest management. Paper for IASC 2008 Theme on Understanding the Benefits of the Commons.
- Mahanty, S., Gronow, J., Nurse, M., Malla, Y., 2006. Reducing poverty through community base forest management. *Journal of Forest and Livelihood* 5 (1), 78–89.
- Malla, Y.B., Neupane, H.R., Branney, P.J., 2003. Why aren't Poor People Benefiting More from Community Forestry? *Journal of Forest and Livelihood* 3 (1), 78–93.
- Maskey, V., Gebremedhin, T.G., Dalton, T.J., 2007. Social and cultural determinants of collective management of community forest in Nepal. *Journal of Forest Economics* 11 (4), 261–274.
- McCarthy, J., 2004. Viewpoint — Community Forestry: A Few Sympathetic, But Critical Questions. *Bulletin of the Global Caucus on Community Based Forest Management*, pp. 11–12 (Fall).
- McDermott, M.H., Schreckenber, K., 2009. Equity in community forestry: insights from North and South. *International Forestry Review* 11 (2), 157–170.
- Oyono, P.R., 2005. Profiling Local-Level Outcomes of Environmental Decentralizations: The Case of Cameroon's Forests in the Congo Basin. *The Journal of Environment Development* 14 (3), 317–337 (14, No. 3, September 2005).
- Pandit, B.H., Albano, A., Kumar, C., 2008. Improving Forest Benefits for the Poor: Learning from community-based forest enterprises in Nepal. Center of International Forestry Research, Bogor.
- Pangdee, A., Kim, Y.-s., Daugherty, P.J., 2006. What Makes Community Forest Management Successful: A Meta-Study From Community Forests Throughout the World. *Society and Natural Resources* 19 (1), 33–52.



- Poffenberger, M., 2006. People in the forest: community forestry experiences from Southeast Asia. *Environment and Sustainable Development* 5 (1), 57–69.
- Ribot, J., 2009. Authority over Forests: Empowerment and Subordination in Senegal's Democratic Decentralization. *Development and Change* 40 (1), 105–129.
- Ritchie, B., McDougall, C., Haggith, M., de Oliviera, N.B., 2000. *Criteria and Indicators of Sustainability in Community Managed Forest Landscapes: An Introductory Guide*. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.
- Rusli, Y., 2003. The Policy of the Ministry of Forestry on Social Forestry. A paper from the Ministry of Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia in International Conference on Rural Livelihood, Forest and Biodiversity. 19–23 May 2003, Bonn.
- Rutters, K.H., Law, B.E., Kucera, R.C., Gallant, A.L., DeVelice, R.L., Palmer, C.J., 1992. A Selection of forest condition indicators for monitoring. *Environmental Monitoring and Assessment* 20 (1), 21–33.
- Sarin, M., 2001. Empowerment and Disempowerment of Forest Women in Uttarakhand, India. *Gender, Technology and Development* 5 (3), 341–364.
- Sarkar, S., Margules, C., 2002. Operationalizing biodiversity for conservation planning. *Journal of Biosciences* 27 (4), 299–308.
- Shackleton, S., Campbell, B., Wollenberg, E., Edmunds, D., 2002. Devolution and community based natural resource management: creating space for local people to participate and benefit? *Natural Resource Perspectives* 76, 1–6.
- Shepherd, K.R., 1985. Community forestry: concepts and reality. In: Shepherd, K.R., Richter, H.V. (Eds.), *Managing the Tropical Forest*. Centre for Development Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, pp. 317–327.
- Shrestha, K.K., 2005. *Collective Action and Equity in Nepalese Community Forestry*. PhD Thesis, School of Geosciences, The University of Sydney, Sydney.
- Springate-Baginski, O., Blaikie, P., 2007. *Forest, People and Power. The Political Ecology of Reform in South Asia*. Earthscan Publication, London.
- Stevens, S., 1997. *Conservation through cultural survival*. Island Press, Washington, D.C.

- Sunderlin, W.D., 2006. Poverty alleviation through community forestry in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam: an assessment of the potential. *Journal of Forest Policy and Economics* 8 (4), 386–396.
- Thompson, J., Elmendorf, W., McDonough, M., Burban, L., 2005. Participation and conflict: lessons learned from community forestry. *Journal of Forestry* 103 (4), 174–178.
- Thoms, C.A., 2006. Conservation Success, Livelihoods Failure? Community Forestry in Nepal. *Policy Matters* 14, 169–179.
- Timsina, N., 2002. Empowerment or marginalization: a debate in community forestry in Nepal. *Journal of Forest and Livelihood* 2 (1), 27–33.
- Westoby, J., 1987. *The Purpose of Forests: Follies of Development*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
- Wiersum, K.F., 1984. Development strategies for social forestry: a conceptual approach. East-West Center Working Paper Series. Honolulu.
- Wollenberg, E., Iwan, R., Limberg, G., Moeliono, M., 2008. Locating social choice in forest co-management and local governance: the politics of public decision making and interests. In: Sikor, T. (Ed.), *Public and Private in Natural Resource Governance: A False Dichotomy?* Earthscan Research Editions, London.







---

# Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research

---



Professur für Forst-und Naturschutzpolitik, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen,  
Büsgenweg 3, D-37077 Göttingen

<sup>1</sup>Carsten Schusser, <sup>2</sup>Max Krott, Rosan Devkota, Ahmad Maryudi, Manjola Salla and  
Mbolo C. Yufanyi Movuh

(Received January 2012)

This research was funded in part by the German Research Foundation  
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft/DFG)

### **Key Words – Schlagwörter**

Power analysis; mixed methods; triangulation; quantitative and qualitative  
analysis; community forestry; sequence design; power features.

Machtanalyse; kombinierte Methoden; Triangulation; quantitative und qualitative  
Erhebungen; Gemeinschaftsforsten; Sequenz Design; Machtelemente.

1 Corresponding author: CARSTEN SCHUSSER. Mitarbeiter der Professur für Forst- und  
Naturschutzpolitik. Tel.: 0170/6876123. E-Mail: cschuss@gwdg.de

2 Contact address: Prof. Dr. MAX KROTT. Leitung der Professur für Forst- und Natur-  
schutzpolitik. Tel.: 0551/393 41. E-Mail: mkrott@gwdg.de

---

## 1. Efficiency by Linking Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys

---

A sound empirical basis is of high importance for applied research in forest policy. Conducting the intended intensive empirical observations in the field requires a vast amount of resources which go beyond the capacity of many projects. The amount of resources required is especially high for international comparative projects. For example, while designing a comparative analysis of community forestry we realized that the fieldwork in seven countries would last 126 months (seven times 18 months, as shown in Table 1 and calculated in detail in chapter 2). In order to reduce this we resorted to a sequence design found in the literature which appeared to be a promising strategy for increasing empirical method efficiency. MCVILLY (2008) gives an overview of mixed methods design and mentions a specific sequence design for (1) a quantitative preliminary survey – (2) a qualitative survey and (3) a quantitative follow-up study adapted from Morse (1991), which focuses the observations on preselected subjects in order to save resources during the field work.

We focus our attention on the following question. How to save resources and simultaneously to fulfill high methodical standards? First we will describe cost efficiency and the methodical quality criteria which we apply. Then we will introduce both survey methods which we will compare: the single survey model and the sequence model which we have designed in order to improve efficiency. The main part of the paper will discuss how to save resources while keeping methodical quality high based on accepted common research standards.

**Tab. 1**

**Comparison of time resources needed for sequence of surveys and single survey.**

**Vergleich des Zeitaufwandes für eine Sequenzmethode und eine singuläre Methode.**

Method <i>Methode</i>	Number of countries/ cases and Nr. of days to conduct research <i>Anzahl der Länder/ Anzahl Fallstudien und Anzahl der Tage für die Durchführung</i>	Total number of months <i>Gesamtanzahl in Monaten</i>
<b>Single survey:</b> <i>Singuläre Methode</i> • Qualitative survey	7 Countries, 12 cases each 45 days	<b>126 months (100%)</b> 126 months
<b>Sequence of surveys:</b> <i>Sequenz Methode</i> • Preliminary survey	7 Countries/12 cases, each 7 days	<b>51 months (40%)</b> 20 months
• Qualitative analysis	7 Countries/12 cases, each 10 days	28 months
• Comparative quantitative	7 Countries/12 cases, each 1 day	3 months

The input of resources into the surveys we evaluate with the economic criteria cost efficiency (THOMMEN and ACHLEITNER, 2006). It is defined by the minimum costs needed to achieve a specific output of scientific results. Within social science methods the biggest input is the working time of researchers. Therefore we consider the working time measured in working days of qualified researchers as a good estimate of the cost for the input of resources. The outputs are the results achieved with the sequence design and will be evaluated with the following criteria.

As basic quality criteria we define measurement validity. It shows “how well an empirical indicator and the conceptual definition of the construct that the indicator is supposed to measure fit together” (NEUMAN, 2006; p. 193). The “construct supposed to be measured” is defined by theory and hypothesis. Therefore this type of validity shows the fit of the hypothesis and the supposed observations by specific methods.

By reliability we mean that the measurement method itself does not cause deviation in the results (Neuman, 2006; p.189). High reliability requires minimizing the bias produced by the researcher or by the empirical observations, like answers, written resources or behavior.

---

## 2. Sequence of Surveys for a Comparative Analysis of Actor-centered-Power in Community Forestry

---

With our research we try to identify the actors involved in a local community forest network and their actor-centered power, in order to test the hypothesis that “Activities and outcomes in community forestry depend mostly on the interests of powerful actors”. Apart from the sequence design we also apply interest analysis and outcome analysis techniques which will be not discussed in this paper. Our project compares community forestry in Albania, Cameroon, Germany, Indonesia, Namibia, Nepal, and Kenya. Two case studies, Nepal and Indonesia, have been completed and their results are published (DEVKOTA, 2010; MARYUDI, 2011). The two case studies made experiences with the sequence model which is discussed here. In this paper, for the purpose of illustrating methodical arguments, we select the issue of implementation of community forestry being informally dominated by “local elites”, as recent studies have revealed (WOLLENBERG et al., 2008, p. 39; EDMUNDS and WOLLENBERG, 2001, p. 192). We will focus on the hypothesis that, within a network of actors linked to a specific local community forest, specific actors are more powerful than others. Despite being simple, specifying and proving this hypothesis empirically will answer highly relevant questions. For example, which are the types of powerful actors: state agencies, associations, international associations, enterprises or other actors? In addition, the power processes and sources of the powerful actors can be analyzed. This analysis requires a link to hypotheses about power theories developed by

DEVKOTA (2010) and MARYUDI (2011). For illustrative purposes it will suffice to mention only some of the theoretical assumptions (see chapter 4) for the following methodical discussion.

The methodical challenge was to design a sequence of quantitative and qualitative surveys which are suitable to identify the involved actors, to stratify these into a group of powerful actors and less powerful actors, and to observe their specific power behavior empirically. All this had to be achieved with a small budget and limited time. Therefore, we designed the sequence shown in Table 2: The preliminary quantitative network survey was conducted to identify actors involved for a specific community forest as well as to stratify them into the two groups mentioned above. The follow-up qualitative power survey analyzes the power resources of the individual powerful actors according to three different power elements of the actor-centered power concept (DEVKOTA, 2010; MARYUDI, 2011 and KROTT et al., 2011). The follow-up comparative quantitative network analysis builds on the data produced by the prior step of the sequence and tests hypotheses about powerful actors, comparing the situations in seven countries.

In Table 1 and 2 the sequence of surveys is compared with a single survey. The single survey follows basic assumptions of the network analysis of power (HASANA-GAS, 2004; PATTON, 1990). It is aimed to observe the power of all members and to link them within a power network. A straightforward way is to conduct empirical observations of all members of the network. The case studies by DEVKOTA (2010) and MARYUDI (2011) show that the network of an individual community forestry comprises approximately 15 actors in average including the speaker of the committee of the community forest, the state forest agencies and other state agencies at different levels, donors, forest-based enterprises and a number of associations lobbying for community forestry. Estimating on average 2 days of field work for each actor we get 30 days for one community forest and 360 days for the 12 cases planned. Keeping in mind that in many developing countries the weather conditions do not allow access to the field during the whole year a realistic estimate of the resources needed is one researcher in the field for 1.5 years per country. This means in average 45 days per one case (See Table 1).





The scientific quality of the single survey is quite similar to the second step in the sequence of surveys because the field observation applies the same combination of quantitative and qualitative questions, documents and observations directly in the forest and the offices of the actors. These quality questions are discussed in the chapter about the second step the follow up qualitative power survey in detail

---

### 3. Preliminary Quantitative Network Survey

---

This huge amount of resources of a single survey approach can be diminished by focusing the observations on the findings of a preliminary network analysis. The method of network analysis follows the theoretical model of a power network closely (HASANAGAS, 2004). The theory assumes that actors are linked by complex power processes which become visible within a network only.

The network analysis provides the researcher with mostly quantitative tools for describing the power relations. MARSDEN (2011) draw the attention to the numerous errors which can occur in survey data about networks. The respondent answers within a “four-stage cognitive model: comprehending a question, retrieving relevant information from memory, integrating the information retrieved to develop a judgment about an answer and providing a response within the format given in the survey instrument” (MARSDEN, 2011; p. 380). Trying to cover all these aspects properly would drive the sources needed for the complex survey instruments up.

**Tab. 2**

**Sequence of surveys for power analysis compared with single survey.  
Sequenz von Methoden im Vergleich mit einer singulären Methode für die Machtanalyse.**

<b>Quality criteria</b> <i>Qualitätskriterium</i>	<b>Sequence of surveys 1-3,</b> <i>Sequenz der Methoden 1-3</i>	
	1.Preliminary quantitative network survey <i>1.Quantitative Netzwerkanalyse (Vorstudie)</i>	2.Follow-up qualitative power survey <i>2.Qualitative Machtanalyse (Folgestudie)</i>
<b>Validity</b> <i>Validität</i>	High for simple hypothesis <i>Hoch für einfache Hypothese</i>	High for complex hypothesis <i>Hoch für komplexe Hypothese</i>
<b>Reliability</b> <i>Reliabilität</i>	Sufficient for identifying the group of powerful actors <i>Ausreichend zur Identifizierung der Gruppe der mächtigen Akteure</i>	Good due to combination of multiple sources <i>Gut durch die Kombination verschiedener Quellen</i>
<b>Resource use</b> <i>Mittleinsa</i>	Low <i>Niedrig</i>	Low <i>Niedrig</i>

	Single survey Singuläre Methode
3. Follow-up comparative quantitative network analysis <i>3. Vergleichende quantitative Netzwerkanalyse (Folgestudie)</i>	1. Qualitative survey <i>1. Qualitative Studie</i>
High for complex hypothesis <i>Hoch für komplexe Hypothese</i>	High for complex hypothesis <i>Hoch für komplexe Hypothese</i>
Good due to triangulation of the results of the previous sequence steps <i>Gut durch die Triangulation der Resultate beider Vorstudien</i>	Good due to combination of multiple sources <i>Gut durch die Kombination verschiedener Quellen</i>
Very low <i>Sehr niedrig</i>	High <i>Sehr hoch</i>

The solution we suggest is to simplify the hypothesis. Instead looking for a complex power network we are looking for a much the simpler model only namely the hypothesis that “Within the power network of a specific community forest there are only two groups of actors, powerful ones and less powerful ones”. This hypothesis contrasts two positions, namely powerful or not powerful rather than it describes power processes exactly. To look for contrasting positions in order to get robust data is suggested by MARSDEN (1990, 456). If we define complexity as the number of acknowledged variables, their diversity and the multiple relations between them, it becomes obvious that this hypothesis is simple because it assumes that power is an unspecified attribute of a group of unspecified actors. The information we get from the simple hypothesis is much lower than from a complex network hypothesis. But the hypothesis indicates actors belonging to the powerful group which helps in focusing the follow up steps of the analysis.

Our main argument is that for such a simple hypotheses a preliminary networks analysis is able to achieve high validity. High validity does not require complex data about all individual power relations. Instead it is sufficient already when the data indicates whether an actor belongs to the power full group or not. Further the validity is not hurt a lot when the survey misses one or two actors because the hypothesis did not deal with individual actors but with a group.

The instrument used for the preliminary network analysis is a quantitative survey. The first question identifies the actors involved following a snowball technique (HASANAGAS, 2004; PATTON, 1990). Starting with the chairperson of the specific Community Forest User Group Committee we ask him which actors he has to deal with within specific community forest. Afterwards, this question is repeated to all actors mentioned, always referring to the specific Community Forest, until no new actor is mentioned. The case studies by DEVKOTA (2010) and MARYUDI (2011) showed that after the group meets 10 to 15 actors no new actor is mentioned anymore indicating that the core group is observed.

Each actor is asked simultaneously with the first question other questions regarding the power of the other actors. The external estimation of power has the advantage that the bias of strategic answers about the own power is avoided. Of course also the external estimation has a bias caused

by lack of knowledge and lack of willingness to tell about their knowledge (FRIEDRICHS, 1990). For the special case of looking for powerful actors we regard the lack of knowledge low because the powerful actors influence other actors who feel them and know them within the context of the community forestry. General experiences of network analysis support our assumption because data about strong ties and about local networks are better (MARSDEN, 1990; p. 456). In contrast this kind of survey is not very strong for the identification of weak actors, since most in the network pays little attention to them. Due to the prominent position of powerful actors we regard the first question to identify other actor as an indicator for power already. If actors are not mentioned at all we consider them as not powerful from the point of view of the specific actor asked.

The social desirability bias (NEUMANN, 2011) caused by the selection of “social and political correct” answers instead of the own opinion exists and might be higher in surveys conducted in countries with an uncertain justice system like in many developing countries. Even if an actor understands the question well it might be that he avoids speaking about the power of other actors. Due to this bias we estimate the reliability of the survey to low to use the data for a complex network analyses. But the reliability is sufficient to identify some of the powerful actors. The improvement by the follow up qualitative survey is important.

The survey measures the power of the actors in a quantitative manner, meaning that numeric data count how strong the power is (BRYMAN, 2001; MCVILLY, 2008; p. 172). We create standardized measures based on our theory of actor-centered power before data collection (NEUMAN, 2006; 157). As described by DEVKOTA (2010) and MARYUDI (2011) the actor-centered power theory defines power as a social relationship in which the actor A alters the behavior of actor B without recognizing B’s will. Altering the behavior can be achieved by coercion, incentives or trust. The three elements of power are discussed in DEVKOTA, 2010; MARYUDI, 2011 and KROTT et al., (2012 in review) in detail. For the methodological considerations we will not deepen the theoretical discussion here but we will show how we define simple quantitative indicators for each power element.

In order to measure incentives we asked the actors, directly, from whom they had received any kind of incentives and we transcribe in a

Likert scale the answer yes into a 1 and the answer no into a 0. In the same simple manner we asked whom they trust in the network. Assuming that answering questions about trust is more sensitive we used a four-grade Likert scale which assigned the value of 0 to the option “no trust at all” and 1 to 3 to more differentiated answers. Finally we did not address coercion directly but rather, we used the two questions: “Apart from the information and incentives provided, do you still need one or more actors to carry out your involvement in community forestry?” And “Do you need the permission of one of these actors?” If one of these answers is “yes” with regard to specific actors we assume they have coercive power and coded this with “1”, otherwise we assigned a “0”. We received as many external estimates for the specific power elements for each actor as there were other actors in the network. The multiple external estimates are stable against the bias which would be inevitable if we were to ask an actor about his own power. Based on the data of all external estimates we calculate the power for each actor for the three elements of coercion, incentives and trust, separately. Finally, the data are standardized for each actor by calculating the percentage of the sum he got relative to the maximum an actor could get.

Having standardized estimates for each actor, the task remains of determining the group of most powerful actors. We were looking for a measurement sensitive to the specific distribution of power among the actors. If all actors are weak but two are relatively stronger these two should comprise the group of the most powerful. On the other hand, actors should not become part of the group of the most powerful, even if they are strong, if there are some other actors with a similar power level. The dominance degree (PIESCH, 1975; DEFFAA, 1982; HÄNI, 1987; SCHMIDT, 2005) is a suitably sensitive measurement to differentiate the relational habit of power in a network.

The dominance degree can be calculated in the following way<sup>1</sup>):

- $n$  Total number of identify actors
- $X_i$  Sum of answers per actor and for one power element,  $0 > X_i \geq (n - 1) *$

1 Adopted from DULLER, C. and KEPLER, J. (2005, pp. 348–351)


highest possible answer of the corresponding Likert scale (1 or 3) for  $i = 1, \dots, n$ ,  $\sum_{i=1}^n X_i = \text{Total given answers per power element}$

- $h_i$  is the ratio of power per actor and per power element (i), with  $0 > h_i \geq 1$ , and for  $i = 1, \dots, n$  and  $\sum_{i=1}^n h_i = 1 = \text{Total power per power element}$
- $r$  is the position of the sorted ratio of power per actor ( $h_i$ ), the sorting starts with the highest  $h_i$  value until the lowest, equal values can be sorted continually anyway, for  $r = 1, \dots, n$
- $m$  number of considered powerful actors
- $CR_m$  concentration ratio, show the distribution of the power per actor (i.e.:  $CR_2 = 0.4$  means that the first two actors hold 40 % of the total available power per power element in the network)
- $D_m$  Dominance Degree (Herfindahl-Dominance Degree or Deeffaa-Degree), with  $m = \text{group of powerful actors}$  and  $n - m = \text{group of less powerful actor}$

$$h_i = \frac{X_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n X_i} \quad CR_m = \sum_{j=1}^m h_r \quad D_m = \frac{(CR_m)^2}{m} + \frac{(1 - CR_m)^2}{n - m}$$

### Graph 1

**Dominance degree ( $D_m$ ) value distribution for the power element of trust for all actors of the Mbeyo Community Forest Network, Namibia. Dominanz Grad Verteilung für das Machtelement Vertrauen, für alle Akteure des Mbeyo Gemeinschaftswaldes, Namibia.**





**Tab. 3**

**Quantitative, qualitative data and triangulated results for all power elements for the Mbeyo Community Forest Network, Namibia.**  
**Quantitative, qualitative und triangulierte Ergebnisse für alle Machtelemente für den Mbeyo Gemeinschaftswald, Namibia.**

Actor Classification	Trust			Incentice			Coercion		
	QT	QL	R	QT	QL	R	QT	QL	R
Forest Administration	2	+	2	2	+	2	2	+	2
Donor	2	+	2	2	+	2	2	-	1
User Group Representative	2	+	2	2	-	1	2	-	1
Traditional Authority 2	2	+	2	2	-	1	2	-	1
Traditional Authority 1	2	+	2	2	-	1	2	+	2
State 1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
State 2	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
State 3	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
State 4	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
Association	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
Board	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
Forest Based Enterprise 1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
Forest Based Enterprise 2	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1

*Group of powerful actors:* 2

*Group of less powerful actors:* 1

*Power source observed:* +

*Power source not observed:* -

*Not checked:* 0

*Quantitative data:* QT

*Qualitative Data:* QL

*Final Results (Triangulation):* R

The point for the separation between the group of powerful actors and less powerful actors can be found at the maximum of the dominance degree values (highest  $D_m$  value). At this point the  $D_m$  value for the last member of the group of powerful actors is still higher than the  $D_m$  value of the first member of the group of less powerful actors. This is the point where the power mean value ( $D_m$ ) for the assumed group of powerful actors plus the power mean value of the assumed group of less powerful actors is higher than in the following assumed actor-power constellation.

As an illustrative example, Graph 1 shows the distribution of the dominance degree values for all actors, sorted from the strongest to the weakest, measured for the power element of trust. The peak is with the fifth actor, indicating that these five are members of the most powerful group.

Based on the dominance degree, the group of most powerful actors is identified. Table 3 shows the group to which an actor belongs, for each power element (Trust, Incentives and Coercion) for the quantitative- and qualitative sequence as well as for the triangulated result. The result of the preliminary network survey (QT data in Table 3) is found using the rule which states that each actor who is part of the most powerful group with regard to at least one power element is considered to be part of the group of the most powerful actors.

The actors in Table 3 are sorted into a theoretical based classification according to the classification used by DEVKOTA, 2010.

Summing up, the preliminary network survey produces quantitative results indicating the members of the most powerful group. The resources needed to conduct this sequence are small. There are only about 10 standardized questions which can be ticked quickly by the actors asked. Due to the size of the network, of approximately 15 actors in average, the survey for one community forest is done within one week. Of course, the empirical indicators are not sufficient for a power analysis, but they are a good starting point for a follow-up survey which would go deeper by focusing on the powerful actors only.

---

## 4. Follow-up Qualitative Power Survey

---

The follow-up survey examines the power sources of the actors belonging to the group of most powerful actors individually, in a qualitative manner. The observations look for empirical evidence of specific power sources or processes within the framework of the three elements of power defined theoretically. For example, coercion can be exercised by using a power source or threatening to use it only. The power source could be the rifle of a forest guard, the physical strength of a truck or igniting a fire. Qualitative, in-depth interviews shed light into such power features. They are accompanied by observations and secondary data like a forest management plan or law, written meeting minutes and guidelines or letter of formal acts from the field. The interviewer identifies an empirical phenomenon and sees whether he can find a relation to the power element. If he can, the phenomenon supports the existence of the specific power element. For example, the possession of a rifle by a forest guard indicates that he can exert considerable coercion over a forest user with no gun. The hypothesis specified in the power features becomes complex. It would be seen later whether it is possible to identify theories already formulated in the literature which correspond to the observation. If this is the case, the power feature is formulated and supported empirically. If we cannot find a theory, we disregard the observation. The selection of observations which correspond to theories formulated prior to the survey is used as

technique to ensure high validity for hypotheses which are more complex than those within the preliminary survey (MODELL, 2009; p. 213).<sup>2</sup>

Conducting a qualitative field investigation which makes use of observations, interviews and all kind of documents requires good access to the field actors. An initial meeting between the researcher and actors for the purpose of introductions and the exchange of arguments which are largely symbolic is followed by other meetings which are more substantial. About 10 days were needed to carry out the field investigation of the 5 powerful actors which were identified within one case, on average. In comparison with the quantitative preliminary survey this means that the time spent with each interview partner is 400 % higher, but the overall time per case study is only 30 % higher (DEVKOTA, 2010; MARYUDI, 2011). The strict focus on the powerful actors increases the efficiency of the survey. This means the field researcher can spend more time with the most relevant actors, looking for documents and making his own observations, which increases the reliability.

- 2 For the methodical discussion the argument that we select all qualitative observations guided by existing theories is important. Due to limited space we cannot present here all complex hypotheses of the actor-centered power theory and how they guide the selection of observations. See DEVKOTA (2010) and MARYUDI (2011) for this.

---

## 5. Follow-up Comparative Quantitative Network Analysis

---

The comparative quantitative network analysis builds on the data of the preliminary sequence triangulated with the results of the qualitative investigation. The triangulation follows the simple rule that if an actor is powerful some evidence for it can be found during the qualitative follow-up survey. This means that if a proof or disproof of the results from the preliminary quantitative survey can be made with the qualitative survey, the triangulated result will be the finding of the second survey. Only if no information can be collected during the second survey will the result of the triangulation always be not powerful, regardless of the result from the first survey. For each power element quantified by the preliminary survey, qualitative support has to be found. If the quantitative data indicates a power element of an actor, the qualitative follow-up survey must identify power features. For example, if the survey estimated high coercive power, the qualitative investigation must find a “smoking gun” somewhere. The qualitative survey cannot quantify the power elements but rather, guided by theory, it looks for empirically-based evidence of power features which may be a strong indicator as to whether they exist. Otherwise, we do not recognize the quantitative data as being reliable and review them giving priority to the qualitative information (See Table 3).

Giving stronger credit to the qualitative survey is justified by our specific research question as well as by methodic arguments:

(i) The quantitative survey is done in a methodical rudimental way asking a view questions only in order to save resources. The data indicate the group of powerful actors but not more. E.g., no complex net-

work indicators are calculated and we use a most simple scale with “1 (no strong)” and “2 (strong)” for describing the quantitative results.

(ii) In contrast the qualitative survey is done combining interviews, documents and observations. The results rely not only on the judgment of the actor asked but also on the documents which proof the answers and on observations, e.g. of his technical sources.

(iii) Derived from our research focus on explaining the power process we are interested in empirical evidence for constructs based in our theory about power. The qualitative survey is linked much better to specific hypothesis than the quantitative survey which measures a general power relation. If the quantitative survey indicates a powerful actor in general and we are not able to describe his power process and sources based on theory we cannot use the empirical data for the further analysis. The weak link to detailed hypotheses justifies additionally overruling the quantitative data by qualitative one. Even in the rare cases the quantitative data are better they are not highly useful for testing our hypothesis.

(iv) Giving priority to qualitative data derives the question why we rely so much on the strong actors identified in the quantitative survey. First we do this not fully. The qualitative survey may omit strong actors or add some if the data give evidence for power sources and processes. Second we might oversee some powerful actors due to the weakness of the quantitative survey and the focus of the qualitative on the actors identified by the quantitative survey. Underestimating the powerful actors is not destroying the ability to test our hypothesis that powerful actors determine the outcome. If we get a positive result we accept the hypothesis. If no proof is given by data it could be because the hypothesis is wrong or because we have overseen a powerful actor. Nevertheless we will not accept the hypothesis in this case following a cautious principle in testing. Of course if this phenomenon turns out frequently we will be forced to do additional surveys in order to find the hidden powerful actor.

The preliminary actor power network is reviewed focusing on the powerful actors based on the qualitative data. For example, in Table 3, and for all three power dimensions, the data for “powerful” (2) and “not-powerful” (1) are examined to see whether they are supported by the qualitative results and they are corrected in case of abbreviation.

The final data goes into the follow-up comparative quantitative network analysis. The first two steps in the sequence build up a quantitative data set which comprises all cases (powerful actor per community forest) from all countries. All actors of the power networks of the Community Forests studied for all countries are classified according to their power elements as being “powerful” or “not powerful”. This set of data can be used for the quantitative comparative analysis of more complex hypotheses about power.

The main theoretical progress of the comparative analysis is that we classify the actors into categories which are theoretically meaningful. In line with our guiding research question we select hypothesis which describe power processes and resources. An additional restriction caused by the empirical method applied is the focus on powerful actors. The identification of weak actors and their specific power processes is not covered by our research design. As discussed we justify this restriction by the hypothesis that in explaining the outcomes the powerful actors make the difference. For example, we can differentiate those state agencies which are described well by the rich theory of bureaucracy (PETERS, 1995). From this theory we get hypotheses on how powerful bureaucracies generate and use power, which can be set against the elements of coercion, incentives and trust. For example, the quantitative data can prove whether state forest agencies in case they are powerful rely more on coercion or on trust in managing community forests, which is highly relevant for the discourse on governance.

All categories of actors in Table 3 are linked to theories about state or private actors. From these theories we get a rich supply of hypotheses which can be tested by comparative quantitative analysis.

Due to the quantitative data produced and improved by the methodological sequence the resources needed for the final qualitative analysis are fairly small. Only an analysis of the literature and running a computer program are required. It is estimated that one qualified researcher for three months is needed.

---

## 6. Conclusion: Efficiency Gain for the Methodological Sequence Due to Flexibility in Hypothesis and Empirical Evidence

---

The experience of the comparative analyses of power in community forestry supports our claim that a sequence of quantitative-qualitative-quantitative surveys could save about half of the resources needed for the field work. We reduced the amount of months of work for one qualified researcher from 126 months to 51 months.

Nevertheless, the quality of the research could be kept high by having flexibility in the formulation of hypotheses and in the search for empirical evidence:

Good validity is secured by starting based on radically simplified hypotheses and then formulating increasingly complex hypotheses, step by step, based on existing theories and remaining within the framework of the initial hypothesis.

Good reliability is achieved by using the preliminary quantitative survey to lead toward the research subject, namely powerful actors only, and subsequently checking the results using qualitative observations. Then we can use the qualitative data to correct the quantitative data for the final comparative quantitative analysis

The methodological experience might encourage forest policy research to look for methodological sequences. However, one must be aware that the mix of quantitative and qualitative data has to be accompanied by an explicit strategy to maintain high research quality.



---

## 7. Summary

---

A sound empirical basis is of high importance for applied research in forest policy despite empirical methods increasing the resources needed for research. Especially in developing countries, the extensive needs of field research might exceed the available resources. A sequence consisting of a quantitative preliminary survey–qualitative study–quantitative follow up study is recommended in the literature as an efficient methodological strategy. This paper investigates how to diminish resources by means of the sequence design and discusses how to keep a high research quality using the example of comparative power analysis in community forestry. The sequence design is applied in seven countries studies from which are two are already successfully completed (Nepal, published by DEVKOTA, 2010 and Java-Indonesia, published by MARYUDI, 2011).

The preliminary quantitative survey is used to identify the group of most powerful actors for each community forest. The measurement validity, meaning the degree of agreement of measurement and theory, is kept high by simplifying the hypothesis down to the claim that a group of powerful actors exists. The reliability of the survey is strengthened by using, for each actor, the external estimate of his power by the other actors in the network. Nevertheless, the reliability is relatively low due to the use of standardized questions only, but it is sufficient to indicate who the actors of the powerful actors group are.

The follow-up qualitative power survey ascertains the power resources of the strong actors which have been identified as such. It applies a complex hypothesis about actor-centered power which involves the three power elements of coercion, incentives and trust. Reliability is high due to such multiple empirical resources as are obser-

vations, interviews and documents. The data of the qualitative survey is used to improve the quantitative data of the preliminary survey.

Finally, a comparative quantitative analysis of the power of actors in community forestry for all researched countries is conducted using the improved data. This analysis tests complex hypotheses which involve the power of different actors. The actors are differentiated using theoretically meaningful terms from which we can derive hypotheses for the empirical tests. In particular, the theories about bureaucratic politics and interest groups can deliver hypotheses about the power relations of these actors, which are then particularly suitable for the quantitative test.

The results show that the sequence survey can reduce the resources needed by about half. Nevertheless, the validity can be kept up by formulating hypotheses of different complexity and sufficient reliability can be ensured by improving the data step by step by means of the follow-up survey.

---

## 8. Zusammenfassung

---

Titel des Beitrages: Vernetzung von quantitativen und qualitativen Erhebungen zur Steigerung der Effizienz in der Forstpolitikforschung.

Für die angewandte Forstpolitikforschung ist eine belastbare empirische Basis von großer Bedeutung, auch wenn dadurch die Ressourcen für die Forschung steigen. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Entwicklungsländer, in denen empirische Projekte häufig an den nur knapp verfügbaren Ressourcen scheitern. In der Literatur wird eine Sequenz von quantitativer Vorstudie – qualitativer Erhebung – quantitativer Analyse vorgeschlagen, um die Effizienz der Methoden zu erhöhen. Im Folgenden wird am Beispiel der Machtanalyse „Gemeinschaftswälder (Community Forestry)“ untersucht, ob eine solche Sequenz den Ressourcenbedarf senkt und wie die Qualität der Methoden hoch gehalten werden kann. Die Sequenz wurde bereits in sieben Länderstudien angewandt wovon schon zwei Studien erfolgreich abgeschlossen wurden (Nepal, veröffentlicht: DEVKOTA, 2010 und Java-Indonesien, veröffentlicht: MARYUDI, 2011).

Die quantitative Vorstudie identifiziert innerhalb der Gemeinschaftswälder eine Gruppe von mächtigen Akteuren. Hohe Validität, d.h. die Übereinstimmung des Gemessenen mit der Theorie, wird durch eine starke Vereinfachung der Hypothese gesichert, indem nur die Existenz einer Gruppe mächtiger Akteure behauptet wird ohne Binnendifferenzierung der Akteure oder der Macht. Die Reliabilität wird erhöht, indem die Fremdeinschätzung der Macht der einzelnen Akteure erfragt wird und nicht die Selbsteinschätzung. Sie ist ausreichend, um eine erste Identifizierung jener Akteure vorzunehmen, die zur Gruppe der Mächtigen gehören.

Die nachfolgende qualitative Analyse erhebt differenziert die Macht der ausgewählten starken Akteure. Sie setzt eine komplexe Machttheorie ein, die auf den Elementen Zwang, Anreiz und Vertrauen beruht und aus der Literatur vor der Erhebung abgeleitet wurde. Die Reliabilität wird insbesondere dadurch gestärkt, dass die Experteninterviews durch Beobachtung und Dokumentenanalyse erweitert werden. Die Daten dienen zur Verbesserung der Daten aus der quantitativen Vorerhebung.

Die verbesserten Daten gehen in die quantitative vergleichende Analyse aller untersuchten Länder ein. Diese testet komplexe Hypothesen über die Macht unterschiedlicher Akteure. Die Akteure werden in Begriffe mit definierter Bedeutung in ausgewählten Theorien differenziert. Aus diesen können Hypothesen für den empirischen Test abgeleitet werden. Insbesondere Theorien über bürokratische Politik und Interessengruppen liefern Hypothesen über das Machhandeln dieser Akteure, die für den quantitativen Test gut geeignet sind.

Im Ergebnis erreicht die Sequenz eine Verminderung der Ressourcen um rund 40 %. Dennoch können die Validität durch Einsatz von Hypothesen mit unterschiedlicher Komplexität und die Reliabilität durch schrittweise Verbesserung der Daten hoch gehalten werden.

---

## 9. References

---

- BRYMAN, A. (2001): *Social Research Methods*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- DEFFAA, W. (1982): Die Berücksichtigung monopolistischer und oligopolistischer Strukturen in der statistischen Konzentrationsmessung. In: *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv*, vol. 66, pp. 330.
- DEVKOTA, R. R. (2010): *Interests and Power as Drivers of Community Forestry*. Universitätsdrucke Göttingen, Göttingen.
- DULLER, C. and J. KEPLER (2005): Die österreichische private Krankenversicherung – Ein Monopol? *Austrian Journal of Statistics*, vol. 34, pp. (4): 348–351.
- EDMUNDS, D. and E. WOLLENBERG (2001): Historical perspectives on forest policy change in Asia: an introduction. *Environmental History*, vol.6, pp. 190–212.
- HÄNI, P. K. (1987): *Die Messung der Unternehmenskonzentration*, Grusch, Schweiz.
- HASANAGAS, N. (2004): *Power factor typology through organizational and network analysis – Using environmental policy networks as an illustration*. Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2004.
- KROTT, M., A. BADER, R. DEVKOTA, C. Schusser, A. MARYUDI, C. M. YUFANYI MOHVUH and M. SALLA (2011): Manuscript: Actor-centered power analysis in forest policy – a theory-based concept, *Forest Policy and Economics*, 15 pages, in review.
- KROTT, M. (2005): *Forest Policy Analysis*, Springer.
- KROTT, M. (2011): Value and risks of the use of analytical theory in science for forest policy. *Forest Policy and Economics* 00682 8 pages, in print.
- MARSDEN, P. (1990): Network Data and Measurement. *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 16, pp. 435–463.

- MARSDEN, P. (2011): Survey Methods for Network Data. In: SOCOTT, J. and CARRINGTON P. J. (eds). The Sage Handbook of Social Network Analysis.
- MARYUDI, A. (2011): The Contesting Aspirations in the Forests. Universitätsdrucke Göttingen, Göttingen.
- MCVILLY, K. R. et al. (2008): Remaining open to quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-method designs: An unscientific compromise or good research practice? In: International Review of Research in Mental Retardation, Elsevier, Amsterdam, vol. 35, p. 151–203.
- MODELL, S. (2009): In defense of triangulation: A critical realist approach to mixed methods research in management accounting. Management Accounting Research, pp. 208–221.
- MORSE, J. (1991): Approaches to qualitative-quantitative methodological triangulation. Nursing Research, p 40 and pp. 135–145.
- NAUMAN, W. L. (2006): Social Research Methods, Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Pearson Education (6. edition).
- PATTON, M. (1995): Qualitative evaluation and research methods. 2nd edition, Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- PETERS, B. G. (1995): The Politics of Bureaucracy, Longman Publishers, White Plains, N.Y..
- PIESCH, W. (1975): Statistische Konzentrationsmaße: formale Eigenschaften und verteilungstheoretische Zusammenhänge, Mohr, Tübingen.
- SCHMIDT, I. (2005): Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht. Stuttgart.
- THOMMEN, J.-K. und A.-K. ACHLEITNER (2006): Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag D. Th. Gabler/GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden.
- WOLLENBERG, E., R. IWAN, G. LIMBERG and M. MOELIONO (2008): Locating social choice in forest co-management and local governance: the politics of public decision making and interests. In: SIKOR, T. (ed.). Public and private in natural resource governance: a false dichotomy? Earthscan Research Editions, London, pp. 27–43.





---

# Power, the Hidden Factor in Development Cooperation

---

## An Example of Community Forestry in Cameroon

---





Open Journal of Forestry  
2012. Vol.2, No.4, 240-251



**Article Info**

Received July 23rd, 2012

Revised August 26th, 2012

Accepted September 15th, 2012

Published Online October 2012 in SciRes (<http://www.SciRP.org/journal/ojf>)

DOI:10.4236/ojf.2012.24030

Mbolo C. Yufanyi Movuh, Carsten Schusser

Chair of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy, Georg August University Goettingen,  
Goettingen, Germany

Email: [cyufani@gwdg.de](mailto:cyufani@gwdg.de)



## **Abstract**

This paper is concomitant with our comparative study analysis of the interests and power of the stakeholders involved in Community Forestry (CF) in six countries. The study hypothesises that, “governance processes and outcomes in CF depend mostly on interests of the powerful external stakeholders”. For this paper which is on CF in Cameroon, the study hypothesizes that, “Power is a hidden factor in Development cooperation”. Based on political theories, the paper uses the “actor-centered power” (ACP) concept of the Community Forestry Working Group (CFWG) in Göttingen, Germany, the post-development theory and empirical findings, to back up the assertions made in the study through the analysis of thirteen different CFs in the South West region (SWR) of Cameroon. It analyzes the empirically applicable ACP concept, that consists of three elements: trust, incentives and coercion and at the same time connects these elements with the post-development theory. The elements were derived from the basic assumptions on power made by Max Weber in political sciences and Max Krott in forest policy. The study confirms the existence of powerful internal and external stakeholders that influence CF in Cameroon and aims to empower important but marginalised communities. It concludes that, CF as a development instrument to alleviate poverty and increase livelihood while sustainably managing the forest has actually not brought significant or meaningful development to the targeted sector of the society

## **Keywords:**

Community Forestry; Devolution; Power; Development; Post-Development; Theory; Trust; Incentive; Coercion



---

## Introduction

---

As community forestry (CF) is being recognized as a paradigm shift (La Viña, 1997; Rebugio, 1998; Devkota, 2010) of forest policy in the so-called developing countries,<sup>1</sup> it is essential to understand the power processes and its distribution behind it. This makes it easier to understand the way power is wielded among stakeholders (Devkota, 2010: p. 6), hence, identifying the different interests and influence. Furthermore, many global funding agencies have bought into the idea of CF and feel that it is a far more ethical way of donating money for the protection of forest and at the same time fulfilling their development agenda. Millions of Euros are being invested in CF programs all over the world with very little success in their implementation, management and monitoring, not achieving the goals of biodiversity protection and increased human well-being as always proclaimed in discourse and rhetoric, in the name of Development. In Cameroon for instance, most of the community forests were established through projects implemented by NGOs and drawing on donor support (Mandondo, 2003: p. 17).

In implementing CF, the forest condition (sustainable management) is often referred to as a precondition for positive social and economic outcomes. Nonetheless, in many cases, forests are devolved to local arenas after they have been severely exploited and are in a degraded condition (Mandondo, 2003: p. 15), while states appear to have initiated the devolution concept to restore degraded forest lands by taking advantage of cheap and voluntary labour (Shackleton et al., 2002; Sarin et al., 2003; Colfer, 2005; Larson, 2005; Contreras, 2003; Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001;

1 This is regarded as a new forestry paradigm favouring a people-oriented approach generally termed “community forestry” or “participatory forestry,” rather than the previous top-down forest policies of these countries



Thoms, 2006; Devkota, 2010). Furthermore, in the devolution of some usufruct and to a limited extent participation rights to local communities, institutional arrangements had not been followed by the establishment of more effective institutions (Poffenberger, 2006; Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011). Larson (2005) and Devkota (2010) mention that at times after locals have invested in the protection of these resources and improved their status, the state often re-appropriates these forest resources. For Larson and Ribot (2007: p. 3), forest policy and the implementation “—systematically exclude various groups from forest benefits— and often impoverish and maintain the poverty of these groups”. Also, the concept of CF in Cameroon has been attributed to colonial heritage and post-colonial entanglement to the former colonial masters (Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011: p. 77), with power and interests of stakeholders being seen to influence outcomes of CF. With such critical findings, it is but adequate to question the concept of CF (as a pro community policy implementation instrument) and further examine the factors contributing to it not achieving its proclaimed objectives (Devkota, 2010: p. 2).

Most often than not, power comes in many forms and is concealed where it is strongest and therefore resists scientific analyses (Krott, 2005: p. 14). Consequently, CF analysis through the power spectrum require a logically and theoretically based concept of power based on social relationships. As an important phenomenon in social relation, power analysis is very necessary in forest policy as well as in other domains. By referring to the classic sociological definition of power by Max Weber (1947: p. 152), Krott (2005: p. 14) relates the issue in forest policy as, “those who utilize or protect forests are forced to subordinate their interests to politically determined programs in the face of conflict”. This, he explains, results from “stakeholders and political players availing themselves of power” (Krott, 2005: p. 14; Devkota, 2010: p. 6), leading to criticism of development as a whole and the CF programs in particular. In criticizing the development theory as a whole,<sup>2</sup> I chose

- 2 Development theory is a combination of theories about how desirable change in the so-called third world societies can be best obtained, by following the examples of the development processes of the so-called first world societies. These theories are based on a variety of social scientific disciplines and approaches.

CF as a case study and show how power and the interest, characteristics and circumstances (Mayers, 2005) of the powerful stakeholders are exhibited in the era of post-development theory. This could be well ostracised in a situation where conservationism, sustainable and participatory forest management for economic benefits are notably tied with the politics of funding, conditioned upon the adoption and mainstreaming of such viewpoints in national policy arenas (Mandondo, 2003: p. 23). The study also sheds light on how and why countries with rich forests, especially African countries like Cameroon, are generally marginalized in international forestry think-tank, decision-making and trend-setting institutions.<sup>3</sup>

The main hypothesis of the interest and power analysis is that, “governance processes and outcomes in CF depend mostly on interests of the powerful external stakeholders”. To test the hypothesis, a comparative research study was carried out on “Stakeholders” Interests and Power as Drivers of Community Forestry”. The comparative research project is conducted in Albania, Cameroon, Germany, Indonesia, Namibia and Nepal, in three different continents. Pertaining to CF in Cameroon, the study hypothesizes that, “Power is a hidden factor in development assistance”. It uses a simple concept of power suggested by the Community Forestry Working Group (CFWG), the post-development theory and empirical findings, to back up the assertions made in the study, and is strictly reduced to the basics of social interaction. This approach helps understanding the present CF model in Cameroon, by identifying the key actors or stakeholders in the system, and assessing their respective interests in, or influence on, that system (Mayers, 2005: p. 3).

3 ibid

---

## CF and its Rationale in Cameroon

---

In the last 3 decades, CF<sup>4</sup> has been hailed by researchers, policy makers, governments and Organisations alike (Brown et al., 2007: p. 136; Pulhin & Dressler, 2009) as a successful contemporary paradigm and implementation mechanism for sustainable forest resources management, decentralization and devolution (Ezzine de Blas et al., 2009; Larson & Ribot, 2004; World Bank, 2004; World Bank, 2005; WRI, 2005). Based on its theoretical decentralization and devolution characteristics, it has been promoted by international bi- and multilateral green Organizations, development agencies (Agrawal & Redford, 2006) and western governments, becoming one of the most practiced participatory models<sup>5</sup> of forest management as an alternative to previous models (Barry et al., 2003; Sikor, 2006: p. 339), promising and aiming at alleviating poverty of many forest dependent communities while at the same time sustainably managing their forest (Maryudi et al., 2011; Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011; Maryudi, 2011).

But the common reality across the globe and Cameroon in particular is that, the governance process of CF has not yet produced expected outcomes (Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011; MINEP, 2004; Devkota, 2010). While McDermott and Schreckenber (2009: p. 158) have elaborated CF

4 We define “Community Forestry” as “forestry which directly involves local forest users in the common decision making and implementation of forestry activities” (CFWG in Göttingen).

5 Although “Traditional Community Forestry” models have existed long in the local communities before the present introduced models by Western NGOs and agencies (Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011; Larson & Ribot, 2007; Sunderlin, 2004: 3; Oyono, 2005b).

as the exercise by local people of power to influence decisions regarding management of forests, including the rules of access and the disposition of products; in Cameroon, the “power shift” rhetoric from the state to the local communities through CF opens a question of power sharing, when these management objectives would really be put into practice. In Cameroon since 1995, a new forest policy act was enacted (proclaimed in 1994) to accommodate two approaches: CF and sustainable forest management. Conserving and enhancing biodiversity through rural peoples’ involvement was one of the components of the new forest policy act of 1995 (Sobze, 2003; Yufanyi Movuh, 2007: p. 1). This law lays emphasis on increasing the participation of the local populations in forest conservation and management in order to contribute to raising their living standards.<sup>6</sup> For the first time in Cameroon’s history, the 1994 forest law and its 1995 decrees of application, provided for a legal instrument for community involvement in forest management (Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011; Oyono, 2005a, 2005b; Mandondo, 2003).

Although the implementation of CF differs in different countries,<sup>7</sup> its concept and formulation goes far back to colonial times (Larson & Ribot, 2007; Oyono, 2004b). Presently, it is being incentivised with development assistance in many, if not all of these formerly colonised countries, from a variety of different western or western-backed agencies and organisations, like the World Bank, KfW (German development bank) and GIZ for Cameroon<sup>8</sup>. After more than 14 years of CF implementation with financial support from international donors, the central government of Cameroon is gaining more control and influence of the forest

6 The Forestry Law No 94/01 of 20th January 1994 and its decrees of application No 95/531/PM du 23 August 1995.

7 Cameroon forestry law definition of community forestry: A community forest is “a forest forming part of the non-permanent forest estate, which is covered by a management agreement between a village community and the Forestry Administration. Management of such forest—which should not exceed 5,000 ha—is the responsibility of the village community concerned, with the help or technical assistance of the Forestry Administration.” *Source: Article 3(11) of Decree 95/531/PM of 23 August 1995.*

8 GTZ (German technical service) and DED (German development service) have now merged with InWEnt, to be called GIZ (German Organisation for international cooperation).



resources than before, strengthening the top-down approach of forest policy implementation with strong tendencies towards re-centralization, dictated by the practices of bureaucrats and state representatives (Oyono, 2004b), contrary to the CF aim. This confirms the growing concerns that CF practice in many regions of the world is not attaining its intended objectives (Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011; Oyono, 2004b). In Cameroon, CF has been proven to be a leverage for colonial legacy and entanglement (Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011) and an instrument of power against a backdrop of development assistance reminiscent to colonial times. Just like the 1974 land tenure law that followed the French colonial conception and which is still in place today in Cameroon,<sup>9</sup> the 1994 forestry law reinforced the colonial conception of the state as the ultimate owner of the national forest domain although it established for the first time in Cameroon the possibility for rural people to gain usufruct rights in the exploitation of forest resources in their neighbourhood.

Before, but especially since the inception of a different approach in forest policy in Cameroon through the new forestry law, European development agencies like GTZ, DED (now GIZ), KfW, AFD, (Agence Française de Développement), SNV, etc. have become more influential than ever in controlling the policies of natural resource management in Cameroon. They have become a *sine qua non* for the formulation and implementation of CF in tandem with their political ideologies of westernisation (Oyono et al., 2005: p. 364; Mbile et al., 2009; Oyono, 2009; Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011). Also, in the last 3 decades, we have experienced a wave of criticism of the uncritical acceptance of development in the form of post-modern critiques against western development schemas (Ahorro n.p.; Matthews, 2004, 2006). These criticisms have been literally boosted or elaborated by contemporary theories like the post-colonial and post-development theories.

This paper will proceed by analysing the CF stakeholders' power network in Cameroon using conceptualisation, theory and empirical data from the research collected from field work in Cameroon.

9 In the colonial times, lands were considered "vacant" and without "master" and as such defined as state land.

---

## Materials and Methods

---

The CFWG<sup>10</sup> definition of CF, includes community based natural resource management through programs emphasizing biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management involving the local communities. Here, the practice of Council forestry in Cameroon is included as part of the CF. Thirteen communities (see **Figure 1**, map) were explored in the South West Region (SWR) of Cameroon and the history, status and stakeholders of the CFs were analyzed.<sup>11</sup> Stakeholders here, refer to those who have interests in and the potential to influence the CF processes. We classify them into two main groups: state and non-state stakeholders. The main state stakeholders relevant for CF are the central Ministry for Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) and the regional and local forest administrations. The non-state stakeholders include forest users, forest users' groups and their federations; donors, forest-based enterprises; environmental and user associations and political parties; university and research institutions; media and consultants. Such stakeholders may belong to local/regional, national and international levels, all of which may be of worth in CF processes. For Cameroon and for this study, our identified non-state stakehold-

10 The Community Forestry Working Group (CFWG) in Germany, within the Chair for Forest and Nature Conservation Policy of the University in Goettingen.

11 The statistical population of the CFs was drawn from the number of Community and Council forest applications received by the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) until 2009 in Yaoundé-Cameroon as a whole. This sums up to 451 Community forest and 28 Council Forest applications with a total of 479 CFs, spread out in all the ten Regions of Cameroon.

ers are: GTZ, DED (now GIZ), KfW/GFA, WWF, WCS,<sup>12</sup> the Common Initiative Groups (CIG) and Village Forest Management Committees (VFMC) of the different communities with community and council forests respectively.

Quantitative and qualitative interviews were carried out with CF managers and forestry officers and at times with members of the CIG and VFMC, responsible for the management of these forests; with representatives of MINFOF-SWR, KfW/ GFA representing the main Program (PSMNR-SWR),<sup>13</sup> for the facilitation of the implementation of the forestry law, hence CF. Structured questionnaires were used with closed and opened-ended questions. More than seventy interviews were conducted and observations noted, in the course of the research that lasted three years. Documents like the log-frame (logical framework) of the PSMNR-SWR, Management Plans (MP) and Technical Notes (NT) of the CFs were also part of the materials collected and analyzed.

The selections of the community and council forestry samples were done the map of the PSMNR-SWR (**Figure 1**) and based on information on recent activities of the communities in the CF process. It is also an area where the researcher has a good existing knowledge. From this population, a simple random selection was made. Interviews carried out with different stakeholders were in relation to the information given by other stakeholders in their networking (Schnell et al., 2005) and interest representation in CF.<sup>14</sup> All the interviews were recorded for transcription and further analyses. The quantitative network analysis uses the knowledge of the stakeholders to identify the partners of the network while the qualitative analysis goes deeper to describe and evaluate the powerful stakeholders, identified through the quantitative network analysis (see Schusser et al., 2012: p. 6). More the qualitative and less the quantitative analysis will be used to test our actor-centered

12 MINFOF (national and Regional -SWR), GTZ, DED (now GIZ), KfW/GFA, WWF , WCS are all representing the main Program, PSMNR-SWR.

13 Program for the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the South West Region.

14 This was done through the snowball method. It is a typical way to analyse networks.

power (ACP) and post-development theories through the concept and practice of CF in Cameroon.

In employing a critical realistic sequence of quantitative and qualitative research design approach, Schusser et al. (2012) identify stakeholders and their respective influence, providing explanations of activities and power in CF settings.

---

## Definitions and Theoretical Roots


---

### Actor-Centered Power (ACP)

Despite being the crucial question of political science, the concept of power played an increasingly minor role in the last decades' forest policy analysis. All the credit for the reintroduction of a power concept is due to Bas Arts and Jan van Tatenhove who published a conceptual framework on power in 2004 (Schusser, 2012: p. 2; Krott et al., 2013). Although we think that powerful actors influence the policy outcomes heavily, we still need to understand the social phenomenon called "power" in the given context of forest policy issues.<sup>15</sup> Many political scientists including Weber offered explanations and definitions of power but there has been little reference directly linking forest policy analysis and development. To analyze power in forest policy analysis, we need to focus on single actors and their interaction in detail and therefore, the theory should focus on that substance of social behaviour.

This paper aims to analyze the empirically applicable concept of an ACP that consists of the following power sources (see **Box 1**): Trust, Incentives and Coercion and at the same time connect these elements with the post-development theory. The elements were derived from basic assumptions on power made by Weber (1947) and Krott (1990). The elements are clearly defined and described with instruments and empirical findings. To analyze the social relations of forest policy actors

15 ibid




Source PSMNR 2010

**Figure 1.**  
**Community and Council Forestry regions in the PSMNR-SWR: Areas visited are encircled.**

in Cameroon, a simple concept that is strictly reduced to the basics of social interaction was suggested. For clarity's sake, in this text an actor exercising power is called A and an actor receiving power B. Our ACP concept defines power as follows:

*Power is a social relationship, where an actor A alternates the behavior of actor B without recognizing B's will.*



#### *Note*

Power can only be verified at the presence of resistance and the use of coercion to break this resistance (Weber,1972). But even Weber mentioned the *possibility to exercise power* as an equivalent to power, with the help of the *threat of power*.

This behavioral concept of power has some inherent weaknesses, as Offe points out: Here, influence cannot be verified. The better power 'works' in everyday life as he states, the fewer power would be verifiable (Offe, 1977).

Etzioni (1975:333) proposes to examine the actor's resources and instruments.

Historic experiences of a use of these resources and instruments would allow for a foresight. B could estimate, on what the threat is based on. Thus, power potential becomes verifiable beyond its simple exercise which was first mentioned by Krott (1990). On the other hand, power can be verified also on the behavior of "B". His change in behavior can be verified empirically at his deciding or failing to decide and the information he possesses (Simon, 1981).

#### **Box 1.**

**ACP concept consists of three elements: Trust, Incentives, and Coercion.**

For Weber (1947: p. 152), power is, “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”. That is, the chance of a person or of a number of persons to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action (Schusser, 2012: p. 2; Krott et al., 2013).

We define trust as a power element when one stakeholder B, changes behaviour by accepting for example, stakeholder A’s information without check. A might typically achieve this situation by persuasion, prestige and reputation or by withholding information from B. Trust can be assumed through furnishing or provision of information, checks or a high frequency of interaction with a stakeholder. It is B’s confidence to A’s goodwill that makes B behave accordingly. It happens when B has the reasonable expectation that following the guidance of A will be beneficial.

The second element, incentives, are financial or non-financial factors that alters B’s behaviour by motivation from A,<sup>16</sup> which is most likely to be done by money, luxuries or any other kind of benefit. Here, transfers are likely to occur. In this case, it exists for B when B delegates to A control over good C in which B has an interest. To B, a behaviour according to A’s incentives produces more benefits than a pursuit of A’s former strategy to fulfil B’s objectives. It is important to note, that B’s inherent interests stay the same—just the behaviour changes. And this change was triggered by the benefits.

The third element, coercion, on the other hand is the practice of A forcing B to behave in an involuntary manner which can be done by violence or threat of violence. Coercion is force and control. If one cannot control other stakeholders, then there is a coercion problem or there is no coercion. Coercion can go with threat or action as a means of control. It is the application of pressure and that is why it is a top-down approach. As coercion builds resentment and resistance from B,

16 As far as technical support changes the behaviour of B (through motivation) it is part of a power process.





it tends to be the most obvious but least effective form of power because it demands a lot of control. When coercion comes to play, B can do little or nothing about it.

Although at times the complex theoretical analysis of the APC only generates face validity and lacks content validity (i.e., not being able to analyze a meaningful range of power) we are going to contentiously and empirically analyse it, pertaining to CF as a development tool in Cameroon.

In the last three decades, critical political and social scientists alike have grown interest in analysing the global society, especially areas of the world with weak economies that strive for better social and economic developments. They use critical theories to deconstruct the Development Theory that emerged in the period after World War II (late 1940s). These researchers and theorists have been interested in the role of development in poverty alleviation and stability, in the social systems where development has become the *status quo* and the notion of poverty alleviation obsolete. This interest has grown significantly since the early 1980s, from works of scholars like Sachs ed. (1992), Escobar (1995) and Rahnema & Bawtree (1997), in the field of post-structuralism and post-development. This has been characterized by the continuing changes in the society, triggered by the unsatisfactory manifestation of the power relations between stakeholders of development. On the other hand, less has been invested in the role of power in the development and poverty alleviation process of the concerned societies. It is also the objective of this paper to use the post-development theory to explain this role.

## Post-Development Theory and the Policy Discourse

Post-development theory argues that the whole concept of development and practice is influence by Western-Northern hegemonies, with blueprints of their values over the rest of the world. Its theorists call for the rejection of the development concept (Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997; Sachs Ed., 1992; Escobar, 1995), looking beyond it. It began during the 1980s following criticisms of development projects and the development theory justifying them (Matthews, 2004). It hitherto ostracises development as a tool used by western societies in the post-world war II era, to

define development concerns, dominating the power relations arena, with the interests of the so-called development experts (the World Bank, IMF and other western development agencies) defining the development priorities, excluding the voices of the people they are supposed to develop, with intrinsically negative consequences. The post-development theory argue that to attempt to overcome this inequality and negative consequences, the stage should be taken over by non-western, non-northern peoples, to represent their priorities and concerns. It differs from other critical approaches to development (like dependency theory, alternative development theory and human development) in that it hitherto rejects development in its present form and calls for an alternative to development (Sachs ed., 1992; Escobar, 1995; Rahnema, 1997; Matthews, 2004, 2006), thus, moving beyond development.

Post-development theorists do not reject development<sup>17</sup> per se but the development that has been a response to the problematization of poverty that occurred in the years following World War II (Klipper, 2010; Matthews, 2004), and label this type of development as being “an historical construct that provides a space in which poor countries are known, specified and intervened upon” (Escobar, 1995: p. 45). Hobley (2007: p. 4) rhetorically asks, “why, if this was so clearly the case thirty years ago, we are still repeating the same mistakes with the same consequences”, echoing poverty alleviation also as being a rationale for the international funding of CF. Foucault described this as a form of power which, “makes individuals subjects; categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him” (Foucault, 1983: p. 212), with individual and collective effects. With its roots in post-modern critiques of modernity, one of the main arguments by theorists of post-development against development practices is the well-established modernist powerful economic, socio-political and ecological interests in the pursuit of development. By deconstructing the development practice and theory, they reveal the operations of power and knowledge in development discourse and practices (Kippler, 2010: p. 2).

17 Development being an improvement or progress in life standards in time



## Why the Analysis of ACP and Post-Development in CF

Power, although being a core element of social and political sciences, has nevertheless played a less important role in forest policy (Krott et al., 2013) and post-development theory analysis. It is understood from many scholars in the field of post-structuralism and post-development studies (Sachs, 1992; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997; Little & Painter, 1995; Berger, 1995; Escobar, 1995; Crew & Harrison, 1998; Pieterse, 1998; Blaike, 1998; Kiely, 1999; Storey, 2000; Babbington, 2000) that power is neglected in the post-developmentists' deconstruction of development. Escobar (2000) points out that it might even be suggested that post-development theorists do not understand power since power lies in the material and with the people, not in discourse, stressing livelihood and people's needs and not theoretical analyses to be of more importance. On the other hand, Rossi (2004: p. 2) argues that, "discourse is a form of power, producing reality, domains of objects and rituals of truth".

We argue that it is not the one or the other. We believe that using the power processes in our concept, we can easily decipher and confirm the arguments of the post-development theorists in analyzing our hypothesis that power is a hidden factor in development assistance. And because it is hidden and resists scientific analysis, it plays a major role (Offe, 1977; Krott, 2005: p. 14). Furthermore, we do not want to assume that the contact with development and the commodity is to be interpreted as a desire for development and the commodity on the part of those affected, arguing that such contacts are made possible through the enactment of a cultural politics by development advocates, in which development and the commodity are prioritized and bestowed upon the subaltern (Escobar, 2000). The only way to explain this is by analyzing the visible and invisible power processes behind these political enactments upon subaltern groups. They willingly or otherwise become actors of a cultural if not hegemonial politics bestowed on them as they struggle to defend their places, existence, ecologies, and cultures.

Until recently, only a few African scholars have had something to say about post-development theory although it goes without doubt that the critique of development offered by post-development theory

is very important to Africa.<sup>18</sup> Relatively little attempt has been made to relate the post-development perspective to the continent (Matthews, 2004: p. 374). The fusion of theory with empirical case studies gives the possibility for a better understanding of both our ACP concept and the post-development theory, countering the criticism of post-development theory as being able to offer a critique of development but lacking instrumentality in relation to practice (Kippler, 2010), the same critique that is levied on many theories on power. As Matthews (2004: p. 377) explains further, even those few African scholars who have published work on development, have not taken into account the post-development perspective, be it from anything similar to a post-development perspective or discussions and literature focusing on the question of development in Africa. The present CF model in Cameroon is a practical example in natural resource management where powerful international actors propose, formulate, impose and implement forest policies through development aid or assistance. Larson and Ribot (2007: p. 190) point out that forest policy and the implementation—“systematically exclude various groups from forest benefits—and often impoverish and maintain the poverty of these groups”. Eighteen years after the new forestry law in Cameroon was proclaimed, the present CF model is still to achieve its objective of sustainable forest management and poverty alleviation through the communities by acquiring benefits from CF.

18 it recognises the failure of the post-World War II (also post-colonial) development project which is illustrated by the African experience



---

## Result

---

### Evaluation of Power in Community Forestry

In all thirteen CFs visited between 2009 and 2011, ten CFs had some form of regulated activities perceived to conform with the definition of our CFWG and also MINFOF classification as a CF. **Table 1** shows the different cases of CF analysed, indicating the presence or not, of donor involvement in the form of development assistance to the GoC through MINFOF and the PSMNR-SWR to the CF.

### Empirical Finding—Resources

Through our critical realistic sequence of quantitative and qualitative research design approach (Schusser et al., 2012), two stakeholder blocks were identified from the state and non-state groups as being the most influential. MINFOF [state] and the GDC,<sup>19</sup> German Development Cooperation [non-state] were identified as being more powerful than others in all the cases studied, determining most of the outcomes of CF in the region. This is the reason why they are always mentioned in the empirical findings.

In 2004, a financial agreement (themed: German Financial Cooperation with Cameroon; Program for the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in Cameroon South West Region) was signed between the GoC (represented by MINEFI—Ministry of Economy and Finance, MINFOF and the Autonomous Sinking Fund) and the government of the federal republic of Germany (represent by KfW, GTZ and

19 (GIZ, GFA/KfW)

DED). This financial agreement was a form of development aid from Germany to Cameroon to assist in the sustainable management of the natural resources of the SWR through the PSMNR-SWR and continues until date. In the same year, the sum of seven million EURO under the supervision of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), with document No.: 2004 65 252, was disbursed after a separate Agreement (by all actors concerned) to the financing Agreement dated December 29, 2004 was signed. Since then, the promotion and support of CF to enhance community participation was a main objective in the PSMNR, against the backdrop of sustainable forest management and poverty alleviation. Notwithstanding this flow of financial, technical and material assistance in CF, results gathered from the field research show less progress in CF being an income generator for the local community who are custodians of the forest.

CF, which was supposed to be a form of decentralization of forest resource management and a form of devolution of power to the local communities has instead strengthen the grip of central MINFOF over the communities with CF. Furthermore, the dependency of the GoC (MINFOF) on financial assistance from Germany and other western countries to run the PSMNR has also increased the influence of these actors over policy and implementation of CF. Without these funds, activities in CF will be almost impossible since certain technical documents and related services have to be paid for by communities who are themselves financially not viable. Empirically, the three elements of power are used to confirm the existence and strong influence of powerful international actors in CF. These elements also confirm the arguments of the post-development theorists, that development, in this case through CF in Cameroon should be rejected since it is a project premised upon a set of values that are not found or regarded strange in the society in which it is implemented and in the long run cannot succeed and will be reason for its demise.

## The Power Element Trust

Trust as defined in the ACP concept is where an actor B complies without a check of information given by another actor A. As Fisher et al. (2010) put it, trust arises from a judgement of whether to place oneself

in a position of potential vulnerability by granting others discretionary power over one's interests. At a certain stage, A is trustworthy just to the extent that he attends to B's interests, values, and collective identities. Seen from B's point of view, trust suspends the need of control over A (Möllerring, 2005: p. 299).

CF in Cameroon came with the objective of enhanced participation of the communities concerned in managing their forest resources sustainably and at the same time benefit financially from it, hence, attaining a progressive development. But in most cases that concerns trust in the powerful actors that govern CF (be it to MINFOF or international organisations), a thorough check by the local stakeholders concerned is just too complex, time-consuming and expensive and therefore inefficient for them, so they rely on the unchecked information given to them by the powerful actors.

In all the case studies mentioned in **Table 1**, it was observed that trust was granted to MINFOF and the international organisations representing the GDC. While the local actors like the CIGs and VFMCs trust MINFOF and the other government ministries concerned with CF, when they comply without any check of alternatives, MINFOF also trusts the GDC by accepting the conditions in the way the PSMNR is going to be managed, also without any check of alternatives. It could be observed in the field that staff of the GDC were very much trusted by the MINFOF staff without check of Information. It could also be observed that the CIGs, VFMCs and MINFOF respectively do not check or are not able to check information from the GDC but use it as a basis for orientation. If they would have the means to check or double-check the information and would hence be able to agree to it voluntarily, there would no power process because here, both parties would have the same interests, but this is not the case.

Also, in the past, the GDC has always been supporting as a development goal, the green sector in Cameroon and this is also a reason for trust without checks. In the above mentioned 2004 separate (bilateral) contract between the German Cooperation and the GoC, the GoC accepted the GFA/DFS,<sup>20</sup>

20 GFA is an international consultancy firm based in Hamburg, Germany/ DFS-Deutsche Forstservice GmbH

(a decision from KfW) without checking, as the main consultancy partner to manage the PSMNR-SWR with MINFOF. Here, the acceptance of MINFOF could be interpreted as change of behaviour due to motivations from the GDC but this could not be confirmed in the research. Officially, the GFA and DFS were selected as program consultants (supposedly through an international bidding process) to assist the program implementation agency, MINFOF, in the coordination of the PSMNR-SWR. However unofficially, they act as a watchdog to MINFOF and monitor the interests of the KfW (personal interview with some PSMNR staff). This again shows that while MINFOF trusts the German partners, it is not reciprocal or mutual, tilting the power element more to the GDC. Nevertheless, there is a fine line between trust to a specific actor and change of behaviour due to motivations initiated by that same actor. This is categorized under incentives.

## The Power Element Incentives

In an actor-centered perspective, it is the expectation of benefits that encourages actor B to change behaviour through motivation from actor A.

Due to incentives from international organisations and agencies like the Bretton Woods institution, World bank, and KfW, the GoC was encouraged or otherwise motivated to make changes in its forest policy to suit the goal of these institutions and the 1994 Forestry Law No. 94/01 of 20th January 1994 and its decrees of application No. 95/531/PM of 23 August 1995 were some of the outcomes of this changed behaviour (Mbile et al., 2009; Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011; Bigombé, 2003; Oyono, 2005a: p. 318). Also, the seven million EURO budget made available to the GoC as development assistance for the first phase (2006-2010) of the PSMNR-SWR was identified as motivation or incentive enough to change the behaviour of its ministries like MINFOF.

On the other hand, a very good field example is the case of the Community of Ikondo Kondo in the Mundemba municipality. They were resettled from the Korup National Park and promised a CF by the authorities that be. As years went by and although they still had the interest of acquiring a CF which they could manage by themselves, they were lured or otherwise motivated to join the Mundemba CF instead.



**Table 1.**
**General information of the selected community forests (CFs) in the SWR of Cameroon.**

Communit(y)ies		Forest status	Name of management institution
1	Mundemba	Council forest, Reserved	Mundemba rural council (Ndian)
2	Ikondo Kondo	Community forest (not existing anymore)	Mundemba rural council (Ndian)
3	Mosongiseli	Community forest, Reserved	Mosongiseli Balondo Badiko CIG (MBABCIG) (Ndian)
4	Toko	Council forest, (not existing anymore)	Toko rural council (Ndian)
5	Itali	Community forest	Christian philanthropic Farms and Missions (CPFAM) CIG (Ndian)
6	Konye	Council forest, (not existing anymore)	Konye rural Council (Meme)
7	Nguti	Council forest, Reserved	Nguti rural council (Kupe-Muanengouba)
8	Manyemen	Community forest, Operational	REPA-CIG (Kupe-Muanengouba)
9	Akwen	Community forest	Akwen CF (Manyu)
10	Bakingili	Community forest, Reserved	Bakingili CF management CIG (Fako)
11	MBACOF	Community forest, Reserved	MBAAH community forest CIG (Kupe-Muanengouba)
12	Woteva Village	Community forest, Reserved	Woteva village development CIG (WODCIG) (Fako)
13	Bimbia-Bonadikombo	Community forest, Operational	CF management CIG (Fako)

Source: From Author (nd = no data)

<b>Resource status</b>	<b>Donor involvement</b>	<b>Visited</b>
Rich	Yes, GIZ (GTZ)	2009/2011
Rich	Not anymore but previously GTZ	2009/2011
Rich	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
Poor	Not anymore but previously GTZ	2009/2011
Rich but no access	No	2009/2011
Poor	Not anymore but previously GTZ	2009/2011
Rich	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
Rich	Not anymore, but previously CA-FECO	2009/2011
Rich	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
Poor	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
nd	No	2011
nd	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2011
Poor	Not anymore but previously MCP	2009/2011

Here it should also be mentioned that there is also a form of negative incentives (disincentives) at play in this case. They accepted to change their behaviour, in accordance with the offer of MINFOF, GTZ and DED, else they would have lost everything that would have given them future benefits. Their estimation was that the price they will have to pay for their resistance may be higher than their chance of obtaining a positive outcome, or than the benefit they may gain (Sadan, 1997: p. 48). The Ikondo Kondo case shows that although the chief of the community (who works with MINFOF) was well informed about CF and tried to follow up the process for almost ten years, facing a strong incentive (disincentive) structure like MINFOF and the GDC, the Community was driven towards the goals of the present day GIZ.

Motivation in form of financial or non-financial incentives (technical and material) or de-motivation in the form of loss, by MINFOF or the GDC was observed in all the field studies performed. 100 per cent of the cases displayed disincentives in form of fear of losing the communal land (e.g. Ikondo Kondo, Mosongiseli, Bakingili, Woteva, Akwen) to GoC, which would then be used for other natural resource management (NRM) purposes. Sometimes it might not be easy to distinguish between disincentive and threat, which we categorized under coercion.

## The Power Element Coercion

In an actor centered perspective, coercion is the practice of forcing actor B to behave in an involuntary manner which can be done by threat of violence or violence from A.

In the case of CF in Cameroon, the prerequisite of a forest inventory and a management plan for the gazettment of CF from MINFOF is a sort of control which can be linked to coercion; other stakeholders have to follow them. Some coercive power features for CF are that only MINFOF can decide which CIG or VFMC has fulfilled all the conditions for the gazettment of a particular CF. It also has the physical ability to keep other stakeholders out of the CF management process by using administrative and implementation limitations, such as signing of legal documents, monopoly of control of the whole CF process, with infor-

mation and interpretation of legal issues. It also controls the administrative procedures required in the process (consultation meetings, forest inventory, boundary demarcation, management plan, management conventions, annual cutting area, quantity and quality of exploitation (in m<sup>3</sup> and minimum diameters, respectively), carrying out actions that other stakeholders or actors cannot stop. There are other tenural characteristics and territorial restrictions (the state is the owner of the land) like e.g.: no CF can exceed 5000 ha and CF being just a landlease (for 25 years) issue and bi-product of protected areas and national parks policies, although with Council Forests, a different procedure holds.

The coercive power is crowned with the fact that MINFOF staff are also part of the armed forces in Cameroon. MINFOF has its own armed officers and where possible, they could be supported by the police, the para-military or the military officers (in patrols in the forest or on missions).

Empirically, there is a fine line when analysing disincentives and the threat of force e.g.: the threat of losing your CF to another community if there is no joint management with another community to manage the CF which was previously yours is at the same time an incentive (a disincentive) knowing that if a community does not accept the offer, MINFOF will go ahead and recognise only the other community as the legal custodian for the CF (Ikondo Kondo and Akwen CFs).

Important to note is the fact that the state through MINFOF has the overall control of definition and decision making in the process of establishing and management of CFs, while international organisations like GDC and the World Bank use incentives on the one hand and pressure on the other hand, to influence forest policies of the GoC, especially with regard to CF in the name of development. Quoting Mbile et al. (2009: p. 3), “by the mid 1980s, the world economy was in decline, as was Cameroon’s and under pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank, the GoC introduced a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1988 to reduce its debts and to lay the ground for the recovery. From 1988 to 2005, the policy landscape of Cameroon took on a new direction impacting in important ways on forest livelihoods”. Mandondo (2003: p. 9) pointed out that 1994 forest law was, to a significant extent, imposed on the GoC as a condition for financial support



under structural reforms funded by the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly the World Bank. Although there was some resistance from some politicians, this was overridden by a compliant so-called executive branch of the GoC.

---

## Conclusion

---

### Power and Development

Forest policy throughout Africa originates from European scientific forestry traditions exported during the colonial period (Larson & Ribot, 2007; Yufanyi Movuh & Krott, 2011). The natural resource policy in Cameroon is as old as Cameroon itself, but before the arrival of the first colonial administrators in the late 19th century, natural resources were managed according to the people's law or customary law; the village chiefs were the main administrators of resource management (Mengang Mewondo, 1998; Bigombé, 2003). In the past decades, Cameroon's rainforests and its conservation for global posterity has attracted much concern among northern "Green" NGOs like WWF, WCS, the international scientific community, the World Bank and bilateral aid agencies like SNV, DFID, GIZ or GDC (just to name a few), and other institutions with an interest in biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. These Organisations and institutions have inherited a rich heritage of colonial expertise and policies which they continue to implement till date. This could be confirmed also by the researcher. \

Apparently, numerous efforts at rainforest conservation in Cameroon and elsewhere in Africa, by western development aid agencies and NGOs alike are being made so as to link them with benefits to the rural poor, the custodians of the majority of these forest areas. Today's, protected areas are being created with the rationale of conservation or premise of mitigating unsustainable management of forest resources or unsustainable farm practices. The question here is if this is what will lead to sustainability and reduction in poverty. Moreover, the 1994 Forestry

law is being implemented in a way which is not benefiting the local communities. The current forestry policies and the ways they are selectively implemented continue to reproduce the double standards and conditions that disadvantage, create and maintain the rural poor (Larson & Ribot, 2007: p. 190). Can a law to foster sustainable forest management, devolution of forest resource management to local communities and conservation, externally defined and executed in project modes, be linked to communal approaches? Poverty alleviation, livelihood enhancement and economic development; all issues attracting contemporary donor funding were components or objectives of the present CF model accrued in the law and at the same time linked to conservation objectives.<sup>21</sup> One might argue that communities draw economic benefit from the CF, but the state retains *de jure* ultimate control over the forests and the land on which they grow (Egbe, 1998). For us, the question is also, who are those who benefit economically. Is it the state, the international organisations, the external and internal elites or the rural forest user? Is it the chief and his henchmen who are compliant to the state or the local individual who lives from that forest? The answer through this study is definitely, not positive for the local forest user.

Today's forest policy in Cameroon is still shaped by colonial tradition and dominated by a scientific-cum-bureaucratic paradigm which is deterministic, reductionist, authoritarian and coercive (Murphree, 2004) and bears blueprint of decades of declared colonial heritage, upholding to the underlying concept or principle of colonial land tenure. There are still unresolved land tenure contestations in Cameroon and tenure issues have increasingly stifled the present CF model in achieving its objectives. Although the Cameroon Land Ordinance No. 74-1 of July 6, 1974 maintains that the State is the guardian of all lands, traditional authorities continue to exercise *de facto* rights over land. The resurgence of unresolved historical claims over boundaries and land including the natural resources which are embedded in them has been a stumbling block for CF (e.g.: Itali -CPFAM, Akwen, Ikondo Kondo). The uncertain and colo-

21 The concept of post -development theories can also be used to analyse the intention behind such policies.

nial-like land tenure situation makes the local stakeholders unable to fully embrace participatory forestry. Also, the colonial logic of resource accumulation, including building financial capital on forest exploitation (Oyono, 2005b: p. 124), has been replicated, with some modifications by the Cameroonian post-colonial state and propagated by the development aid agencies. This could also be confirmed in all the case studies.

The main message here is that the GoC, with financial and technical support from their development cooperation stakeholders like GIZ and KfW, is using their decentralization propaganda to re-centralize power in the forestry sector; i.e., recentralization through decentralization (Ferguson, 1994: 180; Rossi, 2004: p. 3; Devkota, 2010: p. 78). Because the power exerted by the western hegemonies is less visible, it is stronger. The aim at this stage is not to totally reject CF but the present model has failed to produce benefits that can be equated to development after eighteen years. Hence, this model should be reconsidered by policy makers, to suit the needs and demands of the communities concerned. All the areas visited in the research displayed rich natural forests but the adjacent communities tend to have high poverty rates. These communities are dependent on their forest resources for a portion of their livelihood and none could boast of poverty alleviation through CF or even after acquiring a CF. Instead, they have fallen under the control of the state and its development partners. This study, is to empower these important but marginalised communities, and to improve policies and institutions (Mayers, 2005) in the forestry sector.

From our concept of the ACP, this study has proven that in Cameroon, the state and its international agents use the three elements of power described above to influence and defend their interests in CF. In the study, it was found that at a given situation, all three elements could overlap each other while distinctive processes could be used to analyse each power source separately. Furthermore, testing the post-development theory, it could also be proven that CF, as a development instrument to alleviate poverty and improve livelihood while sustainably managing the forest has actually not brought significant or meaningful development to the targeted sector of the society.

Millions of Euro or billions of FCFA from international donors (with strings attached to them) have been used to steer the popularity and





subsequent tradeoffs for programs promoting community participation, especially in CF. Through documents like forest inventories, management plans and conventions between the State and the communities, they keep the communities abey, exercising far more authority than even before the implementation of the Forestry Law of 1994. With the present CF model, the influence and power of MINFOF and their international collaborators go up, while the power of the communities to control their forest activities is reduced. Thus, the different village committees (CIGs or VFMCs), lacking effective power and sometimes totally cut off from local communities they represent, have become captive to motivations other than the good of the community or the individual forest user.



---

## Acknowledgements

---

This research was partly funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft/DFG) and Georg-August-University Göttingen.



---

## References

---

- Agrawal, A., & Redford, K. H. (2006). *Poverty, development, and biodiversity conservation: Shooting in the dark?* Working paper No. 26. New York: Wildlife Conservation Society.
- Ahorro, J. (2008). *The waves of post-development theory and a consideration of the Philippines*. Edmonton: University of Alberta.
- Arts, B., & Van Tatenhove, J. (2004). Policy and power: A conceptual framework between the "old" and "new" policy idioms. *Policy sciences*, 37, 339-356. doi:10.1007/s11077-005-0156-9
- Babbington, A. (2000). Re-encountering development: Livelihood transitions and place transformations in the Andes. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 90, 495-520. doi:10.1111/0004-5608.00206
- Barry, D., Campbell, J. Y., Fahn, J., Mallee, H., & Pradhan, U. (2003). Achieving significant impact at scale: Reflections on the challenge for global community forestry. URL (last checked 19-23 May 2003). [http://www.cifor.org/publications/corporate/cd-roms/bonn-proc/pdfs/papers/t7\\_final\\_barry.pdf](http://www.cifor.org/publications/corporate/cd-roms/bonn-proc/pdfs/papers/t7_final_barry.pdf)
- Berger, M. (1995). Post-cold war capitalism: Modernization and modes of resistance after the fall. *Third World Quarterly*, 16, 717-728. doi:10.1080/01436599550035924
- Bigombe', P. (2003). The decentralized forestry taxation system in Cameroon. In J. Ribot, & D. Conyers (Eds.), *Local management and state's logic*. Washington: World Resources Institute.
- Blaike, P. (1998). Post-modernism and the calling out of development geography. *Annual Meeting of the American Association of Geographers*, Boston, 25-28 March 1998.
- Brown, H. C. P., Wolf, S. A., & Lassoie, J. P. (2007). An analytic approach to structuring co-management of community forests in Cameroon, *Progress in Development Studies*, 7, 135-154. doi:10.1177/146499340600700204

- Colfer, C. J. P. (2005). *The equitable forest: Diversity, community and resource management*. Washington: RFF Press.
- Contreras, A. (2003). Creating space for local forest management—The case of the Philippines. In D. Edmunds, & E. Wollenberg (Eds.), *Local forest management: The impacts of devolution policies* (pp. 127-149). London: Earthscan.
- Crew, E., & Harrison, E. (1998). *Whose Development? An ethnography of aid*. London: Zed Books.
- Devkota, R. (2010). Interests and powers as drivers of community forestry: A case study of Nepal. Göttingen: University Press Göttingen.
- Edmunds, D., & Wollenberg, E. (2001). Historical perspectives on forest policy change in Asia: An introduction, *Environmental History*, 6, 190-212. doi:10.1093/envhis/6.2.190
- Egbe, E. S. (1998). *The range of possibilities for community forestry permitted within the framework of current Cameroonian legislation*. Yaoundé: Ministry of Environment and Forests.
- Escobar, A. (1995). *Encountering development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Escobar, A. (2000). Beyond the search for a paradigm? post-development and beyond, *Development*, 43, 11-14. doi:10.1057/palgrave.development.1110188
- Etzioni, A. (1975). *A comparative analysis of complex organizations: On power, involvement, and their correlates*. New York: Free Press.
- Ezzine de Blas, D., Ruiz Perez, M., Sayer, J. A., Lescuyer, G., Nasi, R., & Karsenty, A. (2009). External influences on and conditions for community logging management in Cameroon. *World Development*, 37, 445-456. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.03.011
- Ferguson, J. (1994). The anti-politics machine: "Development", depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho. *The Ecologist*, 24, 176-181.
- Fisher, J., van Heerde, J., & Tucker, A. (2010). Does one trust judgement fit all? Linking theory and empirics. *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 12, 161-188. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856X.2009.00401.x
- Foucault, M. (1983). The subject and power. In H. Dreyfus, & P. Rabinow (Eds.), *Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Hobley, M. (2007). *Forests—The poor man's overcoat: Foresters as agents of change?* Canberra: The Fenner School of Environment and Society, The Australian National University.

- Kiely, R. (1999). The last refuge of the noble savage? A critical assessment of post-development theory. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 11, 30-55. doi:10.1080/09578819908426726
- Kippler, C. (2010). Exploring post-development: Politics, the state and emancipation. The question of alternatives. URL(last checked 21September 2011). <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-10/caroline-kippler-summer-10.pdf>
- Krott, M. (1990). *Öffentliche verwaltung im umweltschutz, ergebnisse einer behördenorientierten policy-analyse am beispiel waldschu*. Wien: Braunmüller.
- Krott, M. (2005). *Forest policy analysis*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Krott, M., Bader, A., Schusser, C., Devkota, R., Maryudi, A., Giessen, L. and Aurenhammer, H. (2013). Actor-centred power: The driving force in decentralised community based forest governance. *Forest Policy and Economics*. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2013.04.012>
- Larson, A. M. (2005). Democratic decentralization in the forestry sector: Lessons learned from Africa, Asia and Latin America. In C. J. Colfer, & D. Capistrano (Eds.), *The Politics of decentralization—Forests, power and people* (pp. 32-62). London: Earthscan.
- Larson, A. M., & Ribot, J. C. (2004). Democratic decentralization through a natural resource lens. *European Journal of Development Research*, 16, 1-25.
- Larson, A. M., & Ribot, J. C. (2007). The poverty of forestry policy: Double standards on an uneven playing field. *Sustainability Science Journal*, 2, 189-204.
- La Viña, A. G. M. (1997). Seeing with clear eyes: *The challenge of community-based resource management and the role of academe*. In: C. Castro, F. B. Pulhin, & L. C. Reyes (Eds.), *Community-based resource management: A paradigm shift in forestry*. Los Baños: University of the Philippines Los Baños.
- Little, P., & Painter, M. (1995). Discourse, politics, and the development process: Reflections on Escobar's anthropology and the development encounter". *American Ethnologist*, 22, 602-616. doi:10.1525/ae.1995.22.3.02a00080
- Mandondo, A. (2003). *Snapshot views of international community forestry networks: Cameroon country study*. Center for International Forestry Research.
- Maryudi, A. (2011). *The contesting aspirations in the forests: Actors, interests and power in community forestry in Java, Indonesia*. Göttingen: University Press Göttingen.
- Maryudi, A., Devkota, R., Schusser, C., Yufanyi Movuh, M., Salla, M., Aurenhammer, H., & Krott, M. (2012). Back to basics: Considerations in evaluating the outcomes of community forestry. *Forest policy an Economics*, 14, 1-5.

- Matthews, S. (2004). Post-development theory and the question of alternatives: A view from Africa. *Third World Quarterly*, 25, 373-384. doi:10.1080/0143659042000174860
- Matthews, S. (2006). Responding to poverty in the light of the post-development debate: Some insights from the NGO Enda Graf Sahel. *Africa development*, 4, 52-72.
- Mayers, J. (2005). *Stakeholder power analysis*. London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).
- Mbile, P., Ndzomo-Abanda, G., Essoumba, H., & Misouma, A. (2009). Alternate tenure and enterprise models in Cameroon: Community forests in the context of community rights and forest landscapes. Washington: World Agro forestry Centre and Rights and Resources Initiative.
- McDermott, M. H., & Schreckenber, K. (2009). Equity in community forestry: Insights from north and south. *International Forestry Review*, 11, 157-170. doi:10.1505/ifor.11.2.157
- Mengang J. M. (1998). Resource use in the tri-national Sangha river region of equatorial Africa: Histories, knowledge forms, and institutions. *Bulletin*, 102, 8-28.
- MINEP (2004). *Etat des lieux de la foresterie communautaire au Cameroun*. Ministère de l'Environnement et des Forêts, Direction des Forêts, Cellule de Foresterie Communautaire.
- Möllering, G. (2005). The trust/control duality: An integrative perspective on positive expectations of others. *International Sociology*, 20, 283-305. doi:10.1177/0268580905055478
- Murphree, M. (2004). *Communal approaches to natural resource management in Africa: From whence and to where?* Berkeley: Center for African Studies.
- Offe, C. (1977). Einleitung. In: P. Bachrach, & M. Baratz (Eds.), *Macht und Armut: Eine theoretisch-empirische Untersuchung* (pp. 7-34). Frankfurt: Verlag.
- Oyono, P. R. (2004a). *Institutional deficit, representation, and decentralized forest management in Cameroon*. Washington: Elements of natural resource sociology for social theory and public policy, Environmental Governance in Africa.
- Oyono, P. R. (2004b). One step forward, two steps back? Paradoxes of natural resource management decentralization in Cameroon. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42, 91-111. doi:10.1017/S0022278X03004488



- Oyono, P. R. (2005a). Profiling local-level outcomes of environmental decentralizations: The case of Cameroon's forests in the Congo Basin. *Journal of Environment and Development*, 14, 317-337.
- Oyono, P. R. (2005b). The foundations of the conflict of language over land and forests in southern Cameroon. *African Study Monographs*, 26, 115-144.
- Oyono, P. R. (2009). New niches of community rights to forests in Cameroon: Tenure reform, decentralization category or something else? *International Journal of Social Forestry*, 2, 1-23.
- Oyono, P. R., Kouna, C., & Mala, W. (2005). Benefits of forests in Cameroon: Global structure, issues involving access, and decision-making hiccoughs. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 7, 357-368. doi:10.1016/S1389-9341(03)00072-8
- Pieterse, J. N. (1998). My paradigm of yours? Alternative development, post-development, and reflexive development. *Development and Change*, 29, 343-373. doi:10.1111/1467-7660.00081
- Poffenberger, M. (2006). People in the forest: Community forestry experiences from southeast Asia. *International Journal of Environment and Sustainable Development*, 5, 57-69.
- Pulhin, J. M., & Dressler, W. H. (2009). People, power and timber: The politics of community-based forest management. *Journal of Environmental Management*, 91, 206-214. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2009.08.007
- Rahnema, M. (1997). Development and the People's Immune System: The story of another variety of AIDS. In M. Rahnema, & V. Bawtree, (Eds.), *The post-development reader* (pp. 111-129). London: ZedBooks.
- Rahnema, M., & Bawtree, V. (Eds.) (1997). *The post-development reader*. London: Zed Books.
- Rebugio, L. L. (1998). Paradigm shift: The key to sustainable forestry and environmental resources management. *Asian Journal of Sustainable Agriculture*, 1, 13-24.
- Rossi, D. (2004). Revisiting Foucauldian approaches: Power dynamics in development projects. *Journal of Development Studies*, 40, 1-29. doi:10.1080/0022038042000233786
- Sachs, W. (Eds.) (1992). *The development dictionary. A Guide to Knowledge as Power*. London: Zed Books.
- Sadan, E. (1997). *Empowerment and community planning: Theory and practice of people-focused social solutions*. Tel Aviv: Hakibbu Hameuchad.

- Sarin, M., Singh, N., Sundar, N., & Bhogal, R. (2003). Devolution as a threat to democratic decision-making in forestry? Findings from three states in India. in D. Edmunds, & E. Wollenberg (Eds.), *Local forest management: The impacts of devolution policies* (pp. 55-126). London: Earthscan.
- Schnell, R., Hill, P., & Esser, E. (2005). *Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung*. München: Auflage.
- Schusser, C. (2012). Who determines biodiversity? An analysis of actors' power and interests in community forestry in Namibia. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 21 July 2012.
- Schusser, C., Krott, M., Devkota, R., Maryudi, A., Salla, M., Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2012). Sequence design of quantitative and qualitative surveys for increasing efficiency in forest policy research. *Allgemeine Forst und Jagdzeitung*, 183, 75-83.
- Shackleton, S., Campbell, B., Wollenberg, E., & Edmunds, D. (2002). Devolution and community-based natural resource management: Creating space for local people to participate and benefit? *Natural Resource Perspectives*, 76, 1-6.
- Sikor, T. (2006). Analyzing community-based forestry: Local, political and agrarian perspectives. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 8, 339-349 doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2005.08.005
- Simon, H. A. (1981). *Entscheidungsverhalten in organisationen: Eine Untersuchung von Entscheidungsprozessen in Management und Verwaltung*. Landsberg am Lech.
- Sobze, J. M. (2003). Analysis of implication of forest policy reform on CF in Cameroon: Case study of Lomié. Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag.
- Storey, A. (2000). Post-development theory: Romanticism and pontius pilate politics. *Development*, 43, 4.
- Sunderlin, D. W. (2004). Community forestry and poverty alleviation in Cambodia, Lao-PDR, and Vietnam: An agenda for research. Jakarta: Center for International Forestry Research.
- Thoms, C. A. (2006). Conservation success, livelihoods failure? Community forestry in Nepal. *Policy Matters*, 14, 169-179.
- Weber, M. (1964). *The theory of social and economic organization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- World Bank (2004). *Sustaining forests: A development strategy*. Washington: The World Bank.
- World Bank (2005). *World development indicators 2005*. Washington: World Bank.



World Resources Institute (2005). *The wealth of the poor- managing ecosystems to fight poverty*. Washington: United Nations Development Program, United Nations Environment Program, World Bank, World Resources Institute.

Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2007). *Community-based biodiversity conservation management: Reaching the goal of biodiversity conservation and community development*. Master's Thesis, München: GRIN Publishing.

Yufanyi Movuh, M. C., & Krott, M. (2012). The colonial heritage and post-colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry by the example of Cameroon. *Forest Policy and Economics*, 15, 70-77. doi:10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004



---

# Analyzing the Establishment of Community Forestry (CF) and Its Processes

---

Examples from the South West Region of Cameroon



First published by

Journal of Sustainable Development; Vol. 6, No. 1; 2013

Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education

Correspondence: Mbolo C. Yufanyi Movuh, Institute for Forest Policy and Nature

Conservation, Faculty of Forest Sciences and Ecology, Georg-August University

Goettingen, Büsgenweg 3, 37077 Göttingen, Germany. Tel: 49-170-8788124.

E-mail: cyufani@gwdg.de

### **Article Info**

Received: November 14, 2012

Accepted: December 20, 2012

Online Published: December 26, 2012 doi:10.5539/jsd.v6n1p76

URL: [dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v6n1p76](http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v6n1p76)

ISSN 1913-9063

E-ISSN 1913-9071



## **Abstract**

This paper reconstructs and analyzes the establishment of the Community Forestry (CF) processes in Cameroon, questioning the extent to which the CF models can act as a decentralization and devolution tool. It includes community based natural resource management through programs/projects emphasizing biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management directly involving the local communities. Thirteen communities were explored in the South West Region (SWR) of Cameroon. Samples selection was based on information about recent activities of the communities in the CF process. From this population, a simple random selection and later quantitative and qualitative interviews were carried out with more than 70 different stakeholders through their networking and interest representation in CF. Analysis show that the CF process is centralized, slow, long, complex and expensive, making it difficult for local communities to be an active part in policy implementation. Results also confirm that decentralization and devolution for sustainable local forest governance could offer the communities an opportunity to derive livelihoods from their forests, but the models and processes have also inhibited them through centralized control of the state and its development partners. Furthermore, it shows that CF as a decentralization tool has not really functioned.

## **Keywords:**

community forest, council forest, decentralization, devolution, Cameroon





---

## 1. Introduction

---

Forests are natural resources as well as public goods that need to be managed in the interests of local, regional and global posterity. Effective governance of forest resources involves difficult choices and reforms. Decentralization approaches in forest governance seem to be the right answer to tackle forest protection issues involving local people (Glück et al., 2005; Devkota, 2010). Oyono (2004b) defines decentralization as, “a process through which powers, responsibilities and resources are devolved by the central state to lower territorial entities and regionally/locally elected bodies, increasing efficiency, participation, equity, and environmental sustainability”. Likewise, Ribot (2004) sees decentralization and devolution as, “any act by which central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy”. Nevertheless, a number of researchers (Ribot, 2004; Ribot, 2009; Larson, 2005; Blaikie, 2006; Dahal & Capistrano, 2006) have analyzed the common practice and have shown that the decentralization policy in forest resources is seldom followed by genuine power devolution to the local users.

Following the above mentioned definitions of Oyono and Ribot, importance is placed on the role of the central government in achieving increased efficiency, participation, equity, and environmental sustainability. To contribute to the discourse, this article will analyze the establishment of CF in Cameroon to investigate if it has functioned as a tool for decentralization. It uses the CF models in Cameroon through its establishment and processes to analytically test the decentralization paradigm with empirical data. It does not want to explain CF using theory but test if the theoretical framework has been or is being successful implemented in CF. The main question is, “if CF has been successful



as a tool for forest management decentralization?”, a paradigm which has found place on paper and the rhetoric of the Cameroonian government and bi/multilateral organizations. It is not in the scope of this paper to address “common pool resources” or “communal land management”, which is a broad field with many alternative institutional features in “governing the commons” (Ostrom, 1990). The scope of this paper is limited to reconstruction of CF establishments and processes as perceived by the main stakeholders in CF.

## 1.1 Community Forestry and Its Establishment in Cameroon

Community forestry (CF) came into prominence in the 1970s, when the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 1978 initiated activities and programs related to rural communities and their forest-related activities. Here, CF was defined as “any situation which intimately involves local people in a forestry activity” (FAO, 1992). McDermott & Schreckenber (2009:158) go further to specify that, “community forestry refers to the exercise by local people of power or influence over decisions regarding management of forests, including the rules of access and the disposition of products”. The 1994 Cameroon Forestry law defines it as “a forest forming part of the non-permanent forest estate, which is covered by a management agreement between a village community and the Forestry Administration” (RoC, 1994, Note 1). For this paper, CF is seen as “forestry or forest practices which directly involve(s) local forest users in the common decision making processes and implementation of forestry activities”. The present models of Community and Council Forestry in Cameroon fall within the scope of the FAO definition and also that of the study. Furthermore, the Forest Policy of Cameroon through the forestry law as well as the Forest Environment Sector Program (FESP/PSFE), seeks to empower the local institutions in the sustainable management of their forest resources for their benefits through the creation and the management of Council and Community forests. Community forest management has been and is still being experienced in the South West Region (SWR) for years but the concept of Council forest management is said to be new. This paper uses CF to refer to both community and council forests and where appropriate

each model will be specified. This is possible since CF is a general term used to refer to a variety of models of community management of forest resources, while the paper focuses more on the local forest users.

According to the 1992 statistics of the *International Union for Conservation of Nature* (IUCN), Cameroon has a national forest cover of 41.2% of the land area (155,330 km<sup>2</sup>) (IUCN, 1992), constituting one of its major economic resource (Yufanyi Movuh, 2008). The strife for decentralization and devolution of forest management led to changes in state policy towards natural resources particularly forest resources. In 1993, a national land use plan or zoning plan (plan de zonage) was conducted in Cameroon, dividing forest areas into a permanent and non-permanent forest zones. Community forests are part of the non-permanent forest zone but as Etoungou (2003) pointed out, Cameroon's Forest Zoning Plan allocates only 2% of the national estate to Community forests. Likewise, part of the permanent forest estate falls under state forests, which are directly under state control or under the control of Councils as council forests, in their status as local government units, subject to a simple management plan (Mandondo, 2003). State forests are permanently classified as national parks, reserves, sanctuaries, botanical parks and gardens as well as game ranches, used for different purposes like for production, reforestation, recreation, protection, research and education. Just like the Community forest model, there are legal options to create and manage Council forests in Cameroon (1994 Forestry law, Article 21). The Legal procedures to be undertaken to create and manage council forests are clearly outlined in the corresponding texts of application (Mambo, 2006). These procedures are explained as perceived by stakeholders concerned, also with the use of practical examples, in the later section.

With the 1994 established forestry law aiming at overhauling the national forest policy, one of its main objectives was the improvement of the participation of the population in the conservation and the management of forest resources, in order to contribute to the elevation of livelihood (RoC, 1994). The law and its decrees of application were enacted in 1995. It created a model Community forestry as part of a non-permanent forest estate whose process of gazettelement would be accompanied with technical assistance by the Ministry of Forestry and





Wildlife (MINFOF), free of charge so as to promote the model. Quoting Oyono (2005a:322), Community forests were meant to be a new and potentially very innovative class of forest exploitation unit, by which it was intended that, for the first time in Cameroon's history, rural populations can gain direct, legal access to forest products, including timber, with some limitations. Management of such forest is the responsibility of the village community concerned, with the technical assistance of the administration in charge of forests (Sobze, 2003). This implies that through contracts from the administration in charge of forests, part of the national forest is entrusted to a village community for its management, conservation and use for the interest of the community. For a council forest, although there are no limitations in surface area, the process is more or less similar, still with a handful of other constraints. Also like Community forests, stakeholders for Council forests could be assisted by the forestry administration, NGOs or the private sector including timber companies (RoC, 1994; Yufanyi Movuh, 2012).

This paper is in sequence with our comparative study analysis of the interests and power of the stakeholders involved in Community Forestry (CF) in six countries, under the auspices of the Community Forestry Working Group (CFWG) in Goettingen (Note 2), Germany. The comparative study hypothesizes that, "governance processes and outcomes in CF depend mostly on interests of the powerful external stakeholders". Being the main research person for Cameroon in the group and for this paper, I will pay particular attention just on the processes leading to the acquisition of CF since much has already been published for Cameroon, on the above hypothesis (see Yufanyi Movuh, 2012; Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012). This is to enable a broader understanding of the constraints faced by communities in the acquisition of CF in Cameroon. Many studies have been conducted in the field of CF in Cameroon (Etoungou, 2003; Mandodo, 2003; Sobze, 2003; Mambo, 2004; 2006; Ribot, 2004; Oyono, 2004a,b; Oyono 2005a,b; Oyono, 2009; Yufanyi Movuh, 2012; Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012), but there has not been a straight and simple analysis of the establishment of the CF processes, directly involving the local forest users, making it possible to understand the present impediments entangled to these processes. This paper is important in linking these processes



and their constraints pertaining to the present situation and it questions the extent to which CF can act as a decentralization and devolution tool for local forest resource management. It falls in line with the above mentioned works but it also gives a detailed analysis with some practical examples.

---


## 2. Method

---

This research study's definition of CF also includes community based natural resource management through programs/projects emphasizing biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management involving the local communities (Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012). As mentioned above, the practice of council forestry in Cameroon is included as part of the CF. Thirteen communities (see Figure 1 and Table 1) were explored in the SWR of Cameroon between 2009 to 2011. It is an area where the researcher has a good existing knowledge. The selections of the community and council forestry samples were done with the map of the PSMNR-SWR (see Figure 1, showing the different forest zones) and based on information on recent activities of the communities in the CF process (Note 3). A total of 18 community forest and 2 council forests were identified using the map (Note 4). From this population, a simple random selection was implemented. Interviews conducted with more than 70 different stakeholders in the selected samples were in relation to the information given by other stakeholders in their networking (Schnell et al., 2005) and interest representation in CF (Note 5). Quantitative and qualitative interviews were carried out with CF Managers and Forestry officers and at times with members of the Common Initiative Groups (CIG) and Village Forest Management Committees (VFMC), responsible for the management of these forests, with representatives of MINFOF- SWR and KfW/GFA (German development bank/German consulting firm) representing the main Program (PSMNR-SWR) for the facilitation of the implementation of the forestry law, hence CF. Documents like Logframe of the PSMNR-SWR, Management Plans (MP) and Technical Notes (NT) of the CFs were also part of the materials collected and analyzed. The sequence design (Schusser et al., 2012) for network



analysis uses, “(1) a quantitative preliminary survey – (2) a qualitative survey and (3) a quantitative follow-up study, which focuses the observations on preselected subjects in order to save resources during the field work” (Schusser et al., 2012: 75). The preliminary quantitative survey identifies the powerful actors of the network while the qualitative analysis goes deeper to describe and evaluate the powerful stakeholders, identified through the quantitative network analysis (ibid: 6).



Source: PSMNR 2010, published in Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012.

**Figure 1. Community and Council Forestry regions in the PSMNR-SWR: Areas visited are encircled**

First, a quantitative network analysis was conducted, exploiting the knowledge of the stakeholders to identify the partners of the network and later, a qualitative analysis went deeper to describe and evaluate the powerful stakeholders, identified through the quantitative network analysis. All the interviews were recorded for transcription and further analysis. Although the main purpose of the comparative research was to identify and analyze the interests, influence of powerful stakeholders within the CF network and the outcomes of CF, the objective of this paper is limited to reconstructing and analyzing the establishment of the CF processes in Cameroon. Details of the methodology are analyzed in Schusser et al. (2012), Yufanyi Movuh (2012), Yufanyi Movuh and Schusser (2012).

---

### 3. Results

---

The results of this paper are based on empirically collected quantitative and qualitative data during the research period. It gives a step to step analysis (as perceived by most stakeholders interviewed) of how CFs are established and the different processes involved, using some practical examples. The results also entail a recollection, analysis and qualitative interpretations of the different stakeholders interviewed. From the thirteen CFs visited between 2009 and 2011, ten CFs carried out activities perceived to conform with the CF definition for the study and also MINFOF classification as a CF. Table 1, shows the different cases of CF analyzed, indicating the presence or not, of donor involvement in the form of development assistance to the government of Cameroon through MINFOF and the PSMNR-SWR to the CF. The results analysis in relation to decentralization and devolution are based on the CF procedures, follow-up steps, participation, time taken for gazettment, complexity and expenses.

**Table 1.**
**General information of the selected community and council forests (CFs) in the SWR of Cameroon**

<b>Communit(y)ies</b>	<b>Forest status</b>	<b>Name of Management Institution</b>
Mundemba	Council Forest, Reserved	Mundemba rural council (Ndian)
Ikondo Kondo	Community Forest (not existing anymore)	Mundemba rural council (Ndian)
Mosongiseli	Community Forest, Reserved	Mosongiseli Balondo Badiko CIG (MBABCIG) (Ndian)
Toko	Council Forest, (not existing anymore)	Toko rural council (Ndian)
Itali	Community Forest, Operational	Christian Philanthropic Farms and Missions (CPFAM) CIG (Ndian)
Konye	Council Forest, (not existing anymore)	Konye Rural Council (Meme)
Nguti	Council Forest, Reserved	Nguti Rural Council (Kupe-Muanengouba)
Manyemen	Community Forest, Operational	REPA-CIG (Kupe-Muanengouba)
Akwen	Community Forest, Reserved	Akwen CF(Manyu)
Bakingili	Community Forest, Reserved	Bakingili CF Management CIG (Fako)
MBACOF	Community Forest, Reserved	MBAAH Community Forest CIG (Kupe-Muanengouba)
Woteva Village	Community Forest, Reserved	Woteva Village Development CIG (WODCIG) (Fako)
Bimbia-Bonadikombo	Community Forest, Operational	CF Management CIG (Fako)

Source: revised from Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012 (nd = no data).

<b>Resource status</b>	<b>Donor involvement</b>	<b>Visited</b>
Rich	Yes, GIZ (GTZ)	2009/2011
Rich	Not anymore but previously GTZ	2009/2011
Rich	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
Poor	Not anymore but previously GTZ	2009/2011
Rich but no access	No	2009/2011
Poor	Not anymore but previously GTZ	2009/2011
Rich	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
Rich	Not anymore, but previously CAFECO	2009/2011
Rich	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
Poor	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2009/2011
nd	No	2011
nd	Yes, GIZ (DED)	2011
Poor	Not anymore but previously MCP	2009/2011



### 3.1 Community Forest: Acquisition Procedure

For a Community or village interested in acquiring a community forest, a legal entity (Common Initiative Group—CIG or Association) is registered at the Ministry of Agriculture (Note 6). This entity then commences with the different steps of the acquisition process (Note 7). Generally, the most literate and respectful members of the community are elected into the Executive Committee of the legal entity (Mambo, 2004).

**Step 1 is sensitisation:** An elite of the area or the government (forestry administration) goes about where there is a non-permanent forest (fôrets du domaine nationale) to sensitise the villages in and around this type of forest about the possibilities to create a Community forest in that piece of land, not exceeding 5000 ha. There are Community forests with different surface areas and in the North West Region for example, there are community forests of about 72 ha (Babah II), which was a virgin forest. In this step, the interest of the population of the community involved is stimulated and this would subsequently lead to the decision to begin the process.

**Step 2 is the demarcation:** The community then carries out demarcation of the area where they intend to carry out their CF activities. This is a participatory field work with the village or villages, and the CF procedures insist that these boundaries should be natural boundaries (Note 8), where the villagers can easily identify. This is contrary to the Forest Management Units (FMUs) with technical capacities to demarcate boundaries, where concessionaire can use a GPS to locate a boundary in the field. The villages do not have these capacities.

**Step 3 is the production of the map:** This map is on the scale of 1:200.000 and has to be verified and approved by the National Institute of Cartography (NIC). The NIC checks and sees if this particular area does not fall under a particular land use (mining exploitation area or any other use) of the state. After checking, it rejects or approves it with their stamp, for the continuation of the process. The villagers pay for the checking mission of the NIC experts in the field for signing (approval) and producing the map.

**Step 4 is the consultation meeting:** The villagers now organise a consultation meeting with an overall objective of informing the surrounding villages, to seek their agreement and acceptance of the boundaries. During this meeting, the village(s) involved in the process present the map, announcing their intentions and the boundaries. If there are no objections from the neighbouring villages concerning the boundaries, the process continues. If a neighbouring village has a portion of land in the same area, they can jointly create the Community forest and then have a “collective convention” (Note 9) and the revenue can be shared according to the percentage surface area of the different villages. Another objective of the meeting is to set the management objectives in the creation of the Community forest, where the village(s) would decide for what purpose they would want to use the forest for; for example, timber exploitation or Non Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) exploitation, medicinal plants exploitation, protection of water catchment, protection of traditional shrine, etc, depending on their objectives. From this meeting, there is a key protocol documenting the minutes, (Procès-verbal de la Réunion de consultation) that results from it (Note 10). This document states the date and objectives of the meeting and all the representatives of the civil administration are invited and mentioned and their signatures included.

All these documents, the map produced, the minutes of the consultation meeting and the Article of Association (rules and regulation of the legal entity responsible for the community forest), etc, are compiled and an application letter is written to the Minister at MINFOF, to apply for a reservation letter for the demarcated area. This documents have to pass through the Chief of Post for MINFOF (Note 11), of the area, the divisional delegation of MINFOF and the regional delegation, which then sends them to MINFOF in Yaounde, the capital city of Cameroon. MINFOF Yaounde then checks the map and with its own GIS, sees if the demarcated boundary does not fall under a permanent forest and then approves or reject it. If it is well demarcated, the Minister then signs a reservation letter for that area to the Community.

With no reaction from MINFOF 60 days after the village(s) deposits their document at the regional delegation, the village is reserved the right



to make an application directly to the minister at MINFOF Yaoundé. If there is still no reaction from Yaoundé 10 days after the direct deposition at the ministry in Yaoundé, the village(s) can consider their application as approved. Approval through such a channel makes it more difficult for the Communities to subsequently follow up, exploit and sell their products. When the reservation letter is signed, the next step would be for the Community to produce a Simple Management Plan (SMP) for the community forest. The SMP is elaborated by the Community through hired experts and sent back to MINFOF Yaounde for approval. There is a new manual of procedures (MoP) with rules and regulations guiding the creation of a community forest from MINFOF, but just like the old one, it does not assist the Communities much though a mandatory participatory inventory system for SMP was added. Since the SMP is a technical document that shows how the forest is going to be sustainably managed in a 5 years period, there is a commission that sits in Yaounde to evaluate the SMP. A skeleton of the SMP (or a guide), enumerating what steps are supposed to be followed in its elaboration. This can also be found with the Staff of the RIGC Project (Note 12). There is a guide to develop a SMP with titles and subtitles, with every step described inside. A Community has the right to choose if they want a sales of standing volume or if they want a community forest. This should be made clear to them before starting the public notice procedure.

This step was mandatory with the former requirements but at present, the new procedures (MoP) stipulates that a Community applying for a community forest can at the same time apply for a two years “Provisional Convention (PC)” (Note 13). This is because it was identified in the former procedures that communities were not financially viable to sponsor the elaboration of the SMP, which is costly (at least 5 million FCFA). The new manual came up with a new provision where Communities can exploit some timber for the elaboration of the SMP. Parallel to the signing of the letter of reservation, the PC is also signed, provided the forest is not in the zoning plan. During the two years of provisional convention (which includes already a map with the parcellaire stands as a reservation) money generated from the Community forest exploitation has to be used on multiple resource inventory, socio-economic study and a development plan. The village development plan activities have to be taken over in the SMP

as they have been decided in a participative way and money from the Community forest should go towards those activities. Some timber can be exploited and sold as logs with special authorization.

When the SMP is approved, the village(s) will be called to sign the Management Convention (MC) at the local level between the village(s) and the senior divisional officer (SDO) who represents the Minister at MINFOF (Note 14). After the signing of the MC which is the final stage, implementation begins, and the village(s) are supposed to carry out an Annual Action (cutting) Plan (AAP) according to stipulations in the SMP (Note 15).

From the Communities listed in Table 1, only three have a MC at the moment (Manyemen, Itali and Bimbia-Bonadikombo), giving them the full authority to manage their resources. The Akwen CF also had a MC but due to outstanding conflicts with other stakeholders, it was suspended. Furthermore, all the CFs started the process of acquisition not less than 5 years ago and the majority has still not arrived at the final status of signing the MC with MINFOF. Three CFs (Ikondo Kondo, Toko and Konye) became extinct due to long waiting periods.

## 3.2 Council Forest: Acquisition Procedure

Similar to Community forests with a CIG, for a council forest, the villages forming part of the Council forest should also form a legal body, the VFMC (Note 16). These two, are the main bodies within the village Community and villages within the municipal council respectively, responsible for the adjacent forests, follow up and running of the CFs (see Figure 1). They could be assisted by the forestry administration (MINFOF), NGOs or the private sector including timber companies. Here, some practical examples of Council forests will be used to describe the process of acquisition.

### 3.2.1 Mundemba

The initiation of the Mundemba council forest started in 2006 when experts of the German development bank (KfW) and the regional MINFOF (Buea) visited the Mundemba council to introduce the council forest idea (Mambo, 2006). A letter of intent (to MINFOF) to acquire a council forest was written and published at the concerned local council



area and with no objections after a time, there was the sensitization phase, to inform the local communities about the intent. Because the intent was welcomed by the Communities, the technical note (TN) was written to include the maps which then went through the delegation of state property and land tenure (Ministry of State property and Land tenure). The TN is a document that highlights the various activities of the Council forest. After identification of the area, there were several sensitization meetings including a cross-section of other villages of the municipality, with the council forest acquisition as main goal.

Following these meetings, the council gave its approval to other partners to assist in the process. Formerly, the council had interest in Council forestry but did not know how to go ahead so it contacted MINFOF for technical support. Then the GTZ-ProPSFE elaborated the TN for the council, in consultation with the council. Subsequently, it was sent to Yaoundé for the Minister to sign together with the public notice. In the TN, the council identifies the area to be managed and elaborates the map of the area. Also within, the objectives of managing the Council forest and its different activities are listed. After the elaboration of the TN, the different communities have the duration of 3 months after the public notice publication, to oppose the plan. Although there was some opposition from the Ikondo Kondo village (Note 17), the council went forward with the acquisition according to the processes spelled out by the law. The council then carried out sensitization tours.

The maps and TN were then forwarded to MINFOF Yaoundé again, and later to the Prime Minister. During the consultation meetings for the Council forest, the chief of Post, the divisional delegate and regional chief for MINFOF (or representative), the civil administration (DO), local delegations (divisional delegates of the different ministries of the concerned area) were all involved and present, also with representatives of the Mundemba council. The file for acquisition is currently somewhere in Yaoundé between MINFOF and the Prime Ministry.

### 3.2.2 Ngu

The initiation of Nguti council forest started in 2006 when experts of KfW and MINFOF (Buea) visited the Nguti council to introduce the council forest idea (ibid). This was with the aim of preservation of the


ecosystem (animal and plant species), and also for the council to derive benefits. For this, there was the demarcation of the council boundaries (with GPS). After the demarcation and other necessary procedures, likewise described above (Mundemba), the file was sent to the Prime Minister's office for the publishing of the public notice, later giving the council the power to continue with other activities including sensitization of administrative and local elites, the local population and the sitting of the classification commission (CC). The process or task of the CC entailed the identification of the council forest area in a map, the surface area measurement and the carrying out of the management inventory. Further steps were the authorization or approval of the application, followed by the carving out of the first annual cutting area. This is when the exploitation inventory is done (assessing the exploitable species).

There was also a meeting with the administrative elites and local authorities in the council chambers of Nguti. This was chaired by the regional delegate for MINFOF. Other delegates like those for Mines, tourism, agriculture, livestock; also the senior divisional officer (SDO) and a Member of Parliament and council personnel including the civil society were all present. After this, the council organized sensitization tours for the concerned communities or villages. These meetings were chaired by the sub -delegate for MINFOF. The Divisional Officer (DO-representing the SDO) was also present, with other representatives of the above mentioned ministries all present. The council together with MINFOF assembled all the required documents and sent to Yaoundé for gazettelement. The elaboration of the management plan (MP) has to come after the gazettelement. Although the elaboration of the MP was in progress, there was no gazettment yet.

The council forest classification and gazettment process can be summarized in 7 steps: Step (0) is the initiation of the process by the municipal council; (1) publishing of public notice of intention and subsequent preparation of technical note from preliminary information; (2) sensitisation of administrative authorities and local elites; (3) village to village sensitisation of the population; (4) formation of divisional classification commission headed by the SDO; (5) preparation of documents to be sent to Prime Ministry for signing; (6) documents transmitted to PM for signature; (7) decree signed and made available.

Presently, the Mundemba and Nguti councils are in step 6, where the documents are transmitted to the prime minister for signing. It is worth noting that these councils started the process since 2006 and are still awaiting positive results.

Figure 2 (Organogram) gives a brief overview of the different local institutions responsible for the acquisition and running of the CFs. It starts from bottom to top where an interested Community forms a CIG, or a VFMC. This CIG/VFMC (together with the council) subsequently follows-up the application and classification process of the CF (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012).



Source: Yufanyi Movuh (2012).

**Figure 2. CF organogram**

The forestry law (Note 18), introduced Annual Forest Royalties (AFR) payments to councils and local communities. For exploitation through a village(s) CF, the total benefits are surrendered to the council and local communities, through negotiations with the stakeholders agreeing on a benefit sharing mechanism. For Community forests, the benefits are controlled by the CIG as stated in the SMP. For Council forests, 100% of the revenue goes into the council coffers supposedly to be strictly used for development. According to the joint ministerial Order MINT-ATD/MINFI/MINFOF no. 520 of 3rd June 2010 explaining the sharing of forest revenue (Note 19), 70% of the revenue is used for development of the entire municipality while 30% is paid directly to the concerned villages for development.

In the Nguti Council forest for example, there have been discussions with villages and there is a mechanism in the sharing of revenues. 30% of the revenues is for the villages surrounding the council forest area (originally their land which they have given up to the council), 20% is going to the management of this forest and 50% is going to the council. Nothing is going to the state anymore. The Council forest law states that these forests belong to the council. FMUs allocate tax benefits as follows: 50% to the State treasury, 40% to the concerned Council and 10% to the relevant villages. From the joint ministerial order No. 520, the royalty foreseen for the council (40%) was split between the council (20%) and FEICOM (Special Fond for inter-council equipment and interventions) (20%). In the same mechanism, specialised software (GIS) can be used to calculate the areas of forest attributable to different villages as well as their timber potential, also for calculating benefits for each village.

In the last 15 years, following the limited success in implementation of the Community forest concept in the SWR in particular and Cameroon at large, donor organizations especially the German Cooperation—GTZ ProPSFE have embarked on fostering the Council forest approach (Yufanyi Movuh, 2012). It comes with the argumentation that municipal councils have a much more financial base to embark on forest management activities than village communities would. In the SWR of Cameroon, there are supposedly 18 CFs and 2 proposed Council Forests (Note 20). At the moment classification procedures are being



undertaken in the 2 Council Forests (a process which began in 2006). These CFs spread in all the 4 regions of the Technical Operation Units (TOU) (Note 21) of the SWR.

Elaborated reasons from the German Cooperation and MINFOF, for the preference of the council-managed CF model were mentioned. While the communities running the council forest model through the municipal councils have more opportunity of acquiring loans which will enable them to manage the forest, the village communities with the community forest model are less successful in the implementation of the Community forests concept in the SWR and the country at large due to financial constraints. It is argued that under the council, communities have more bargaining power and possibilities to marketing channels. Furthermore, the council forest model is more liable in creating job opportunities for youths in the municipality. For the land tenure contracts signed with the central government through MINFOF, the management convention (MC) with the council is signed for 30 years while that with the community is only 25 years, allowing communities under the municipal council through council forest model of CF communities to acquire an unlimited surface area, while in the community forest model, the communities acquire a maximum of only 5000ha.

---

## 4. Discussion and Conclusion

---

Ribot (2004), after an examination of a subset of countries (including Cameroon) implementing decentralization and devolution of forest management, concluded that, “most decentralizations are not being established in law or they are not being implemented in practice”. The forest management decentralization in Cameroon is a process defined and controlled by the central state (Oyono, 2004a, b). The results of this paper can only confirm these finding. Furthermore, the paper stresses the lengthy period of acquisition, complication and exorbitance of the whole process. Related to Community forestry, communities can apply for community forests of up to 5,000 ha, under 25 year leases, to be reviewed every 5 years (Hoare, 2006; Yufanyi Movuh, 2012). The communities are supposed to be solely responsible for the management of the forest and receive all the benefits arising from its utilization. Theoretically, a village community can apply for a community forest, which is then reserved for them by MINFOF, awaiting a SMP, which can either be approved or rejected. Practically, this process is slow, long, complex, expensive and centralized and does not lead to devolution of authority as claimed by the government and many international Organizations. Also within the scope of the 1994 Forestry law (article 21) and the current forest and environment sector program (FESP), it became imperative that local councils manage Council forests as part of the decentralization process. The German Cooperation (KfW/GFA, GIZ, Note 22) is working with other partner organizations to provide support to councils nation-wide to create and manage Council forests within their area of jurisdiction (Note 23). For Council forest an agreement is valid for 30 years (Note 24), with an unlimited land area size compared to the 5000 ha of the community forest.



If forest resource decentralization is seen as, any act by which central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions, enhancing efficiency, participation, equity, and environmental sustainability and CF meant to be forest practices which directly involves local forest users in the common decision making processes and implementation of forestry activities, then the CF models have not yet functioned as a decentralization tool. Although decentralization of local forest management and income offers the local communities an opportunity to derive livelihoods from their forests, the process has also made them to fall under the control of the state and its development partners. Through documents like forest inventories, management plans and conventions between the State and the Communities, they keep the communities abey, exercising far more authority than even before the implementation of the Forestry law of 1994. With the present CF models, the influence and power of MINFOF and their international collaborators go up, while the power of the communities to control their forest activities is reduced. Thus, the different village committees (CIGs or VFMCs), lacking effective power and sometimes totally cut off from local communities they represent, have become captive to motivations other than the good of the community or the individual forest user (Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser, 2012). At the end of the day, *ceteris paribus*, the State is still *de jure* and *de facto* owner of the land.

Finally, the natural resource policy in Cameroon is as old as Cameroon itself, but before the arrival of the first colonial administrators in the late 19th century, natural resources were managed according to the people's law or customary law; the village chiefs were the main administrators of resource management (ibid; Oyono, 2009). By creating new organizations (CIGs/VFMCs) for the local management of forest resources and benefits, rather than using indigenous institutions, the architects of decentralization have disabled the existing instruments of social regulation and cleared the way for damageable social distortions and conflicts (Oyono, 2005a). To crown it all, there are very weak enforcement institutions designed or put in place to punish or penalize defaulters of the CF regulatory implementation and no monitoring systems to evaluate the successes or failures of the decentralized forest resource management. This has made the present CF models and their



establishments, still to be seen as an instrument of decentralization and devolution.

This paper recommends that traditional and customary regulations, practices and rules should be re-evaluated to see if they would not offer a better way of local governance or managing forest resources while involving local people. For this, more research is needed.

---

## Acknowledgements

---

This research was partly funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft/DFG) *and the Open Access Publication Funds of the Georg-August-University Goettingen.*

---

## References

---

- Bikié, H., Collomb, J. G., Djomo, L., Minnemeyer, S., Ngoufo, R., & Nguiffo, S. (2000). An Overview of Logging in Cameroon. Global Forest Watch / World Resources Institute. Washington DC. Retrieved from <http://www.globalforestwatch.org/common/cameroon/english/report.pdf>
- Blaikie, P. (2006). Is Small Really Beautiful? Community-based Natural Resource Management in Malawi and Botswana. *World Development*, 34(11), 1942-1957. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.023>
- Dahal, G., & Capistrano, D. (2006). Forest governance and institutional structure: an ignored dimension of community-based forest management in the Philippines. *International Forestry Review*, 8(4), 377-394. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1505/ifor.8.4.377>
- Devkota, R. (2010). Interests and Powers as Drivers of Community Forestry: A case study of Nepal. Göttingen: University Press Göttingen.
- Etoungou, P. (2003). Decentralization viewed from inside: The implementation of community forests in East Cameroon (Working Paper No. 12). Washington, DC: *World Resources Institute*. Retrieved from [http://pdf.wri.org/ea\\_etoungou.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/ea_etoungou.pdf)
- FAO. (1992). CF Note 7: Community Forestry: Ten Years in Review. Revised edition prepared by J. E. M. Arnold. *Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*, Rome, 1992.
- Glück, P., Rayner, J., Cashore, B., Agarwal, A., Bernstein, S., Capistrano, D., ... Pleschberger, W. (2005). Changes in the governance of forests resources. In G. Mery, R. Alfaro, M. Kaninen, & M. Lobovikov (Eds), *Forests in the Global Balance: Changing Paradigms. IUFRO World Series*, Vol. 17. Helsinki: *International Union of Forest Research Organizations*. Retrieved from [http://www.iufro.org/download/file/6981/153/ws17intro\\_pdf/](http://www.iufro.org/download/file/6981/153/ws17intro_pdf/)



- Hoare, A. L. (2006). Divided Forests: Towards fairer zoning of forest lands. A report produced for the Rainforest Foundation UK. Retrieved from <http://rainforestfoundationuk.org/files/Divided%20Forests.pdf>
- IUCN. (1992). Conservation Atlas of Tropical Forests. Africa. IUCN, Gland, Suisse.
- Larson, A. M. (2005). Democratic decentralization in the forestry sector: *lessons learned from Africa, Asia and Latin America*. In C. J. Colfer, & D. Capistrano (Eds), *The Politics of Decentralization- Forests, Power and People* (pp. 32-62). London: Earthscan.
- Mambo Okenye. (2004). Community Forest in the South West Province of Cameroon. Lessons Learned Opportunities, Successes and Constraints. GTZ-PGDRN, SW Antenna. Retrieved from [http://data.cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18\\_64\\_07.pdf](http://data.cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18_64_07.pdf)
- Mambo Okenye. (2006). PSMNR- in Cameroon Feasibility study on creation of Council Forests in the South West Province. Mission Report for GTZ-PGDRN, Buea September 2006. Retrieved from [http://data.cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18\\_61\\_127.pdf](http://data.cameroun-foret.com/system/files/18_61_127.pdf)
- Mandondo, A. (2003). Snapshot Views of International Community Forestry Networks: *Cameroon Country Study*, CIFOR/Ford Foundation, March 2003. Retrieved from [http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf\\_files/CF/Cameroon\\_CF.pdf](http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/CF/Cameroon_CF.pdf)
- McDermott, M. H., & Schreckenber, K. (2009). Equity in community forestry: insights from North and South. *International Forestry Review*, 11(2), 157-170. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1505/ifer.11.2.157>
- Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press, New York. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807763>
- Oyono P. R. (2004a). Institutional deficit, representation, and decentralized forest management in Cameroon. Elements of natural resource sociology for social theory and public policy. *Environmental Governance in Africa, Working Paper No. 15*, Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Retrieved from [http://pdf.wri.org/ea\\_wp15.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/ea_wp15.pdf)
- Oyono, P. R. (2004b). One step forward, two steps back? Paradoxes of natural resource management decentralization in Cameroon. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42(1), 91-111. Cambridge: University Press. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X03004488>
- Oyono, P. R. (2005a), Profiling local-level outcomes of environmental decentralizations:

- The case of Cameroon's forests in the Congo Basin. *Journal of Environment and Development*, 14(3), 317-337. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1070496505276552>
- Oyono, P. R. (2005b). The Foundations of the Conflict de Langage over Land and Forests in Southern Cameroon. *African Study Monographs*, 26(3), 115-144. Retrieved from [http://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/68242/1/ASM\\_26\\_115.pdf](http://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/68242/1/ASM_26_115.pdf)
- Oyono, P. R. (2009). New niches of community rights to forests in Cameroon: tenure reform, decentralization category or something else? *International Journal of Social Forestry (IJSF)*, 2(1), 1-23. ISSN 1979-2611. Retrieved from [http://www.ijsf.org/dat/art/vol02/ijsf\\_vol2\\_no1\\_01\\_oyono\\_community\\_rights\\_cameroon.pdf](http://www.ijsf.org/dat/art/vol02/ijsf_vol2_no1_01_oyono_community_rights_cameroon.pdf)
- Republic of Cameroon (RoC). (1994). Law N° 94/01 of January 1994, establishing forestry, wildlife and fisheries regulations. Yaoundé, Cameroon: Imprimerie Nationale.
- République du Cameroun. (1995). Décret No. 95/531 du 23 Août 1995 Portant Application du Régime des Forêts [Decree No. 95/531 of August 1995 laying down the implementation of the Forestry Law]. Yaoundé, Cameroon: Imprimerie Nationale.
- Ribot, J. C. (2004). Waiting for democracy: The politics of choice in natural resource decentralization. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Retrieved from [http://pdf.wri.org/wait\\_for\\_democracy.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/wait_for_democracy.pdf)
- Ribot, J. C. (2009). Authority over Forests: Empowerment and Subordination in Senegal's Democratic Decentralization. *Development and Change*, 40(1), 105-129. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01507.x>
- Schnell, R., Hill, P., & Esser, E. (2005). *Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung*, 7. Auflage, München (Oldenburg).
- Schusser, C., Krott, M., Devkota, R., Maryudi, A., Salla, M., & Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2012). Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research. *Allgemeine Forest und Jagdzeitung (AFJZ)*, 183(3/4), 75-83.
- Sobze, J. M. (2003). Analysis of implication of forest policy reform on CF in Cameroon: Case study of Lomié. Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag. WRI. (2007). Interactive Forestry Atlas Of Cameroon, An Overview (Version 2.0). A world resources institute report prepared in collaboration with the Cameroon Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife. ISBN 1-56973-632-4 Retrieved from [http://pdf.wri.org/gfw\\_cameroon\\_atlas\\_v2\\_english.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/gfw_cameroon_atlas_v2_english.pdf)





Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2008). Community-Based Biodiversity Conservation Management: Reaching the Goal of Biodiversity Conservation and Community Development, *Master's Thesis, 2007*, München: GRIN Publishing.

Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2012). The Colonial heritage and post-Colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry by the example of Cameroon. *Forest Policy and Economics, 15*, 70-77. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2011.05.004>

Yufanyi Movuh, M. C., & Schusser, C. (2012). Power, The hidden factor in Development Cooperation. An example of Community Forestry in Cameroon. *Open Journal of Forestry, 2*(4), 240-251. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030>  
<http://cameroun-foret.com/governance/forest-royalties-transferred-councils>



---

## Notes

---

### Summary of some logging Titles in Cameroon (Bikié et al. 2000; RoC, 1994; WRI, 2007)

Community Forests	Established under the 1994 forest code, community forests are areas within the Non-Permanent Forest Domain zoned for use by village communities. With technical assistance from the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife.s ( <i>Ministère des Forêts et de la Faune</i> . MINFOF) Community Forestry Unit ( <i>Sous Direction aux Forêts Communautaires – SDFC</i> ), a village community seeking a forest title identifies a zone not exceeding 5,000 ha and drafts a simple management plan for approval by MINFOF. Proceeds from community forest management are used for community development projects.
Council Forests	Areas zoned within the Permanent Forest Domain and managed according to an approved management plan. The objectives of a council forest, along with its final boundaries, are established during the official classification process. Once allocated, these forests become the private property of a council; however, the commune must abide by the management plan in order to retain title to the forest area.
FMU	Forest Management Unit: Created under the 1994 forest code, FMUs are forest management units zoned within the Permanent Forest Domain (i.e., forests that are zoned for biodiversity conservation and sustainable management). They are allocated by a competitive bidding process for a 15-year period and require a forest management plan approved by the relevant administrative authority. (The corresponding term in French for FMU is <i>Unité Forestière d.Aménagement</i> . UFA.)
Forest Concessions	Singly managed units, which may include one or more FMUs, not to exceed 200,000 ha. SSV . Sales of Standing Volume: SSVs are typically zoned within the Non-Permanent Forest Domain (i.e., forests zoned for timber extraction, agricultural, mining, and other uses), but they can also be allocated to nationals within the Permanent Forest Domain. SSVs are allocated by a competitive bidding process for a maximum of 3 years, are not to exceed 2,500 ha, and do not require a management plan. (The corresponding term in French for SSV is <i>Ventes de Coupe</i> . VC.)



Note 1. Cameroon forestry law definition of CF: A community forest is “a forest forming part of the non-permanent forest estate, which is covered by a management agreement between a village community and the Forestry Administration. Management of such forest – which should not exceed 5,000 ha – is the responsibility of the village community concerned, with the help or technical assistance of the Forestry Administration.” *Source: Article 3(11) of Decree 95/531/PM of 23 August 1995.*

Note 2. The Community Forestry Working Group (CFWG) in Germany, within the Chair for Forest and Nature Conservation Policy of the University in Goettingen.

Note 3. PSMNR-SWR: Program for the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the South West Region.

Note 4. These numbers have been adjusted to suit the actual statistical analysis of this paper. Originally in 2009, 19 Community Forests and 6 proclaimed council forest areas were identified.

Note 5. This was done through the snowball method. It is a typical way to analyse networks.

Note 6. There are four types of legal entities recommended to rural organizations, to be officially recognized and to be institutionalized actors in the community forest process: i) the common initiative group (CIG); ii) the association (Ass); iii) the economic interest group (EIG); and iv) the cooperative.

Note 7. Forming of an entity or Common Initiative Group—CIG (this is one of the foremost steps of the village: it has to be organized as a legal entity, creating an Association, a CIG or other forms of association since the government does not deal with individuals.

Note 8. Natural boundaries are rivers, streams, settlements, mountains; permanent geographical features. Note 9. Collective convention means that every village has its own area in the CF.

Note 10. the written minutes of the consultation meeting or assembly. Note 11. The district representative of MINFOF.

Note 12. The RIGC Project (also a MINFOF project) is a project assisting communities managing community forests, especially in drawing up SMPs and carrying out some training and providing them with basic equipments like chainsaws in the form of a loan, expecting that when the community is operational, then they refund the money for others to use. They are based in Yaoundé.



Note 13. The Provisional Convention gives the rights to the Community to exploit 200m<sup>3</sup> timber from the forest to finance the elaboration of their MP.

Note 14. SMP is valid for 5 years (and has to be revised after every 5 years) whereas the Management Convention (protocol of agreement between the community and the State) or Management Agreement is valid for 25 years.

Note 15. AAP is to be approved every year by MINFOF.

Note 16. Village Forest Management Communities (VFMC) is a committee created at the village level to ensure a participatory approach in the management of the forest resources of that village. It is created in all the villages concerned with the Council Forest and is an 8 member committee per village.

Note 17. The Ikondo Kondo village had for a long time applied for its own community forest. After about eight years, it was rejected and later included in the Mundemba council forest. The problem was supposedly later resolved and the area reserved for community forest became part of the council forest.

Note 18. The law no. 94/01 of 20 January 1994 on forestry, wildlife and fisheries regulations.

Note 19. MINTAD/MINFI/MINFOF Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization/Ministry of Finance/Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife.

Note 20. To repeat again, all these were just on paper or on maps. Some are just reserved forests with no Management Plan, Management Agreement or Management Convention.

Note 21. A TOU is a given geographic space (a given ecosystem or an ecologically fragile zone) which is selected due to its socio-economic, ecological, cultural and political importance with the benchmark strongly conforming to the development of an integrated management of natural resources and sustainable development based on an arrangement that assures the sustainable use of the resources by all stakeholders concerned. It is elaborated within the framework of component N° 3 of the PSFE, and component N°2 of the PSMNR-Cameroon (PGDRN).

Note 22. These different Organisations have and represent different interests within the PSMNR-SWR although they want to be seen as representing the same interest.

Note 23. Examples of support are the Nguti and Mundemba Councils in the SWR.

Note 24. The Management Agreement has a rotation period of 30 years and is renewable.





---

## Curriculum Vitae

---

Mbolo C. Yufanyi Movuh

Warthestr. 9  
D-12051 Berlin, Germany  
Tel.: +49 (0) 170-8788124  
Email: cyufani@gwdg.de

P.O. Box 613, Limbe  
Southwest Region, Cameroon  
Tel: (237) 75708785 / (237) 55745675  
Email: cyufani@gwdg.de



**Date/ Place of birth:** 11/03/1974, Victoria-Limbe, Cameroon

**Parents:** Joseph Movuh (deceased)  
Anna Movuh (deceased)

**Family Status:** Married

**Children:** 2



## Academic Education

- 04/2013 **Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D): Forest Development Policy**  
Georg-August University Goettingen, Chair of Forest- and Nature Conservation Policy (Professur für Forst- und Naturschutzpolitik), Büsgenweg 3, 37077 Goettingen, Germany
- 2012/2013 **PhD dissertation: Power: a driving factor of Forest Policy in Cameroon—Example of Community Forestry.**
- 07/2008–04/2013 PhD candidate and associate researcher at the Georg-August University Goettingen, Chair of Forest—and Nature Conservation Policy
- 08/2007 Masters Degree (M.Sc.) in Forest sciences and Forest Ecology (Tropical and International Forest sciences), Faculty of Forest sciences and Forest Ecology, Georg-August University Goettingen, Germany
- 01/2007–06/2007 Masters Degree (M.Sc.) dissertation with original title, “Community-based biodiversity conservation management - Reaching the goal of biodiversity conservation and community development”
- 09/2004–06/2007 Masters Degree (M.Sc.) studies in Tropical and International Forest sciences, Georg-August University Goettingen, Germany
- 10/2001–03/2005 Bachelors Degree (B.Sc.) studies in Forest sciences and Forest Ecology, Georg-August University Goettingen, Germany
- 01/1999–10/2001 Residence in Germany; acquisition of certificate for German language skills for higher education (Deutsche Sprache für Hochschule—DSH), in Goettingen





- 06/1996–12/1998 Assistant business coordinator—NUNU Brothers Enterprise, Limbe–Idenau, Cameroon
- 09/1994–05/1996 Yaoundé I University—Faculty of Natural Sciences, Biochemistry Department
- 09/1992–06/1994 Advance-Levels, Saint Joseph's College, Sasse/Buea, Cameroon
- 09/1987 – 06/1992 Ordinary-Levels, Sacred Heart College, Mankon/Bamenda, Cameroon



## Academic Publications:

### **Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2013)**

Analyzing the Establishment of Community Forestry (CF) and its processes. Examples from the South West Region of Cameroon. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol 6, No. 1, p. 76-89. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v6n1p76>.

### **Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. and Schusser, C. (2012)**

Power, the Hidden Factor in Development Cooperation. An Example of Community Forestry in Cameroon - *Open Journal of Forestry*, Vol. 02, No. 04, p. 240-251. <Http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojf.2012.24030>

### **Yufanyi Movuh, M.C., Krott, M. (2012)**

The Colonial heritage and post-Colonial influence, entanglements and implications of the concept of community forestry by the example of Cameroon, *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol. 15, pp. 70-77

### **Schusser, C., Krott, M., Devkota, R., Maryudi, A., Salla, M., Yufanyi Movuh, M., C. (2012)**

Sequence Design of Quantitative and Qualitative Surveys for Increasing Efficiency in Forest Policy Research. *AFJZ*, Vol. 183(3/4), 75-83

### **Maryudi, A., Devkota, R., Schusser C., Yufanyi Movuh, M., C., Salla, M., Aurenhammer, H., et al. (2012)**

Back to basics: Considerations in evaluating the outcomes of community forestry. *Forest Policy and Economics*, Vol. 820, pp. 2-3

### **Yufanyi Movuh, M. C. (2008)**

Community-Based Biodiversity Conservation Management: Reaching the Goal of Biodiversity Conservation and Community Development, Master's Thesis, 2007, München: GRIN Publishing.



## Work experience

- 08/2008 to date **Research at the Georg-August University Goettingen, Germany** Extensive research on the PhD Project „Understanding stakeholders’ interest and power in the context of Community Forestry in Cameroon“, with empirical and theoretical results. In-depth research analysis on developing a theoretical model of the Power processes in „Community Forestry“ in Cameroon in correlation with practical empirical results
- 01/1999 to date **Member of The VOICE Forum Germany** Voluntary and philanthropic engagement in the Refugee and Migrant Organization – The VOICE Refugee Forum, Germany. Since 2004, Chairman of the NGO „Fördervereins The VOICE e.V., Göttingen (Co-founder in 2003).
- 2004–2012 Studies relevant scholarship sponsored by the Hans-Boeckler-Foundation, Germany.
- 07/2006–10/2006 **Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) – District office, Idenau, SW region, Cameroon** Studies relevant internship and data collection for Masters (M.Sc.) thesis in and around the communities of the Korup National park, Cameroon, sponsored by the Hans-Boeckler-Foundation, Germany.
- 11/2005–12/2005 **Mekong River Commission, Vientiane, Laos** Studies relevant project in connection with the German Technical Service (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit—GTZ); Completed a Baseline study: Cost-Benefit-Analysis of five different Land-use types
- 10/2002 – 01/2003 **District Forestry Administration (Forstamt) Bovenden, Goettingen** Internship – Forest administration and ecology



## Languages

**English** (fluent in spoken and written)

**French** (fluent in spoken and written)

**German** (fluent in spoken and written)

**Spanish** (Basic knowledge)

Limbe, 1<sup>st</sup>. July 2013

Yufanyi Movuh

